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INTRODUCTION
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU'

The Denver Journalof InternationalLaw and Policy does the legal
community a great service by providing a report on the significant recent rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The dedication of
the Journal's student staff to this undertaking is important not only to
their individual legal education, but also to the general enterprise of
transborder law-making and legality. Under the able leadership of Professor Ved Nanda, the University of Denver and the Denver Journalof
InternationalLaw and Policy have made a significant contribution to
the study of international law and the elaboration of a world law and
legal process.
The reconciliation of national law with a transborder standard is at
the heart of the European enterprise to create an integrated legal process. Such reconciliation is also necessary to establish a unified political
community with common core values. The various cases that are analyzed in this issue address critical questions of law and policy, and demonstrate the court's progress in elaborating a communitarian practice in
the various subject areas.
From the perspective of an academic observer of legal processes,
the content of this issue affirms the notion that the European Union is
the great contemporary repository of comparative law analysis and doctrine. In its decisional law, the ECJ has the delicate task of building a
bridge between the European Community Treaty (EC Treaty), Community directives, and the substantive norms that reign in national legal
systems. The final result cannot simply be an eclectic amalgam of
rules, but rather, it must be a statement of organic principles that reflect an autonomous communitarian position acceptable to constituent
members and to the unifying dictates of the EC Treaty. The work of the
ECJ is difficult and important. It is also unique and essential to the
development of global law and legal practice.
In the cases that are studied, the ECJ rendered preliminary rulings
on previously unresolved issues of Community law. The ECJ has the
power under Article 177 of the EC Treaty to issue preliminary rulings
1. C.J. Morrow Professor of Law and Director, Eason-Weinmann Center for Comparative Law, Tulane Law School.
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on questions of Community law presented to a national court. 2 The
preliminary ruling has a binding effect on the national courts, which in
turn implement the decision into their own decisional law. Ideally, this
process provides for the uniform interpretation of Community law and
is necessary for its uniform application. Questions regarding protection of television and radio broadcasters' rights, the free movement of
persons between and among Member States, state monopolies of employment placement offices, gender-based discrimination in employment, and protection of the image of a luxury perfume for trademark
purposes-have all been recently presented to the ECJ, and are analyzed
in this issue.
I. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF TELEVISION BROADCASTERS

On June 4, 1997, the ECJ decided a case concerning an English
television broadcaster's right to broadcast in Belgium. 3 The decision affects broadcasters throughout the Community who are subject to the
television and radio directive contained in the EC Treaty. VT4, a
broadcasting company incorporated under the laws of England, transmitted programs via satellite from the United Kingdom to Belgium. 4
The Flemish Minister for Culture and Brussels Affairs refused cable access to VT4. Belgian national legislation provides that the Flemish Executive can only license one entity to broadcast to the Flemish community. 5 A license had already been issued to VTM, a Belgian company,
resulting in a virtual monopoly in commercial television and radio ad6
vertising for VTM.
The television directive in the EC Treaty provides that each Member State must ensure that all television broadcasts within its jurisdiction comply with the law applicable to broadcasts intended for the public of that Member State. 7 The ECJ addressed the question of which
Member State had jurisdiction over VT4. The ECJ cited the wellestablished rule that a television broadcaster comes under the jurisdiction of the state in which it was established.8 The ECJ noted that "establishment" had been consistently held to involve actual pursuit of an
economic activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period.
Therefore, when a broadcaster has an establishment in more than one
Member State, the Member State with jurisdiction is the state where

2. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
3. Case C-56/96, VT4 Ltd. v. Vlaamse Gemeenschap, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder]
CEC (CCH) 1,309 (1997).
4. Id. at 1,320.
5. Id. at 1,320-21.
6. Id. at 1,320.
7. Id. at 1,321.
8. Id. at 1,322.
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the broadcaster has the center of its activities-in particular, the place
where decisions concerning the program policy are made and where the
final mixing and processing of the programs takes place. The national
court can take other criteria into account: the head office of the broadcaster, the place where decisions concerning program schedules are
made, the place where the programs are finally mixed and processed,
and the place where a significant part of the workforce is employed. 9 If
the issue remains unresolved after this analysis, the Member State
where the television broadcaster began transmission activities in the
technical sense has jurisdiction. 10

II. FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN AND AMONG MEMBER STATES
On May 29, 1997, the ECJ interpreted Article 164 of the EC Treaty
and certain provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention).1"
Freidrich
Kremzow, an Austrian citizen, was found guilty of murder by an Austrian court. On appeal and in Kremzow's absence, the appeals court
changed the sentence from placement in a psychiatric hospital to life
imprisonment. 12 After the European Court of Human Rights concluded
that the Austrian Appeals Court breached Article 6 of the Convention,
Kremzow sought damages for the appellate court's actions. 13 The ECJ
agreed that the fundamental right of freedom of the person was at issue
in the case; however, it rejected Kremzow's argument that his incarceration infringed upon his freedom of movement. 14 The court stated
that, while deprivation of liberty may impede a person from exercising
his right to free movement, a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising
that right does not establish sufficient connection with Community law
to justify application of Community provisions. 15 The ECJ held that the
national legislation in question did not fall within the scope of Community law; therefore, it could not give the interpretative guidance necessary to determine whether the national legislation conformed to fundamental community rights. 16
The decision evidences the lack of effective Community law governing the protection of human rights. The ECJ gave great deference to
the authority of national criminal laws, and refused to recognize the

9. Id.
10. Id. at 1,322-23.
11. Case C-299/95 Kremzow v. Republik Osterreich, 3 C.M.L.R. 2637 (1997).
12. Id. at 2640.
13. Id. at 2640-41. Article 6 guarantees the right to a personal defense. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
14. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2646.
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impediment upon the freedom of movement. Ultimately, the ECJ ignored the European Court of Human Rights' decision that Kremzow's
human rights were violated. This decision severely limits the human
rights protections available to wrongly convicted criminals in Member
States.

III. PUBLIC GRANT OF MONOPOLY FOR EMPLOYMENT PLACEMENT
OFFICERS

On December 11, 1997, the ECJ issued an opinion concerning a decision by the Tribunale Civile e Penale, in which the Italian court refused to confirm the document establishing Job Center Co-Op ARL (Job
Center). 17 Job Center is an employment placement center and, under
Italian law, private placement centers are prohibited. The state and its
entities have the exclusive legal right to engage in job placement activities.18
The ECJ considered whether public job placement offices were undertakings within the meaning of Articles 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty. 19
The ECJ concluded that they were, because providing employment is an
economic activity that is subject to competition rules. 20 The market for
supplying employee placement services is extensive and extremely diverse. 2 1 It covers all sectors of production and involves a wide range of
jobs.22 Limiting the exercise of these functions to public agencies, however, could make it impossible to respond to a significant portion of the
market demand. 23 The ECJ found that, by establishing a state monopoly, the Member State creates a situation in which the provision of the
service is limited-circumstances that are contrary to Article 86, if the
state agency is manifestly unable to satisfy the market demand. 24 Accordingly, a Member State violates Article 90(1) when it creates a situation in which its agencies cannot avoid infringing upon Article 86 of the
25
EC Treaty.
IV. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION

On February 17, 1998, the ECJ ruled on a case concerning equal

17. Case C-55/96, Job Center Coop ARL, 4 C.M.L.R. 708 (1998), CELEX LEXIS
[1997], at *1.

18. Id. at *21.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *22-23.
at *26.
at *25.

at *25-26.
at *26.
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pay for men and women. 26 Lisa Grant signed an employment contract
with SouthWest Trains, which contained a clause granting reduced rate
travel concessions to the legal spouse and dependents of the employee.
Privilege tickets were also granted to a common law spouse of the oppo27
site sex, if a meaningful relationship existed for at least two years.
SWT refused to afford a travel concession to the same-sex partner of
Grant, stating that travel concessions could only be granted to a part28
ner of the opposite sex.
The ECJ noted that it had already decided travel concessions were
considered "pay."29 Further, the ECJ stated that the refusal to grant
travel concessions was not discriminatory because the conditions for
granting them applied equally to male and female employees. Travel
concessions would be refused to the male partner of a male employee
and to a female partner of a female employee. 30 Community law, according to the ECJ, does not view stable same-sex relationships in the
same light as those between persons of the same sex. 31 Joining the
European Court of Human Rights, the ECJ noted that the prohibition
against gender-based discrimination does not extend to matters of sexual orientation. 32 The ECJ held that a refusal by an employer to allow
travel concessions to a person who is the same-sex partner of an employee, when such concessions are allowed to an employee's spouse or to
a person of the opposite sex witi whom a worker has a stable relationship outside marriage, does not constitute discrimination under the EC
Treaty. 33 The ECJ noted, however, that changing times might eventu34
ally dictate a different policy.
V.

PROTECTION OF TRADEMARKS BY THE OWNER OF THE TRADEMARK

On November 4, 1997, the ECJ issued a preliminary ruling concerning the Uniform Benelux Law on TradeMarks. 35 Christian Dior entered into distribution contracts with entities in various Member States
to distribute its products. 36 Kruidvat, a Dutch importer of Dior, promoted Dior perfumes by using depictions of Dior bottles in leaflets. Dior
brought an action against Kruidvat, alleging that Kruidvat violated the

26. Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains, Ltd., 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) 193.
27. Id. 1 5.
28. Id. 1 8.
29. Id. 1 14.
30. Id. 11 27-28.
31. Id. 1 35.
32. Id. 1 33.
33. Id. 1 50.
34. Id. 1 48.
35. Case 337/95 Parfums Christian Dior SA & Parfumes Christian Dior BV v. Evora
BV,1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 4641.
36. Id. at 107.
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Benelux trademark law by publishing the images in their leaflets. 37
The general rule in Community law is that when the owner of the
trademark places or consents to placing trademark goods on the market, the retailer is free to make use of the trademark to commercialize
the goods. 38 Under Benelux law, the owner of a trademark can object to
a retailer's advertising if the latter creates the impression that the retailer's business is identified with the product, thereby taking advantage of the reputation and goodwill associated with the trademark. 39
The ECJ held that the owner of a trademark or copyright may not object to a retailer's use of the trademark or copyright when the retailer is
engaged in the business of selling goods that are similar to those of the
trademark owner and the advertising techniques in question are common to the trade. 40 To successfully thwart the retailer's conduct in
these circumstances, the trademark owner must establish that the use
of the goods for that purpose seriously damages their reputation. 41
As to trademarks for prestigious luxury perfumes, the ECJ recognized that the trademarks might symbolize and stand as a guarantee of
the consumer expectations associated to the goods.4 2 Retail advertising
that detracts from these expectations can damage the trademark. 43 Accordingly, a trademark owner can prevent such advertising if s/he can
establish a risk of significant damage to the trademark interest. The
ECJ listed several factors that national courts should assess in evaluating whether a risk of significant damage has been shown; all indicated that establishing the existence of such a risk is a difficult and
burdensome process. 44 The ECJ shifted the burden to trademark owners because, as a general rule, they should not be able to object to respectable advertising by respectable retailers even when some damage
is done to the image associated with the trademark.
CONCLUSION

National courts continue to seek clarification on Community law
from the ECJ. These requests mandate that the ECJ balance Community laws with Member States' regulatory rights in the affected areas.
This is a delicate task of comparative law and comparative politics. It
sometimes requires the ECJ to sidestep some critical issues (at least
partially). As national decisional law develops more radical conflicts

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 112.
at 95.
at 92.
at 103.
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with Community law, the ECJ, however, will be forced to take a more
direct stand on sensitive questions-for the sake of providing the EU
with the necessary substantive uniformity. At this conjuncture, the full
implications of transborder and globalized law for national sovereignty
and law will be realized.

VT4 LTD. V. VLAAMSE GEMEENSCHAP: COURT OF
JUSTICE RULING HERALDS NEW AGE OF
EUROPEAN BROADCAST AND ADVERTISING
DEREGULATION
KEITH TRAMMEL*

I. INTRODUCTION

VT4 Ltd. v. Vlaamse Gemeenschap (VT4) is the latest in a series of
European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions announcing the end of strict
national regulation of television markets in EC Member States. VT4
clarifies the earlier ECJ decision, Commission v. United Kingdom,
which held that broadcasters come under the jurisdiction of the state in
which they are established. In so doing, VT4 sharpens the distinction
that Commission v. Belgium and the Joined Cases E8/94 and E9/94
have drawn between EC Member State's regulatory obligations under
Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Television Directive. Although the Television
Directive purports to require only minimal deregulation, the ECJ has
left EC countries little alternative other than to embark upon wholesale
deregulation of national television broadcast and advertising markets.
This deregulation inevitably extends far beyond even the minimal provisions contained in the Television Directive and heralds a resounding
victory for proponents of a single broadcast market in Europe.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
VT4 arose from Belgium's (the Flemish Community) refusal to
grant VT4 Ltd. permission to broadcast television programming on
Flemish cable networks.' VT4 Ltd. is a television broadcasting company established and licensed in London under British law. 2 The company operates a branch office in Flanders, where it conducts advertising

Keith Trammell is a third year law student at the University of Denver College of
Law, received his B.A. in Political Science/International Affairs, Summa Cum Laude,
from the University of Colorado at Boulder, and in 2000 will join Holme Roberts & Owen,
LLP as a Commercial Law and Securities Associate.
1. Case C-56/96, VT4 Ltd. v. Vlaamse Gemeenschap, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder]
CEC (CCH) 1,309 (1997).
2. Id. at 1,312.
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negotiations. Since February 1, 1995, VT4 Ltd. has broadcast programs
via satellite from the UK exclusively to the Dutch-speaking Flemish
3
public in Belgium.
VT4 Ltd.'s attempt to access the Belgian cable network directly
challenged the cable monopoly that Belgium's Cultural Ministry had
previously granted to the privately owned Vlaamse Televisie Maatschappij NV (VTM). Under this monopoly, VTM enjoys exclusive
rights to broadcast television advertising in Belgium's Flemish commu4
nity.
Flemish legislation authorizing the grant of this monopoly was consolidated by the Decree of the Government of the Flemish Community
of 25 January 1995, later ratified by the Decree of the Council of the
Flemish Community of 23 February 1995 (the Codex). 5 The Codex incorporates provisions of the earlier Decree of 28 January 1987 Concerning the Retransmission of Radio and Television Programs on the
6
Radio and Television Cable Networks (the 1987 Decree).
Pursuant to Article 80, paragraph 2 of the Codex, "the Flemish
Government may authorize only one of the broadcasters belonging to it
or approved by it to broadcast commercial and non-commercial advertising aimed at the Flemish Community as a whole."7 In addition, Article 41, point 1 of the Codex stipulates that "only one private broadcaster
may be authorized by the Flemish Government to broadcast to the entire Flemish community."8 To be eligible for this government authorization, Article 44(1) of the Codex requires that publishers of Dutchlanguage newspapers and magazines subscribe 51 % of the broadcaster's capital. 9 Article 39(2) of the Codex incorporates the provision of
the 1987 Decree requiring government-authorized broadcasters to locate their head offices in either Flanders or Brussels. 10 Together, these
provisions permit only one private company having its head office in
Flanders or Brussels, and 51 % of whose capital is held by Dutchlanguage publishers to broadcast from Belgium all television advertis-

3. Commission Decision of 26 June 1997 97/606/EC pursuant to Article 90(3) of the
EC Treaty on the Exclusive Right to Broadcast Television Advertising in Flanders, 1 10,
1997 O.J. (L 244) (visited June 1, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/cj/index.html> [hereinafter
Commission Decision of June 26, 1997].
3.
4. Id.
5. VT4 Ltd., [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] CEC (CCH) at 1,312 (quoting BELGISCH
STAATSBLADJMONITEUR BELGE, May 30, 1995, at 15,058)(corrected in BELGISCH, Oct. 30,
1995, p.30,555).
6. VT4 Ltd., [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] CEC (CCH) at 1,311 (quoting BELGISCH
STAATSBLADJMONITEUR BELGE, Mar. 19, 1987, at 4,196).
7. Commission Decision of 26 June 1997, supra note 3, 11.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.

1999

VT4 LTD. v. VLAAMSE GEMEENSCHAP

ing targeted at the Flemish community. As a consequence of the 1987
Decree and relevant provisions of the Codex, VTM is the only private
television company authorized by the Flemish Cultural Ministry to
broadcast Dutch-language television programming and advertising to
the entire Flemish community."
The Flemish Cultural Ministry regulates transmissions over Belgium's radio and cable television networks. The Cultural Ministry's
current cable regulations appear in the Flemish "Executive Decree of 4
May 1994 on Television and Radio Cable Networks, referred to as the
"Cable Decree."'12 Article 10(1), number 2 of the Cable Decree prohibits
the operation of cable distribution networks and forbids modification to
any programming without the prior authorization of the Flemish Executive. 13 Article 10(2), number 4 of the Cable Decree provides that a
cable distributor may retransmit "[tielevision and radio programs of
broadcasters licensed by the government of a [Miember [S]tate of the
European Union other than Belgium, provided that the broadcaster
concerned is subject, in that [Miember [S]tate, to proper supervision of
14
broadcasters broadcasting to the public of that [Miember [S]tate."'
Pursuant to Cable Decree Articles 10(1), number 2, and 10(2),
number 4, VT4 Ltd. requested permission from the Flemish Cultural
Ministry to broadcast on Belgium's cable television distribution network. Prior to requesting such access, VT4 Ltd. had obtained a license
from the UK to broadcast Dutch-language programming via satellite
from British territory to Belgium. 15
The Minister of Cultural Affairs refused VT4 Ltd.'s request for access, giving two reasons for its decision. First, the Cultural Minister
regards VT4 Ltd. as outside the scope of the Cable Decree because VT4
Ltd. is not licensed by Belgium to broadcast to the Flemish Community.' 6 Only VTM is authorized to broadcast cable programs to the
Flemish Community.' 7 Second, Flemish authorities do not consider
VT4 Ltd. a broadcaster subject to the broadcasting and licensing laws of
another Member State. Instead, Belgium considers VT4 Ltd. a Flemish
broadcaster established in the UK merely to circumvent Flemish regulations. For these reasons, by Ministerial Order, VT4 Ltd. was refused
access to the Flemish cable network.' 8 The Belgian Raad van State
11. Id.
12. VT4 Ltd., [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] CEC (CCH) at 1,312 (quoting BELGISCH
STAATSBLADJMONITEUR BELGE, June 4, 1994, at 15,434).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Commission Decision of 26 June 1997, supra note 3, 10.
16. VT4 Ltd., [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] CEC (CCH) at 1,312-13.
17. Commission Decision of 26 June 1997, supra note 3, 10.
18. Id. (quoting the Order of the Flemish Minister for Cultural Affairs and for Brussels of Jan. 16 1995).
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(Conseil d'Etat) intervened by suspending the Ministerial Order and referred the matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling to determine
which Member State enjoys jurisdiction over VT4 Ltd. under the Television Without Frontiers Directive (Television Directive). 19
The ECJ answered the Raad van State's request for a preliminary
ruling, holding that under Article 2(1)20 of the Television Directive, the
jurisdiction of a Member State is based on a broadcaster's connection to
a Member State's legal system. 2 1 The ECJ held that a broadcaster's
connection to a state's legal system "overlaps the concept of establishment as used in art. 59 of the EC Treaty."22 Thus, Articles 2(1) and
3(2)23 of the Television Directive are understood "as meaning that a
television broadcaster comes under the jurisdiction of the [Member
[S]tate where it is established." 24 If a television broadcaster is established in more than one Member State, jurisdiction resides with the
Member State in whose territory the broadcaster performs its central
activities, in particular, where the broadcaster formulates program
25
policy and makes final assembly of its programs prior to transmission.
The ECJ also emphasized that the mere fact that VT4 Ltd. broad-

19. Commission Decision of 26 June 1997, supranote 3, 1 10. The Television Without
Frontiers Directive constitutes the legal framework for television broadcasting in
Europe's internal market. Council Directive 89/552, 1989 OJ (L 298) 23 [hereinafter
Television Directive]. Under Article 185 of the EC Treaty, the Television Directive binds
all EC Member States. Each member state must ensure that all broadcasters under that
state's jurisdiction comply with the Television Directive and the state's own broadcasting
laws. Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem, The BroadcastingActivities of the European Community
and Their Implications for National BroadcastingSystems in Europe 16 HASTINGS INT'L a
COMP. L. REV. 599, 607 (1993).
20. Article 2(1) provides:
Each Member State shall ensure that all television broadcasts transmitted:
- by broadcasters under its jurisdiction; or
- by broadcasters who, while not being under the jurisdiction of any
Member State, make use of a frequency or a satellite capacity granted by, or
a satellite up-link situated in, that Member State,
comply with the law applicable to broadcasts intended for the public in that
Member State.
Television Directive, supra note 19, art. 2(1).
21. VT4 Ltd., [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] CEC (CCH) at 1,321.
22. Id. Article 59 of the EC Treaty specifically provides that restrictions on freedom
to provide services within the Community shall be progressively abolished during the
transitional period in respect to nationals of Member States who are established in a
State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.
See, TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 59, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573 (1992).
23 'Member States shall, by appropriate means, ensure, within the framework of
their legislation, that television broadcasters under their jurisdiction comply with the
provisions of this Directive." Television Directive, supranote 21, art. 3(2).
24. VT4 Ltd., [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] CEC (CCH) at 1,322.
25. Id.
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casts programs and advertising exclusively for a Flemish audience does
26
not by itself demonstrate that VT4 Ltd. is not established in the UK.
In the ECJ's view, the EC Treaty "does not prohibit an undertaking
from exercising the freedom to provide services [in a foreign state] if it
does not offer services in the [Member [S]tate in which it is estab27
lished."
III. RELATED LEGAL AUTHORITY
VT4 gave the ECJ an opportunity to review and clarify earlier rulings in Commission v. United Kingdom (United Kingdom) and Commission v. Belgium (Belgium). In both earlier cases, the ECJ confronted
ambiguities in the newly adopted Television Directive. 28 United Kingdom resolved questions concerning which Member State may exercise
jurisdiction over broadcasters within Article 2(1) of the Television Directive, and Belgium addressed the related topic of Member State
regulatory obligations under Television Directive Articles 2(2) and 3(2).
United Kingdom promulgated the principle that a television broadcaster's place of establishment determines which Member State is required to exercise jurisdiction over that broadcaster pursuant to Article
2(1) of the Television Directive. 29 In United Kingdom, the EC Commission complained that section 43 of the UK 1990 Broadcasting Act violated Article 2(1) of the Television Directive. Section 43 of the UK
Broadcasting Act relies on a television broadcaster's place of transmission in order to determine which broadcasters fall under UK jurisdiction. 30 Although the Television Directive contains no express formula
for determining which Member State has jurisdiction over television
broadcasters, 31 the EC Commission maintained that the Television Directive nevertheless meant for a broadcaster to come under the jurisdiction of the state where the broadcaster is established.
In defense of the Broadcasting Act, the UK insisted that the Television Directive had to be interpreted in light of Article 5 of the Council of
Europe Convention on Transfrontier Television (the Convention).3 2 According to Article 5, jurisdiction is determined by a broadcaster's point
of transmission. 33 The ECJ rejected the UK position on two principle
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Case C-11/95, Commission v. Belgium, [19971 2 C.M.L.R. 289, 295 (1997).
29. Case C-222/94, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1996 ECR 1-4025, [1996] 3
C.M.L.R. 793, 794 (1996).
30. Id. at 840.
31. Id. at 841.
32. Council of Europe Convention on Transfrontier Television, May 5, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
859 art. 5 [hereinafter Convention].
33 Article 5 of the Convention states in relevant part:
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grounds. First, the ECJ views the Convention and Television Directive
as textually irreconcilable. Whereas the Convention applies place of
transmission as its primary determinant of Member State jurisdiction,
the Television Directive employs transmission criteria only when the
television broadcaster falls outside the Television Directive's other jurisdictional criteria. Writing for the ECJ, Justice Kapteyn held:
The second indent of [a]rticle 2(1) [of the Television Directive]
refers to the situation in which a [M]ember [Sltate may assert
either its jurisdiction in relation to the use of a satellite, or its
territorial jurisdiction in relation to the use of an up-link, situated in that state, to a satellite which does not fall within its jurisdiction. However, the second indent envisages the exercise of
such jurisdiction [based on place of transmission] only on the
condition that no other Member State has jurisdiction under the
34
first indent of [a]rticle 2(1).
The ECJ attributes the substantive divergence between the Television Directive and the Convention to the distinct legislative intent of
each instrument. Many of the Television Directive's provisions first appeared in the European Commission's 1984 Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, 35 a document whose
very title commends as its purpose the creation of a single European
broadcast market. 36 The ECJ views the creation of a single broadcast
market as related to, but distinguishable from the Convention's aim of
easing transfrontier access to state broadcast markets. According to
Article 1 of the Convention, the Convention's purpose is "to facilitate...
the transfrontier transmission and retransmission of television program

1. Each transmitting Party shall ensure, by appropriate means and through
its competent organs that all programs and services transmitted by entities
or by technical means within its jurisdiction ... comply with the terms of
this Convention.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, the transmitting Party shall be:
a. in the case of terrestrial transmissions, the Party in which the initial
transmission is effected; b. in the case of satellite transmissions;
i.the Party in which the satellite up-link is situated;
ii. the Party which grants the use of the frequency or a satellite capacity
when the up-link is situated in a State which is not a party to this Convention;
iii.
the Party in which the broadcaster has its seat when responsibility
under subparagraphs (i) and (ii) is not established.
Convention, supra note 33, art. 5.
34. United Kingdom, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 842 (emphasis added).
35. Paul Presburger & Michael R. Tyler, Television Without Frontiers: Opportunity
and Debate Created by the New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 495, 496 (1990).
36. Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable, COM (84) 300 final.
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More notably, however, the Television Directive's legislative history
supports the view that place of establishment is dispositive for jurisdictional purposes under EC broadcast law. Specifically, Article 1(1) of the
European Commission's 1986 Draft Television Directive expresses "the
principle that all broadcasting activity intended for reception within the
territory of the Community must comply with the law of the... Member State in which the originating body is established." 38
Any force the Convention might once have enjoyed was superseded
months later when the Council of Europe adopted the Television Directive. Since the Council adopted the Television Directive after previously considering the Convention, the ECJ reasoned, "[T]here is no
doubt that the Council was fully aware of the adoption of the Convention when it itself adopted the Television Directive." 39 Indeed, in the
Fourth Recital of the Preamble to the Television Directive, the Council
expressly recognized that "the Council of Europe has adopted the European Convention on Transfrontier Television."4 0 The ECJ concluded
that since the 1986 Commission Draft Directive was not amended to
conform to the Convention, once the Council approved the Television
Directive, the Council signaled its choice "to regulate television services
41
in a way which differs from the path followed by the Convention."
Notwithstanding these considerations, the very terms of the Convention itself provide that any conflict between the Convention and
other EC rules must be resolved against the Convention. As Article
27(1) of the Conventions states, "Parties... of the European Economic
Community shall apply Community rules and shall not.., apply the
rules arising from the Convention except in so far as there is no community rule governing the particular subject concerned." 42 As a community rule covering the particular subject of transfrontier television
broadcasting, the Television Directive trumps the Convention. Consequently, the ECJ correctly found no substantive or legislative basis in
the Convention to counter the view that Article 2(1) of the Television
Directive must be understood as a reference to the Member State in
43
which the broadcaster is established.
The ECJ accepted the possibility that establishment criteria would
cause difficulties for the many broadcasters established in more than
37. Convention, supra note 32, art. 1.
38. United Kingdom, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 822 (quoting Bulletin of the E.C., Supplement 5/86, at 12-13).
39. United Kingdom, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 844.
40. Television Directive, supra note 19, at mbl.
41. United Kingdom, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 844.
42. Convention, supra note 32, art. 27(1).
43. United Kingdom, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. at 844.
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one Member State. 44 Without settling on a precise formula for resolving
this difficulty, the ECJ recognized that in the event of a broadcaster's
multi-state establishment, jurisdiction could reside with that Member
State in whose territory the broadcaster performs its essential activities. 45 These essential activities include the formulation of decisions on
programming policy, mixing, and program processing prior to transmis46
sion.
In Belgium, a related case, the ECJ considered the legality of Belgium's general law, embodied in its 1994 Cable Decree, requiring formal
Ministry approval of all foreign programming and advertisements prior
to their broadcast on Belgium's cable distribution network. 47 The Cable
Decree requires cable operators to prove, to the satisfaction of Belgian
authorities, that a foreign program has met the three following conditions set out in section 10(2)(4) of the Cable Decree: first, prior to being
broadcast in Belgium, all foreign programming must be authorized by
another Member State, second, the broadcaster originating the program
must be subject to the control of that other Member State, and third,
the foreign programming must not compromise Belgian public policy,
8
good morals, or public order.4
The ECJ ruled that the Cable Decree's systematic requirement of
conditional prior authorization by Belgian authorities contravenes the
Television Directive. According to the ECJ, Article 2(1) of the Television Directive stands for the principle that a television broadcaster may
be subject only to the jurisdiction and broadcasting laws of the Member
State where the broadcast originates. 49 Additionally, Article 3(2) allows
only those Member States with jurisdiction to enforce provisions of the
Television Directive. Finally, Article 2(2) of the Television Directive requires that Member States guarantee freedom of reception and refrain
from blocking transmission of programs from other EC states. 50

44. Id. at 845.
45. Id. at 829.
46. Id.
47. Belgium, [19971 2 C.M.L.R. at 289. In Belgium, the country's regions enjoy large
responsibility for television broadcasting regulations. These regions are divided into the
French Community, the Flemish Community, bilingual metropolitan Brussels, and the
German-speaking Community. Id. at 298.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 332.
50. Id. at 327, 330. Article 2(2) reads in full:
2. Member States shall ensure freedom of reception and shall not restrict retransmission on their territory of television broadcasts from other Member
States for reasons which fall within the fields coordinated by this Directive.
Member States may provisionally suspend retransmission of television
broadcasts if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) a television broadcast coming from another Member State manifestly, seriously and gravely infringes [Airticle 22;
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Based on these provisions, the ECJ insisted that it is solely within
the authority of the state from which a broadcast emanates to monitor
compliance with State and EC laws. Absent the conditions needed to
trigger broadcast restrictions under Article 2(2) of the Television Directive, the receiving Member State is not authorized to exercise its own
controls. 51 The conditions set forth in section 10(2)(4) of Belgium's 1994
Cable Decree thus violated Belgium's obligation as a receiving state to
"ensure freedom of reception," 52 and "not to restrict transmission.., of
television broadcasts from other Member States." 53 For these reasons,
Belgium's system of prior authorization constitutes an unauthorized
control, which in the eyes of the ECJ poses "a serious obstacle to free
'54
movement of programs within the community.
In light of the United Kingdom and Belgium decisions, VT4 imposes an appreciably more precise formula for determining Member
State obligations under the Television Directive. Under VT4 a television broadcaster falls under the jurisdiction of the Member State where
the broadcaster is established. If the broadcaster is established in more
than one Member State, the state competent to assert jurisdiction is the
Member State where the broadcaster performs its essential activities.
This Member State must ensure that the broadcaster complies with the
Member State's own general broadcasting laws and with the provisions
of the Television Directive. Of singular importance, recipient states
must ensure near-absolute freedom of reception and retransmission of
programs broadcast from other Member States.
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

VT4's significance concerns its refinement of "establishment" doctrine, which now operates as the basis for determining Member State
jurisdiction under EC television broadcast laws. By confronting the
problem of multi-state establishment, the VT4 ruling will minimize conflicts of law between Member States. Nonetheless, this contribution is
overshadowed by the stunning momentum VT4, Belgium, United King(b) during the previous 12 months, the broadcaster has infringed the same
provision on at least two prior occasions;
(c) the Member State concerned has notified the broadcaster and the Commission in writing of the alleged infringements and of its intention to restrict
retransmission should any such infringement occur again;
(d) consultations with the transmitting State and the Commission have not
produced and amicable settlement within 15 days of the notification provided
in point (c), and the alleged infringement persists.
Television Directive, supra note 19, art. 2(2).
51. Belgium, [1997] 2 C.M.L.R. at 332.
52. Id. at 330.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 342.
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dom, and the case law of the European Free Trade Association give to
the rapidly galvanizing forces of television broadcast and advertising
deregulation in the European Community.
Many European societies consider broadcasting both an economic
and cultural phenomenon. 55 European states value mass media, not as
an end in itself, but as a means to obtain normative social and political
objectives, namely the promotion of democracy. 56 The government of
each Member State, in particular the legislative branch, has responsibility for promoting these objectives and for safeguarding public information as well as the free exchange of ideas. Unavoidably, the legislature influences the shaping of values by the mass media. Most
European states express confidence, however, that legislative control
protects the mass media from public or private power holders.5 7 The
accepted view throughout the United States, that market forces offer
the most effective means of protecting broadcasting freedoms, has simply not taken a firm hold in Europe. 58
Europe traditionally has held strong to the "public service broadcaster model," a concept that conceives of each Member State's respective television broadcasters as public trustees. Accordingly, the broadcast laws of European states emphasize the public tasks and obligations
of mass media. 59 Public service broadcasting originally took the form of
public monopolies, but European states have since developed dual systems involving both public monopolies and private broadcasters, with
public monopolies competing for market share with private broadcast
companies. 60 Despite the presence of such limited competition, in many
6
cases, dual systems remain subject to extensive state regulation. 1
Given this regulatory density, it is not surprising that Belgium's regional Communities retain such a large measure of control over privately broadcast cable television programming.
The structures of public-service broadcast monopolies and dual systems vary from state to state. In some cases, the monopolistic broadcaster is an autonomous corporation, in others, it is a division of a state
ministry. 62 But in all Member States, both private and public broadcast
television companies are ultimately financed by the government and
subject to extensive state programming supervision.63 Throughout
55. Hoffman-Riem, supra note 19, at 599.
56. Id. at 600.

57. Id. at 601.
58. Id. at 602.
59. Id. at 603.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Leo Flynn, Telecommunications and EU Integration, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION 217, 222 (Jo Shaw & Gillian More eds., 1995).
63. Id.
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Europe, "pragmatically and rhetorically, priority is given to the social
and cultural orientation of broadcasting, and not its economic aspect. ''64
Broadcasting takes on such social and political moment that in all EC
states, broadcast regulations appear in separate communications constitutions, influenced in no small degree by each country's political and
65
social system.
Although social and political concerns predominate, the public
service model nevertheless takes on an economic dimension. National
television broadcast companies have sprung vertical linkages to each
Member State's technology industries by establishing and enforcing
standards for equipment used to transmit and receive television broadcasts. 66 Member States also use national broadcast companies as vehicles for extensive industry and labor regulation. 67 Thus, homegrown socio-political and economic influences shape the content and structure of
each Member State's television broadcast regulatory scheme.
In stark contrast to the public service model, the EC's regulatory
point of reference conforms to a purely economic norm: the free movement of services as provided for under Article 59 of the EC Treaty. 68 It
is settled law that the transmission of television signals - including advertisements - must be regarded as a service within the meaning of Article 59.69 VT4's reliance on Article 59's principle of establishment only
strengthens the relationship between television broadcasters and the
freedom to provide transnational services within the EC.
There no longer remains any doubt concerning the Television Directive's definitive regulatory force in Europe. Consequently, large sections of Member States' domestic broadcast regulations may be declared
incompatible with European law. This signals a paradigmatic departure
from Europe's state-driven regulatory tradition. As German Professor
Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem has stated:
In... [this new] order solely oriented towards economic freedoms ... deregulation means implementation
of the market principle. In this respect . . . nonregulation means supporting a certain broadcasting
model. Such support would be associated with a renunciation of differentiated broadcasting models such as
those which currently exist in the dual systems of the
European countries. Treating the Television Directive
as a definitive regulation of broadcasting in the E.C. is
64. Hoffman-Riem, supra note 19, at 603.
65. Id. at 604.
66. Flynn, supra note 65, at 222.

67. Id.
68. Hoffman-Riem, supra note 19, at 606.
69. Belgium, [1997] 2 C.M.L.R. at 295.
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thus tantamount to shifting paradigms.7 0
A paradigmatic shift is exactly what the Commission and the ECJ
have accomplished. Both institutions downplay the force of the Television Directive, asserting that the Television Directive purports to lay
down only "the minimum rules needed to guarantee freedom of transmission in broadcasting." 71 For example, under the Television Directive, Member States retain authority to make legal commitments for
their national broadcasters and to subject these national broadcasters
to continued regulation. Additionally, Member States may freely impose upon broadcasters under their jurisdiction stricter norms relating
72
to advertisements and the protection of minors.
Notwithstanding this pretense for minimalism, the Television Directive's reliance on establishment doctrine places considerable pressure on individual Member States to engage in comprehensive deregulation of their national broadcast markets. Under Article 2(2) of the
Television Directive, Member States receiving broadcasts from other
EC states must avoid placing restraints on foreign broadcasts. A receiving Member State's strict regulation of its own national broadcasters disadvantages these broadcasters in relation to otherwise unrestricted foreign competitors. Member States also must recognize that
broadcasters now are free to establish themselves in host states with
broadcast-friendly laws and continue to broadcast programs throughout
Europe.
As VT4 clearly indicates, the principle of unrestricted transmission
applies to foreign broadcasters largely oriented to their own domestic
states; but the same applies with no less force to broadcasters who
transmit programs exclusively at a foreign recipient state. The recipient state is virtually powerless in the face of unrestrained foreign
broadcast competition. In order to preserve the competitiveness of its
national broadcasters, Member States must exempt national broadcasters from impedimentary regulations. This inevitably includes liberalization in regulatory fields not definitively regulated by the Television
Directive.7 3 Hence, although the Television Directive does not expressly
prohibit Member States from retaining public-service broadcasting monopolies, European legislatures must abolish both public monopolies
and dual systems alike if they hope to provide competitive opportunities
for their domestic broadcasters.
In addition to settling the question of broadcaster jurisdiction,
VT4 also helped resolve questions raised in the Joined Cases E-9/94

70.
71.
72.
73.

Hoffman-Riem, supranote 19, at 612.
Belgium, 11997] 2 C.M.L.R. at 296.
Hoffman-Riem, supra note 19, at 612.
Id.
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and E-9/94 (Joined Cases) concerning the complex matter of jurisdic74
tion over television advertisements under the Television Directive.
The Joined Cases were decided by the Court of Justice of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA Court) after the Norwegian television
channel, TV3, broadcast via satellite two commercials from the UK advertising children's products made by Mattel and Lego. 75 Seeking a ban
on the Mattel and Lego ads, a Norwegian consumer advocate filed suit
in the Norwegian administrative courts pursuant to a Norwegian na76
tional law prohibiting all advertising specifically targeting children.
Mattel and Lego challenged the Norwegian law as contrary to Television Directive provisions calling for the free circulation of television
77
programs.
As discussed above, VT4 rejected transmission-based jurisdiction,
transforming the "transmitting State principle" into the "home country
control" principle, whereby a broadcaster is subject instead to the law of
the country where a broadcaster is established. VT4 also emphasized
the requirement that receiving countries must ensure freedom of reception and not restrict retransmission in their territory of programs from
other Member States. 78 The Joined Cases read this requirement
broadly to include advertisements as within the scope of the Television
Directive's free circulation provisions. 79 Thus, the Television Directive
is now interpreted to allow only the Member State where a broadcaster
is established to regulate advertisements occurring in the broadcaster's
programs. The power of a receiving state to impose restrictions on advertising is limited to actions under Article 2(2) of the Television Directive.8 0
V.

CONCLUSION

VT4 Ltd. v. Vlaamse Gemeenschap indeed marks the dawn of a new
age for European television broadcasters. By furnishing added precision to the doctrine of establishment first articulated in Commission v.
United Kingdom, VT4 further solidifies the distinction Commission v.
Belgium and the Joined Cases drew between the obligations of originating and recipient states under the Television Directive. Together,

74. See Case E8-9/94, Forbrukerombudet v. Mattel Scandinavia A/S and Lego Norge
AIS, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 313 (1996).
75. Advertising: EF'A Court Accepts Mattel and Lego Ads, TECH EUR., July 6, 1995, §
106.
76. Forbrukerombudet, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 321.
77. See id. See also, Advertising: EFTA Court Accepts Mattel and Lego Ads, supra
note 75.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 327-28.
80. Id. at 324.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 27:4

these decisions place overwhelming pressure on EC Member States to
recognize the imperative of wholesale broadcast and advertising deregulation. The famed American jurist Benjamin Cardozo once waxed,
"Jurisdiction exists that rights may be maintained."8 1 As Europe begins
to sow the jurisdictional firmament to a revolutionary new system of
free and unrestricted television broadcasting, Cardozo's truism might
also hint at yet another more novel maxim: jurisdiction exists that
rights may be expanded.

81. Berkovits v. Arbib, 230 N.Y. 261, 274 (1921).

THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ACTIVE
ENFORCER OF FREEDOM, OR A PASSIVE PLAYER

IN THE EC GAME?
DIMPLE

D.

DHABALiA*

In an ordered society of mankind, there is no such thing as unrestricted liberty, either of nations or of individuals. Liberty itself is the
product of restraints; it is inherently a composite of restraints; it dies
when restraints are withdrawn. Freedom... is not an absence of restraints; it is a composite of restraints. There is no liberty without order. There is no order without systematized restraint. Restraints are
the substance without which liberty does not exist. They are the essence of liberty.1

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the European Community's (EC) efforts in moving towards
a more united Europe through its fusion of several economic and political institutions and policies, the EC has failed to implement any structure to protect the fundamental freedoms accorded to each individual,
thereby raising concerns about continued European unity, national sovereignty, and jurisdiction. 2 One of the main foundations of international law, the UN Charter (the Charter), "contains two basic axioms
which may sometimes come into conflict." 3 First, the Charter ensures
each State its sovereign equality as well as its territorial integrity. At
the same time, however, "there is the aim of promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."4 In most
J.D. candidate, University of Denver Law School, 2000. I would like to thank my family for their unconditional love and support in every challenge I undertake. I would also
like to thank Martha Keister, without whom, this paper would never have taken shape.
1. E. Barrett Prettyman, retired Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, in a speech at
Law Day Observances, 1962, at the Pentagon, quoted in Case and Comment, MarchApril, 1963, 26.
2. See Tara C. Stever, Protecting Human Rights in the European Union: An Argument for Treaty Reform, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 919 (1997).
3. S. D. Bailey, The Security Council, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 304 (P.H. Alston ed., 1992), quoted in Peter R. Baehr, The Security
Council and Human Rights, in THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EUROPE 15 (Rick Lawson ed., 1994).
4. Id.
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instances however, States will refer to Article 2, section 7 of the Charter, which supports the first axiom, to "prevent the effective implementation of the latter. 5
Because the EC Member States are also members of the UN, each
State has a right to assert its sovereignty.6 However, all Member States
are signatories to the European Community Treaty (EC Treaty) and
most States are signatories to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 7 Both of these documents, as well as European case
law, explicitly refer to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) "by which
all Member States have consented to be bound."8 However, because
there is no formal written Bill of Rights for the Community incorporating the Convention into Community law, some States adhere to the
Convention and other States do not. 9 Although the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) has taken to regularly referring to the Convention in its
decisions, States continue to dispute the Court's jurisdiction.
Unlike most national constitutions, the EC Treaty explicitly fails to
catalog the "fundamental rights and freedoms upon which citizens can
rely against the governmental authorities."' 1o The ECJ attempts to protect these fundamental rights by "classifying them as general principles
of Community law, referring to the common constitutional traditions of
the Member States and to international instruments, in particular the
Convention."'1 Since the Court has held that Member States are to consider fundamental rights as a part of Community "law" as suggested by
Article 164 of the EC Treaty, 12 the ECJ must attempt to ensure that the
individual Member States as well as the Community as a whole, honor
13
fundamental rights.
This case-note will demonstrate that by denying itself the jurisdiction to guide individual Member States in interpreting the conformity of
national laws to Community laws, the ECJ is failing to protect the fundamental freedoms of the EC citizens. This paper is divided into three

5. Id.
6. See generally U.N. CHARTER, art. 73.

7. See generally TREATY OF ROME, Mar. 25, 1957, [1957] 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1957)
[hereinafter EC TREATY]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976).
8. See also G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the
Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169,
175 (1995).
9. See Stever, supranote 2, at 957.
10. Inge Bernaerts, Opinion 2/94, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 372, 372 (1996).
11. See id.
12. Article 164 of the EC Treaty states, 'The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the
interpretation and application of this Treaty, the law is observed." EC TREATY, supra
note 7, art. 164.
13. Bernaerts, supranote 10, at 372.
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sections. First, an examination of the case of Kremzow v. Republik
Osterreich. Next, an in-depth analysis of the prior legal authority the
ECJ incorporated into its decision. Finally, a discussion regarding the
implications of the ECJ's decision.
II. FRIEDRICHKREMZOW V. REPUBLIK OSTERREICH-A
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

In December of 1982, Friedrich Kremzow, a retired Austrian judge,
confessed to the murder of an Austrian lawyer, a statement he later retracted. 14 In December of 1984, the District Court found Kremzow
guilty of murder and the unlawful possession of a firearm and sentenced him to twenty years in a mental institution. 15 Kremzow appealed to the Supreme Court of Austria regarding the lower court's sentence. The Supreme Court, in a hearing during which Kremzow was
absent, upheld the lower court's finding of Kremzow's guilt, however,
the Court changed the twenty-year sentence in a mental institution to
16
life imprisonment in a civilian prison.
At his appeals hearing, Kremzow argued that his fundamental
right to freedom of movement was at stake.1 7 Historically, scholars
have regarded freedom of movement only in the context of economics,
and not as a fundamental human right within the realms of the European Community. However, in this case, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) and the European Commission (the Commission) considering the "nature" of the freedom at risk reviewed Kremzow's case
stating that Kremzow should have been allowed to defend himself pursuant to Article 6(3)(c) of the Convention.18 The ECHR held that "Article 6 of the Convention had been violated," and Kremzow was entitled
to monetary damages for legal fees and expenses. 19
Following the ECHR judgment, Kremzow again found himself in
the Austrian civil courts. This time in his appeal he requested the
resolution of three issues: (1) a reduction in his sentence pursuant to
paragraph 410 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure; (2) the
payment of damages pursuant to Article 5(5) of the Convention for his

14. Case C-299195 Kremzow v. Republik Osterreich, [1997] 3 C.M.L.R. 1289, at para.
3 (1997) [hereinafter Kremzow].
15. Id., 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640, at para. 4.
16. Id. at para. 5.
17. Id. at 2642, para. 11-12.
18. Id. at 2640-42, para. 6. See also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(3)(c), 312 U.N.T.S. 221
(1950) [hereinafter the Convention]. Kremzow v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A), no. 268 B
(1993).
19. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640-42, at para. 6..
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unlawful detention; and (3) the Court's recognition of the fact that the
Articles of the Convention are directly applicable under Austrian law
and give rise to a legitimate claim for infringement on his right to liberty of person. 20 The Austrian court rejected Kremzow's claims pursuant to paragraph 2(3) of the Austrian Law on State Liability, which contradicted the articles of the Convention, 21 thereby holding Austrian law
above Community law.
Kremzow next appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court. He argued that although the ECHR had determined that the State had violated Kremzow's rights under the Convention, the Courts had failed to
rectify these violations. 22 Kremzow beseeched the Court to reference
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on two main questions: (1) are all or at
least the substantive law provisions of the Convention, including the
provisions of Articles 5, 6, and 53 of the Convention which are relevant
to the proceeding before the Supreme Court, part of Community law
(Article 164 of the EC Treaty), with the result that the ECJ may give a
preliminary ruling on their interpretation pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 177 of the EC Treaty;23 and (2) if the first question was
answered in the affirmative, there was an inquiry as to whether national courts are bound by ECHR decisions under particular circumstances pursuant to Articles 5 and 6.24
Kremzow justified ECJ jurisdiction over this case based on the argument that because he is a citizen of the European Community, he is
entitled to the right to freedom of movement for persons, as articulated
in Article 8, section (a) of the EC Treaty. 25 Further, he stated that because any citizen is entitled to move freely between the Member States
without any specific intention to reside, "a State which infringes that
fundamental right, guaranteed by Community law, by executing an
unlawful penalty of imprisonment must be held liable in damages by
26
virtue of Community law."
The ECJ ultimately held that it did not have jurisdiction because
the legislation in question was outside the scope of Community law.
The Court said:
[w]here national legislation is concerned with a situation
which, as in the case at issue in the main proceedings, does

20. Id. at 2641, at para. 7.
21. Id. at 2641-42, at para. 9.
22. Id. at 2642, at para. 11.
23. Id. at 2642-43, at para. 12(1)-(2).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2644, para. 13. Article 8(a) of the EC Treaty states: "[e]very citizen of the
Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the
measures adopted to give it effect." EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 8a.
26. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2644, at para. 13.
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not fall within the field of application of Community law, the
Court cannot, in a reference for a preliminary ruling, give the
interpretive guidance necessary for the national court to determine whether that national legislation is in conformity
with the fundamental rights whose observance the Court ensures, such as those deriving in particular from the Conven27
tion.
The ECJ based its holding on the fact that its interpretation of the
provision, regarding the freedom of movement of persons found in the
EC Treaty, was not consistent with Kremzow's interpretation. 28 Thus,
although the deprivation of liberty prevents a person from exercising
freedom of movement, the Court did not find a sufficient connection
with Community law to justify the application of Community provisions. 29 The ECJ reiterated that the Austrian Court had sentenced
Kremzow for murder and the illegal possession of a firearm under Austrian national law. 30 The ECJ went on to establish that Austria had
never intended Community law to address the national law in question. 31 Therefore, according to the Court, the national legislation in this
32
case dealt with a situation outside the scope of Community law.
Although several European States agreed to membership in the
EC, the States wanted to ensure the preservation of individual sovereignty. The unification process, which commenced after World War II,
was the result of European State's "desire for economic and political
unity and stability."33 However, in order to progress without a loss of
rights, Member States agreed to institutions such as the ECJ to maintain the framework of the Community.3 4 The States continued to restrict the power of the Community through limitations on Community
law. Thus, although Community law was supreme over national law,
"the European Community [was] a system of limited competences.
Member States approve the transfer of competences to a central institu35
tion," thereby creating an internal limitation on the Community.
In effect, the Member States attempted to secure their sovereignty
through the guarantee that the Community would never have too much
power, since the individual States were the ones supplying the Community with its power. Thus, States left many laws, including criminal
laws under national legislation, thereby creating an area of law under

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 2645, at para 15.
Id. at para. 16.
Id. at para. 13.
Id. at 2646, at para. 17.
Id.
Id. at para. 18.
See Stever, supra note 2, at 931.
See id. at 935.
Id. at 941-42.
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which the ECJ was not meant to accept jurisdiction. In the case at
hand, Kremzow's violations were ones that the Member States never intended the Community to deal with, and thus fell out of the scope of
ECJ jurisdiction. What the Member States failed to realize was that although many laws would fall under national law, there was an entire
body of human rights violations, which (1) protected citizens of the
Community as a whole, (2) superseded national law, and (3) gave the
ECJ the necessary jurisdiction to hear the case. Thus, Kremzow's unlawful detainment justified the request to the ECJ to hear his case, and
the ECJ legitimately had jurisdiction over the case.
III. ANALYSIS OF PRIOR LEGAL AUTHORITY

In Kremzow, the ECJ stated it has consistently held that "fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principle of Community law whose observance the Court ensures."36 This principle was
first espoused in 1969, through Stauder in which the Court considered
the regulation of butter within the Community. 37 Council Regulation
804/68 allowed Member States to provide cheap butter to those who required governmental assistance. 38 In order to control the amount of
butter the Member States could provide to its residents, the regulation
required that "[t]he Member States shall adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that... the beneficiaries of the measures only obtain
butter in return for a coupon issued in their name." 39 Stauder, a resident of Ulm, felt that it was "discriminatory to require the beneficiaries
to reveal their name and address to the retailer."40 Stauder argued that
requiring an individual's name on a coupon breached the basic rights
laid down in the German Constitution. 41 The Stauder case led the
Court to explore the role of the individual within the Community for the
first time. The ECJ established that it must ensure the observance of
"the fundamental rights of the individual contained in the general principles of the law of the Community."42 The Court based this determination "on the very general provision of Article 164 of the EC Treaty,
which requires the Court to 'ensure that in the interpretation and application of [the] Treaty the law is observed."' 43 Stauder was the first

36. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. 2644, at para. 14.
37. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 415, [1969] 9 C.M.L.R. 112, 113
(1970) [hereinafter Stauderl.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 113.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 119.
43. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Protectionof Human Rights in the European Union:
Overview and Bibliography, 22 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 228, 231 (1994). See also EC
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case to emphasize that "the law" did not focus merely on the economic
and political aspects of the Community; it also included the "fundamental rights of the individual."44 Since Stauder, the Court has incorporated this reasoning in several cases, exhibiting an apparent commit45
ment to protecting individual fundamental freedoms.
The problem with the Stauder decision is that it is not explicit in
defining what rights were considered fundamental rights. In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhrund Vorratstelle fr. Gertreide und Futtermittel,46 the Court attempted to create a more succinct
description of what the term "fundamental freedoms" included. The
Court stated that the "protection of basic rights is inspired by the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, but must, nevertheless, be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community." 47 In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, a
German Administrative Court wanted to override Community regulations because they were inconsistent with the German basic law. 48 Although the Court emphasized the supremacy of Community law, it went
on to say, that "respect for basic rights forms an integral part of that
law."49

In order to ensure these basic rights, the Court in Nold v. Commission stated that along with common constitutional traditions among the
Member States, it drew inspiration from international treaties for the
protection of human rights on which the Member States had collaborated or of which they were signatories.50 As Jean-Marie Henckaerts
observes, after the Nold decision, there was an "increasing reliance on
international treaties, more specifically the Convention. Rather than to
commence with a comparative constitutional study on each case, the
Court made use of an existing catalogue of human rights that all Mem51
ber States had already agreed upon, namely the Convention." '
The most significant aspect of the Nold decision was the standard it
set for future ECJ decisions regarding the role of human rights within
the Community setting. Nold suggested that the Community's position

TREATY, supra note 7, art. 164.
44. Id.

45. See generally Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhrund
Vorratstelle fr. Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, [19701 11 C.M.L.R. 255,
(1972) (emphasizing the supremacy of Community law); Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen-und
BaustoffgroBhandlung v. Commission of the European Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 491,
[1974] 14 C.M.L.R. 338 (1974) [hereinafter Nold] (discussing the rights of the individual
within the Community).
46 InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft,11 C.M.L.R. at 283, para. 4.
47. Id. at 257-58.
48. Id.
49. Henckaertes, supranote 43, at 232-33.
50. Nold, 14 C.M.L.R. at 354.
51. Henckaertes, supra note 43, at 232.
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on human rights issues was actually grounded in individual Member
States.5 2 Member States created the basis for the Community's position
on human rights issues through adherence to treaties and constitutions
as well as numerous Member States' recognition of the Convention. Because 'human rights' was now a "Community" issue, Nold laid the foundation for future decisions, despite the lack of stare decisis in ECJ decisions.
One such case, relying on Nold, was Elliniki Radiophonia
Tileorassi v. Dimotiki Etairia.53 In this case, the Thessaloniki Regional
Court asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of
several provisions of the EEC Treaty and the Convention "in order to
determine the compatibility with these provisions of a national system
of exclusive television rights."5 4 The Court, referring to one of its past
decisions,5 5 held that the Convention, which was created to "promote
greater cooperation and understanding of common human rights between European States",5 6 "has special significance." 57 For this reason,
"the Community cannot accept measures which are incompatible with
observance of the human rights thus recognized and guaranteed." 58 Although the Court in Elliniki advocated Community concord through a
general acceptance of Community law, the Court's position in Kremzow
still gives a great deal of deference to the national laws of individual
Member States.
The ECJ's deference to individual Member States' laws is very clear
in Kremzow's holding. The Kremzow court stated that it had no jurisdiction concerning "national legislation lying outside the scope of Community law."5 9 In making this determination, the Court referred to Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland (Society), in which
the Court determined that the question of abortion fell within the parameters of the health, welfare and safety of State citizens, protected by
State law. 60 In Society, the ECJ stated the circumstances giving rise to
ECJ jurisdiction. The Court held that "where the [national] rules do fall
within the scope of Community law, the Court must provide guidance
through a preliminary ruling, in making interpretations to whether the

52. See generally, Nold, 14 C.M.L.R 338.
53. Case C-260189, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia
Syllogon Prossopikouv. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos
Avedellas and others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925, [hereinafter Ellinikil.
54. Id. at para. 1.
55. See Case C-222184, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] E.C.R. 1651, 1986 3 C.M.L.R. 240 (1986).
56. Stever, supra note 2,at 949.
57. Elliniki, 1991 E.C.R. at para. 41.
58. Id.
59. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, at para. 15.
60. See Case C-159/90, The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, 1990
E.C.R. 1-4685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991).
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rules are compatible with the fundamental rights ensured by the
Court's interpretation of the Convention." 6' In Kremzow, the national
law in question regarded Kremzow's sentence for murder and the illegal
possession of a firearm which the Court concluded were "provisions of
national law which were not designed to secure compliance with rules of
Community law." 62 The Court justified its lack of jurisdiction on the
premise that the national legislation in the Kremzow case related "to a
situation, which [did] not fall within the field of application of Community law." 63 The Court also failed to recognize Kremzow's absence from
64
the sentencing as a deprivation of his liberty.
The Court, referring to Moser stated that "[w]hilst any deprivation
of liberty may impede the person concerned from exercising his right to
free movement ... a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising that
right does not establish a sufficient connection with Community law to
justify the application of Community provisions. 65 The case to which
the Court analogized was one in which Moser, a German national was
denied the right to "undertake the post-graduate training necessary to
secure entry... to the post of a teacher ... "66 The National Court
asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling as to whether the defendant's
"legislation was compatible with the principle of free movement of
workers contained in Article 48 of the Treaty."67 The Court's reference
to the Moser holding was inaccurate. The distinction between the two
cases was that in Moser, the fact that Moser had not attempted to find a
job in another Member State, but was merely raising the issue, created
the "hypothetical situation." In Moser, the Court actually refers to "[a]
purely hypothetical prospect of employment in another Member

State ....

"68

On the other hand, in Kremzow, the ECJ did not have to create a
hypothetical situation to "justify the application of Community provisions." 69 Article 6 section 3(c) of the Convention explicitly states
"[e]veryone charged with a criminal offense has the following minimum
rights: to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing. ... "70 When the Supreme Court altered Kremzow's sen-

61. Id. at 892, at para. 31.
62. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, at para.17.
63. Id. at para. 18.
64. Id. at para. 19.
65. Id. at 2645, at para. 16, citing Case 180/83, Hans Moser V. Land Baden Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 720 (1984) [hereinafter Moser].
66. Id. at para. 2.
67. Id. at 725, para. 4. See also EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 48.
68. Moser, 3 C.M.L.R. at 728, at para. 18.
69. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, at para. 16.
70. Article 6(3)(c) states: "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:...(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 27:4

tence, he was not present at the hearing. This lack of representation
was a blatant violation of the Convention. Article 5 of the Convention
states that "[e]very person has the right to liberty and security of person." 71 However, where one "has been the victim of arrest and detention in contravention of provisions of this Article shall have an enforce72
able right to compensation."
Although the national legislation in question dealt with murder, a
crime not covered under Community law, the procedures regarding detention within individual Member States must comply with the Community law. Again, in Kremzow, the Court erroneously referred to past
case law in the Maurin decision. 73 In this case, Mr. Maurin, a French
national charged with selling food products after their expiry date, argued a violation of the Convention "concerning observance of the rights
of the defence and of the adversarial nature of proceedings." 74 The
French government, the United Kingdom, and the Commission argued
that the ECJ lacked jurisdiction because "the national legislation falls
outside the scope of Community law... [and] the national court has not
cited any provision of Community law and therefore does not raise any
75
issue concerning the interpretation or validity of Community law."
The ECJ held that "[t]he Court does not have jurisdiction to determine
whether procedural rules applicable to offenses under national legislation which falls outside the scope of Community law may be in breach of
the principles concerning observance of the rights of the defense and of
76
the adversarial nature of proceedings."
Again, the distinction between Maurin and Kremzow is that Community law makes no explicit provisions regarding procedural issues
77
dealing with the "defense and adversarial nature of proceedings."
However, the Community law does make express provisions for procedural issues regarding detention. Thus, the sentencing of Kremzow,
while a purely procedural issue, clearly falls under the provisions of
Community law and should have provided the ECJ with the necessary
justification for jurisdiction.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE KREMZOw DECISION

For the past thirty years, the ECJ has claimed to put fundamental
rights at the forefront of its decision-making-"an integral part of the
when the interests of justice so require ...." The Convention, supra note 18, art. 6(3)(c).
71. The Convention, supra note 18, art. 5.
72. Id.
73. See generally Case C-144/95, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin,
1996 E.C.R. 1-2909.
74. Id. at para. 12.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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general principle of Community law whose observance the Court ensures."78 Yet, the very foundation of the EC was purely economic, to
create a stronger and more unified Europe to compete in a global economy.7 9 As Linda Hantrais points out, "only twelve of the 248 articles of
the EC Treaty were devoted explicitly to social policy." 80 At what point
did human rights become a central issue within a "community" created
for economic stability? This is a very important question for it helps one
to determine the efficacy of current human rights regimes in the EC.
In order for human rights laws to have any effect within the Community, each Member State must ensure uniform enforcement of the
laws. As the ECJ has stated in the past, every national court must, in a
case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and
protect rights, which the latter confers on individuals.8 ' Accordingly, the
national courts must set aside any provision of national law, which may
conflict with Community law, whether prior, or subsequent to the
Community rule.8 2 However, when the issue is one of fundamental
rights, an area where States do not always agree, often they will turn to
the ECJ and the ECHR for guidance.
The EC Treaty established the ECJ, which from the beginning had
very limited international jurisdiction over cases dealing with disputes
between Member States of the EC.83 Since its inception, the number of
cases over which the ECJ presided has increased steadily, providing the
Court with the "domestic enforcement mechanisms for its judgments." 4
Scholars consider the ECJ's effectiveness in regards to its adjudication
of Article 177 cases.8 5 However, compliance with ECJ decisions has
been inconsistent and has forced the ECJ to turn to private parties and
domestic courts and hold that "a [S]tate that fail[s] to implement a
Community directive could be required to pay compensation to injured
6
private parties."8
The ECHR interprets the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 87 Although originally
only a few countries outside of Western Europe ratified the Convention,
"as of 1997 forty nations from Iceland to Russia have signed on to the

78. Stauder, 9 C.M.L.R. at 119.
79. Linda Hantrais, Social Policy in the European Union 2 (1995).
80. Id. at 2.
81. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978
E.C.R. 629, [1978] 23 C.M.L.R. 263, 283-84 (1978).
82. Id.
83. See Laurence Helfer, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273, 290 (1997).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 292.
86. Id. at 293.
87. Id.
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treaty and one or more of its various protocols."8 8 The problem here,
similar to the problem with the ECJ, deals with enforcement of the
rulings. Despite the fact that all of the parties to the EC Treaty "undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are
parties,"8 9 the adherence to the judgment varies a great deal. 90 Only
half of the signatories to the Convention have incorporated the EC
Treaty into domestic law.91 While this allows these particular Member
States' nationals to invoke the EC Treaty and partake of its benefits,
the other half of the countries have not made the treaty a part of domestic law, and thus, once again citizens are left to deal with the Member States' inconsistencies in enforcing the Court's rulings.
Both of these courts have many similarities and differences. On the
one hand, both are "supranational courts with no direct means of enforcing their judgments and thus are apparently dependent on the
goodwill of national governmental institutions."92 On the other hand,
however, whereas the ECJ "interacts with national courts in a kind of
partnership based on distinct but complementary spheres of jurisdiction.., the ECHR is more likely to be in the position of reviewing the
handiwork of national courts in a more traditional hierarchical relationship."93 Thus, although the ECHR is more narrowly tailored to human
rights issues, it seems that ECJ's direct interaction with individual
Member States might be more successful at attaining a uniform means
of dealing with these issues within the Community.
One should recognize that over the years the ECJ has had an immense influence over the formulation of European human rights law.
As discussed earlier in the note, ECJ cases such as Nold and Stauder,
have assisted in the development of Community human rights law. As
Vincent Power asserts, ECJ decisions have done more to aid the progression of Community law "than the actions of the Council of Ministers
94
and the Commission or the aspirations of the European Parliament."
Although the creation of the ECHR was for the purpose of protecting
the fundamental rights of EC members, one must consider the lack of
enforceability on the part of the ECHR. Without any mechanism for enforcing its decisions, it seems that the judgments of the ECHR are valueless, unless Member States voluntarily adhere to the decisions. One
should think of the ECHR as a "work in progress." The concept of a
court, which deals primarily with human rights issues, is admirable;

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 294.
The Convention, supra note 18, art. 53.
Helfer, supra note 83, at 295.
Id.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Vincent Power, Human Rights and the EEC, in HUMAN RIGHTS: A EUROPEAN

PERSPECTIVE 82 (1994).
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however, unless and until the Community takes a different approach to
implementing and enforcing decisions, the ECHR continues to encounter many obstacles.
In such progressive times, one must consider whether the ECHR is
up to the task of meeting the needs of all its citizens. For example, consider the fact that the Preamble to the Convention refers to "countries
with a similar tradition." 95 At the inception of the Convention, countries with "similar traditions" referred exclusively to Western European
Countries. 96 How will Eastern European countries fare under this system? Brian Walsh argues that many scholars believe that "Eastern
European countries will liberally interpret human rights, and that
these countries desire to conform to what they believe is the requirement of natural law." 97 It is true that if a country wants to become a
Member State, it is likely to agree to any terms the Community sets
forth. However, as history has demonstrated with other human rights
institutions, agreeing to adhere to the law and actual adherence, are
two completely different issues.
Proponents of the ECHR would probably argue that whether it is
the ECHR or the ECJ, both have to interpret the Convention. Thus,
why not allow an institution which focuses primarily on human rights
to interpret a document pertaining to human rights? The answer is
simple. While the ECJ would interpret the same laws as the ECHR, the
ECJ, central to the functioning of the Community as a whole, would
have a more direct influence upon the individual Member States. One
must accept that although social policy is gaining momentum within the
Community, "there is little concrete evidence that European social policy is perceived by the Council as other than a handmaiden to economic
objectives."98 Whereas Member States have recognized a reciprocal relationship between economic and social policy, the concurrence seems to
support the notion that "[a] good economic policy may be a major requisite for an efficient and adequate social policy, but a good social policy
can be a powerful support for a good economic policy." 99 This type of
thinking clearly indicates that despite the Community's progress in areas of social policy, and more specifically human rights, the underlying
foundation continues to focus on economic policy.
Another aspect of the argument focuses on the premise that because the Member States created the ECJ for the purpose of promoting
the Community's goals, the ECJ is more likely than the ECHR to gain
compliance from the Member States. Additionally, because the law as
95. Brian Walsh, International Human Rights Before a Domestic Court, 70 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 77, 92 (1996). The Convention, supra note 18, at preamble.
96. Id. at 92.
97. Id.
98. HANTRAIS, supra note 79, at 15.
99. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 27:4

the Member States set forth and agree upon limits the ECJ, it can never
have any real power. Thus, if it oversteps its boundaries, the Member
States will systematically withdraw from the Community and its laws.
This is not the case. One must keep in mind the economic purpose of
the EC. This being the case, Member States want to see the Community prosper as a whole, as this would allow each individual State to
flourish as well. The desire of individual Member States to achieve the
most stable and prosperous economic setting is enough of an incentive
for the States to ensure the prosperity of the Community as a whole. It
is important to note that the ECJ is willing to respect the Constitutions
of individual Member States, declaring in the Nold decision that "it
cannot therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions of those
States."'100 Although the ECJ accepts State sovereignty to an extent, it
also recognizes that too much deference could be detrimental to the
Community as a whole. For this reason the Court has stated that "special criteria for assessment stemming from the legislation or constitutional law of a particular member State would, by damaging the substantive unity and efficacy of Community law, inevitably lead to the
destruction of the unity of the Common Market and the jeopardizing of
the cohesion of the Community."'' 1
Member States have not put as much time and effort to create a
stronger and more unified Europe, only to see it fall as a result of individual States failing to comply with Community law. It is this prevailing attitude that Member States have demonstrated that gives the ECJ
the capability to enforce its decisions. The situation in the EC is much
like that of the United States. The power of Member States to restrict
the ECJ is comparable to the system of checks and balances in the
United States. Unlike the United States Supreme Court, which has an
express bill of rights, some scholars argue that it is impossible for the
ECJ to uphold fundamental rights as the EC does not contain a bill of
rights at all.10 2 However, although the United States Constitution contains a bill of rights, there is still disagreement as to what constitutes a
fundamental right. 10 3 Whereas fundamental rights in the United States
often appear abstract and difficult to uphold, the ECJ through the
Stauder decision "confirmed that human rights were enshrined in the

100. Iglesias, supra note 8, at 169.
101. Id.
102. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracyand Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the
Role of European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights
Within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1105
(1986).
103. See generally, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Griswald v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (although all of these cases discuss
the concept of fundamental rights, none of these decisions explicitly define what constitutes a fundamental right).
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general principles of EEC law and were enforceable by the ECJ."104 As
one scholar notes,
[tihe ECJ is now using human rights not only to defend the
supremacy of Community law but also to extend the jurisdiction of the ECJ. In finding that Community law was superior to national law, the ECJ had to fill the gap of national
protection of human rights by finding some means of Com105
munity based protection.
V. CONCLUSION

The implication of the Kremzow decision is crucial to the sustenance of the Community. It is unlikely that the current regimes are
sufficient for the simple reason that the underlying foundation of the
Community is economic-that is to say that there are many inconsistencies among the States when it comes to human rights laws. Thus,
individual fundamental rights are not the unifying force of the Community. For this reason, it would seem that until all of the individual
Member States consistently adhere to the human rights regimes, most
notably the ECHR, the ECJ must assume jurisdiction over cases dealing
with individual fundamental rights. In taking on such cases, the ECJ
would not be usurping the ECHR's authority, but rather it would be fulfilling its obligation of ensuring that these rights are enforced for the
individuals of the Community until more consistency is created among
the Member States. By failing to assume jurisdiction to guide individual Member States in interpreting the conformity of national laws to
Community laws in the Kremzow case, the ECJ failed to ensure the
fundamental freedoms of European Union citizens that it guaranteed to
protect.
Despite the fact that the Community chose to narrowly tailor the
ECHR to deal with human rights issues, its lack of enforcement ability
is a significant hindrance. Although proponents of the ECHR argue
that it has had an impact on Community laws, one must keep in mind
that the decisions are not binding on any State, and thus, aside from
the goodwill of each State, there is little incentive to comply. On the
other hand, the ECJ is more central to the actual functioning of the EC.
The underlying principles in the creation of the EC were primarily economic, and the ECJ was supposed to promote the goals that Member
States had set forth for the Community as a whole. This being the case,
individual States, while wanting to preserve their sovereignty, recognize that if the Community as a whole is to prosper, compliance with
the ECJ's decisions is necessary.

104. Power, supra note 94, at 82.
105. Id.
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The ECJ is willing to respect the Constitutions of individual States,
however, it is in the position to give limited deference to the States for
the simple reason that States want to maintain Community cohesion.
Much like the system of checks and balances in the United States, each
institution has the ability to ensure the prosperity of the Community,
while protecting the individual rights of its citizens. As Jeremy Bentham once stated, "[r]ights are the fruits of the law and of the law alone;
there are no rights without the law-no rights contrary to law-no
rights anterior to law."'10 6 If the EC wants to protect the rights of its
people, it is imperative that it allows the ECJ to assume jurisdiction until the Community attains more uniformity regarding the observance of
human rights laws. If not, individuals and States will continue to violate fundamental rights without fear of consequences or castigation.

106 Walsh, supra note 95, at 79.

KREMZOW V. REPUBLIK OSTERREICH: A CASE
FOR EXCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES FROM
THE JURISDICTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE
ERIN MCALPIN EISELEIN*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1997, the Austrian Supreme Court asked the European Court of
Justice (ECJ)l for a preliminary ruling in the case of Kremzow v. Republik Osterreich (Austrian State)2 to determine what effect a decision by
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has upon a Member
State. 3 After a brief analysis relying entirely on five prior ECJ opinions, 4 the ECJ held that it lacked the jurisdiction to offer interpretive
5
guidance since the matter was not grounded in community law.
The ECJ opinion in Kremzow exemplifies a fundamental problem of
Europe as a united body. There is a lack of clear definition regarding
the scope of authority between the various European supranational
bodies. Specifically, between the European Union (EU or Union) 6 and
J.D. Candidate, May 2000, University of Denver College of Law.
1. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the primary judicial branch of the European Union. T.C. HARLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 52 (4TH ed.
1998). The Treaty of Rome created the ECJ in Articles 164-88. TREATY OF ROME, Mar.
25, 1957, [1957] 298 U.N.T.S. 11 arts. 164-88 (1957) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. The ECJ
is discussed in detail infra, notes 134-174 and accompanying text.
2. Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Republik Osterreich, 3 C.M.L.R. 1289 (1997).
3. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642-43,
12(1).
4. See generally Opinion 2/94, RE the Accession by the Community to the European
Human Rights Convention, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996); Case
260/89, Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia (ERT AE) and Another v. Dimotiki
Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Another, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925; Case 159/90,
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v. Steven Grogan and
Others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991); Case 180/83, Hans Moser v.
Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 720 (1984); Case C144/95, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2909.
5. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, 1 19.
6. On February 7, 1992, the Treaty on European Union (also called the Maastricht
Treaty) was signed in Maastricht. Previously, the bodies that were independently called
the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the
European Atomic Energy Community, collectively became the "European Union." TREATY
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the Council of the Europe; 7 and, between the various bodies and their
respective Member States. Over the last fifty years, Europe has created
the most sophisticated system of international community institutions,
yet many structural questions remain unanswered and produce continual confusion among the Member States. 8 The ECJ is a critical channel
established by the European Union to clarify and develop issues surrounding the relationship between the various European bodies and
their respective Member States. 9 Ideally, the jurisprudence of the ECJ
should guide both the Union and the Member States toward an inON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R 719, 31
I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] amending TREATY OF ROME, Mar. 25, 1957, [1957], 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1957), as amended by Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741. It is important to note that the European Community and the European
Union are two separate bodies. The European Community (formerly the European Economic Community) is only one of the bodies incorporated into the larger European Union.
See JAMES D. DINNAGE & JOHN F. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 3 (1996) (clarifying the distinctions between the various European bodies since the
1993 Treaty of European Union). Although, in the Kremzow opinion, the ECJ refers to
this group of 15 Member States as the "European Community," this case note will refer to
this group as the "European Union," to reflect the Maastricht change. However, the
"European Community" will be used when analyzing the ECJ's opinions. See also
WALTER CAIRNS INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 2 (1997). The 15 Member
States of the European Union are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
209 (1995).
7. The Council of Europe was established in 1949 as a post-World War II body, created "for the purposes of achieving co-operation in the cultural, political, legal and social
fields." CARINS, supra note 6, at 12. The Council gained rapid acceptance from many nations, based in large part upon a collective guilt for failing to prevent Nazism and Fascism
during World War II. Peter Leuprecht, Innovations in the European System of Human
Rights Protection: is Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement?, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 313, 313 (1998). As of March 1, 1999, the 40 Member States of the
Council of Europe are: Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey,
Ukraine, and United Kingdom. The Council of Europe Homepage (visited Feb. 28, 1999)
See also Andrew Drzemczewski, The
<http://www.coe.fr/englegaltxt/esignpays.htm>.
European Human Rights Convention: A New Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg as of
November 1, 1998, 55 WASH & LEE L. REV. 697 (1998) (listing the 40 Member States of
the Council of Europe). In six years, the Council of Europe has grown from 23 members
to 40 members. There are also five additional states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia) with special guest status who have applied for full membership. NATO: The Council of Europe, M2 Presswire, Jan. 8, 1997, WL 8023394, at *4-5.
See also Leuprecht, supra note 7, at 326 ("The Council's role is no longer limited to the
defense of pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Its new task is to play
an active role in 'democracy-building' in the post-communist countries').
8. See A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 8, 156
(1996).
9. See EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 164-88.
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creased understanding of Union law and its relationship with Member
State law. However, the continual pressure on the ECJ to broaden the
scope of its authority to include other issues such as human rights, detracts from its ability to perform its essential function of developing
Union law.
The ECJ struggled with how to further define the scope of Union
law when it decided Kremzow v. Republic Osterreich.o Kremzow pressured the ECJ to extend its jurisdiction to include human rights protection." After an initial reading of the opinion, it may appear that the
Court placed human rights in a secondary position when it declined to
address Austria's preliminary rulings based upon procedural grounds. 12
In actuality, the court declined to extend its jurisdiction to include human rights because, if extended, its jurisdiction would then significantly overlap with the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). 13 This case note argues that if the ECJ is to remain a
successful and legitimate judicial body, it must continue to limit the
scope of its authority to issues relating exclusively to the European
Union.
The first section of this casenote will offer a detailed examination of
the Court's opinion in Kremzow v. Republick Osterreich. The factual
10. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646,
19 ("when national legislation is concerned
with a situation which ... does not fall within the field of application of community law,
the Court cannot ...give the interpretive guidance [requested]").
11. See id. at 2642-43, 1 12.
12. See id. at 2646, 19.
13. The European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") was created by Articles 38-56 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. European Convention, Nov. 4, 1950, [1950] 312 U.N.T.S. 221, (1950) [hereinafter
European Convention]. The European Convention emerged in post World War II Europe
and was founded upon a strong desire to protect human rights and preserve these rights
against the newly emerged Soviet Bloc. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 8, at 120.
The preamble to the European Convention explains that the goal of the European Convention:
is the achievement of greater unity between its Members and ....
[re]affirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms
which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best
maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on
the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human
Rights upon which they depend....
European Convention, at preamble. The European Convention has grown into what has
been called "the strongest and most effective human rights treaty there is today." Leuprecht, supra note 7, at 316. In 1998, the Member States of the Council of Europe ratified Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention, streamlining the part-time institutions
that had previously monitored human rights in Europe, into a full-time European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. Drzemczewski, supra note 7, at 697. For further
information on Protocol No. 11, see id. (offering a detailed description of the Strasbourg
reform). For a detailed description of the process of filing a complaint with the ECHR, see
generally LUKE CLEMENTS, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE
CONVENTION (1994).
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background and procedural posture of the case will be discussed to provide a framework for the ECJ's opinion. The second section will conduct
an inquiry of the Court's analysis and a detailed discussion of each of
the five cases the Court relied upon in reaching its decision. The third
section will argue that European human rights are sufficiently protected through a number of other European and international institutions. Further, the ECJ must confine the scope of its authority to issues
exclusively relating to Union law if it is to remain a successful and legitimate judicial body.
While the complex issue of the interrelationships between the European courts is continually debated, the
coming of the millennium begs clarity of this situation in order for
Europe to move forward as a united body.
II. FACTS
The following section will provide the factual background of
Kremzow v. Republik Osterreich and a discussion of how Kremzow
reached the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Friedrich Kremzow, an
Austrian man, worked in Vienna as a legal consultant after retiring
from the Austrian judiciary.' 4 On December 16, 1982, Kremzow confessed to murdering one of his clients, Mr. p.,15 a confession he promptly
retracted.16 Two years later, the Court of Assizes (Geschworenengericht) at the District Court (Kreisgericht) found Kremzow guilty of
murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. 17 Kremzow received the
maximum sentence under Austrian law:18 twenty years in an institution for the mentally ill. 19
Kremzow appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster
Gerichtsho) by filing a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde).20 The
plea was partially supported by the fact that he was denied the right to
represent himself. 2' He also filed an appeal against the sentence
(Berufung), asking for a reduction in his sentence. 22 The Supreme
Court rejected Kremzow's plea of nullity and affirmed his guilty verdict.23 Additionally, the Supreme Court modified his sentence and ordered him to serve life in an ordinary prison rather than twenty years

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Kremzow v. Austria, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322,
See id.
See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640, 1 3.
See id. at 2640, 1 4.
See Kremzow, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep., 11.
See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640, 4.
See Kremzow, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 12.
Id.
See Kremzow, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep., 12.
See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640, 5.

8 (1993).
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in a mental institution.24 The Supreme Court also rejected supplemen25
tary pleas of nullity brought by Kremzow's wife and mother.
Kremzow did not request to attend the appellate proceedings, nor
was his presence requested by the Supreme Court.26 This fact resulted
in the referral of his case to the ECHR.27 The premise of the referral
was that Kremzow's human rights, under the European Convention for
28
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention),
were violated when he was not allowed to defend himself in person at
the Austrian Supreme Court. 29 On September 21, 1993, the ECHR
unanimously found that Kremzow's absence at the hearing violated his
right to a fair trial under the European Convention, Article 6(1),30 when
taken in conjunction with Article 6(3).31 Article 6(3) provides the right
to defend oneself in person. 32 The ECHR awarded Kremzow costs and
expenses in the amount of 230,000 Austrian schillings, 33 as "just satisfaction" under Article 50 of the European Convention. 34 Articles 53 and

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 2640, 5.
See Kremzow, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep.,
12, 22.
See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640, 5.
See id.
See generally, European Convention, supra note 13.
See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640-41, 1 6.
Article 6(1) of the European Convention states:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press
and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest
of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society,
where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of
the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion
of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
the interests of justice.
European Convention, supra note 13, art. 6(1). While Article 6 of the European Convention guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time, it is violated more often than all other articles combined. Henricus G. Schermers, International
Human Rights in the European Community and in the Nations of Central and Eastern
Europe: An Overview, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 313, 315 (1993). For an interesting discussion of
Article 6, see Annemarieke Beijer et al., Witness Evidence, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Principle of Open Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
EUROPE 283 (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995) (comparing the different approaches taken by
England and the Netherlands concerning vulnerable witnesses and witnesses outside the
jurisdiction).
31. Article 6(3) of the European Convention provides in relevant part "[elveryone
charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights ... (c) to defend himself in person ....
European Convention, supra note 13, at art 6(3).
32. See Kremzow v. Austria, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322, 69 (1993).
33. See id J 10. The currency in Austria is the schilling, which is roughly equivalent
to the German deutsche mark. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIvISION, AUSTRIA, A COUNTRY
STUDY 120 (Eric Solsten & David E. McClave eds. 2d ed. 1994).
34. Article 50 of the European Convention states:
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54 of the European Convention provide the supervision for the enforce35
ment of this judgement.
Based on his victory at the ECHR, Kremzow brought two claims
against the Austrian courts in the Regional Civil Court in Vienna
(Zivilrechtssachen Wein). 36 Kremzow asked for a reduction in his sentence, in accordance with paragraph 410 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, 37 that allows for a reduction of sentence when mitigating
circumstances emerge. 38 Additionally, he requested damages in the
amount of 3,969,058 Austrian schillings for unlawful detention 39 during
the time period of July 3, 1986 through September 30, 1993, as allowed
by Article 5(5) of the European Convention. 40 The Regional Civil Court

If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or
partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the present Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial
reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure,
the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.
European Convention, supra note 13, art. 50 (emphasis added).
35. Article 53 of the European Convention states "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are parties."
European Convention, supra note 13, art. 53. Article 54 of the Convention states "[tihe
judgment of the court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers which shall supervise its execution." European Convention, supra note 13, art. 54.
36. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2641, 7.
37. See id.
38. Paragraph 410 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure:
If, after a sentence (penalty) may no longer be appealed, mitigating circumstances emerge, which were not available or were not known at the
time of deliverance, and if, indeed, the use of another penal clause is
not involved, but nevertheless they plainly would have brought about a
more lenient assessment of the penalty, so the court of first jurisdiction
is to issue, as soon as it is satisfied as to the existence of these mitigating circumstances, a petition for reasonable relaxation of the penalties to the court of second jurisdiction, which is to give a ruling on the
petition after hearing the attorney general. (2) No legal remedy is
permitted against denial of a petition for reduction in penalty. If the
court of second jurisdiction accedes to the petition for leniency on assessment of penalty given by the highest court, then it is to present the
petition to the highest court, which is to give the final ruling after
hearing the attorney general.
§410 StPO (Phyllis Shorman trans.)
39. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2641, 1 7.
40. Article 5(5) of the European Convention allows an injured party to be compensated for violations of their rights under Article 5(1)-(4). It reads as follows:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance
with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person
after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention
of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the
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in Vienna (Zivilrechtssachen Wein) found for the Austrian government
on both claims. 41 On appeal, the Higher Regional Court in Vienna
(Oberlandesgericht Wien) affirmed the decision, 42 based on Paragraph
2(3) of the Law on State Liability (Amtshaftungsgesetz).43 That paragraph states in part "no claim for compensation could arise out of a
judgment of the Supreme Court."4 4 The judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights has Constitutional status in Austria, 45 and is
therefore binding. 46 However, when the original case has achieved the

lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on a reasonable suspicion
of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having
done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of
educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; () the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his
effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against
whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge
against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantee to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness
of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
European Convention, supra note 13, art. 5(5).
41. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2641-42, 1 9.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Austria gave the European Convention constitutional status in their domestic
jurisprudence as a result of the Federal Constitution (Amendment) Act of March 1964.
Holly Dawn Jarmul, The Effect of Decisions of Regional Human Rights Tribunals on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 334 (Fall 1995-Winter 1996). However,
Austrian courts have been inconsistent in their application, sometimes finding the European Convention subordinate to Austrian domestic laws. Id. at 335.
46. See Eva Brems, Kremzow, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 474, 475 (1997). See also Jean M.
Sera, Note, The Casefor Accession by the European Union to the European Convention for
the Protectionof Human Rights, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 151, 152 ("The European Convention
and the judgments of the ECHR are binding on all members of the Council of Europe
which have ratified the European Convention"). Austria was not an original member of
the Council of Europe; they joined in April 1956, and ratified the European Convention on
September 3, 1958. ANDRE Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN
DOMESTIC LAW 93 (1983). See generally MARK W. JANIS ET AL, EURPOEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
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status of res judicatathe effect of such judgment remains undecided in
Austrian Courts. 47 Kremzow was therefore unable to enforce the judgment of the ECHR against the Austrian Supreme Court.
Under these circumstances, Kremzow filed an "extraordinary appeal" 48 to the Austrian Supreme Court, 49 asking them to request the
European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the issue of
whether the decision of the European Court of Human Rights is binding
on Austrian Courts. 50 The Austrian Supreme Court stayed their proceedings and addressed two questions to the ECJ for preliminary rulings. The Austrian Court first asked the following question:
Are all or at least the substantive-law provisions of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention")-including
the provisions of Articles 5,51 6, 5 2 and 5353 of the Convention which are relevant to the proceedings before the Oberster Gerichtshof-part of Community law (Article 164
EC),54 with the result that the Court of Justice of the
European Communities may give a preliminary ruling on
their interpretation pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 17755 EC?56
LAW 428-450 (1995) (describing how the European Convention has the status of a treaty
and states are required to make the substantive ideas of the Convention applicable to citizens).
47. See Brems, supra note 46, at 475.
48. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642, 1 11.
49. One author suggests that the Austrian Supreme Court "possesses a strong conservative inclination generally, with an attitude of particular reserve towards the [European] Convention." DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 46, at 103. This is significant as Member
States national courts must act in accordance with the ideals of the European Convention
although there is no sufficient enforcement mechanism in place. See infra note 231 (Article F of the TEU establishes this relationship.)
50. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642, 1 11.
51. See European Convention, supra notes 13, 31, 41, art. 5.
52. See European Convention, supra notes 13, 31, 32, art. 6.
53. See European Convention, supra notes 13, 31, 36, art. 53.
54. Article 164 of the EEC Treaty states "[t]he Court of Justice shall ensure that in
the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed." EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 164. The purpose of the European Community is explained in Article A of
the Treaty on European Union that states: "[t]he Union shall be founded on the European
Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of co-operation established by this
Treaty. Its task shall be to organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the member-States and between their peoples." TEU, supra note 6,
art. A.
55. Article 177 of the EEC Treaty states:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the
ECB; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an
act of the Council; where those statutes so provide. Where such a ques-
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Essentially, Austria asked the ECJ to determine the relationship
between the European Convention and European Union law. Austria's
second question was actually a series of five questions to be answered
only in the event that the first question was answered in the affirmative.5 7 The ECJ never addressed the second question, since the first
question was answered in the negative; therefore, this case note will not

directly address

it.58

III.

COURT'S ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The ECJ, through Judge Rapporteur 59 and President of the Fifth
tion is raised before any court or tribunal of a member-State, that court
or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a
ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending
before a court or tribunal of a member-State, against whose decisions
there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal
shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 177.
56. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642-43, 1 12(1).
57. See id. at 2642-43, 12(2)(a)-(e). The second question asked:
(2) Only in the event that Question 1 is answered in the affirmative,
at least as regards Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention: (a) Are national courts bound by judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights funding violations of the Convention at least to the extent
that they are not entitled to hold that the conduct of State institutions to which the finding of a violation relates was in accordance
with the Convention? (b) Are claims for compensation for damage
based on Article 5(5) of the Convention precluded where the damage
flows from a decision of the Oberster Gerichtshof? (c) Is detention
within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of the Convention contrary to
the Convention ex tunc where the European Court of Human Rights
has found that, in the criminal proceedings, the national court was in
breach of the procedural safeguards enshrined in Article 6 of the
Convention? (d) Is the legal entity against which proceedings have
been brought for State liability entitled to plead that the punishment
would have been on no different a scale if the violation of Article 6 of
the Convention found by the European Court of Human Rights had
not occurred, although the Austrian law of criminal procedure - to
date - does not provide in such cases for proceedings for the revision
of a judgment or other amending proceedings by means of which the
procedural error could have been remedied? (e) Does the burden of
proving the causal connection between the violation of Article 6 of
the Convention and the deprivation of the plaintiffs liberty fall on
the plaintiff or does the burden of proof in respect of this defect fall
on the defendant legal entity?
Id. at 2642-44, 1 12.
58. See id. at 2646, 1 19.
59. In each case, the President of the ECJ appoints one Judge to serve as Judge Rapporteur. RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 13 (1998). The job of the
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Chamber, J.C. Moitinho de Almeida, offered a brief opinion in response
to the preliminary rulings requested by the Austrian Supreme Court.60
After a summary of the factual background, the ECJ affirmed
Kremzow's position that he felt entitled to damages because his right to
freedom of movement under Article 8(a) of the Treaty of Rome. 6 1 The
violation occurred when Austria unlawfully detained him in violation of
Community law. 62 To reach its conclusion, the ECJ's analysis relied entirely on a series of five prior ECJ decisions: RE the Accession by the
Community to the European Human Rights Convention;63 Elliniki Radiofonia TileorassiAnonimi Etairia(ERT AE) and Another v. Dimotiki
EtairiaPliroforissisand Sotirios Kouvelas and Another;64 Society for the
Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v. Steven Grogan
and Others;65 Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg;66 and Criminal
ProceedingsAgainst Jean-Louis Maurin.67
The ECJ's first point was that "fundamental rights form an integral
part of the general principles of Community law." 68 ECJ jurisprudence
has reiterated this ideology, most notably in Opinion 2/94, Re the Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention,69
Judge Rapporteur is to create a preliminary report summarizing the case, which is distributed to the other judges to help them prepare for the hearing. Id. The Judge Rapporteur also prepares draft opinions on behalf of the chamber. Id. Because the position of
Judge Rapporteur is quite influential, judges are never assigned to cases originating from
their own country. Id.
60. See generally Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2637-47.
61. Article 8(a) of the EEC Treaty states in relevant part "[elvery citizen of the Union
shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States .... EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 8(a).
62. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2644, 1 13.
63. Opinion 2/94, RE the Accession by the Community to the European Human
Rights Convention, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996).
64. Case 260/89, Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia (ERT AE) and Another v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Another, 1991 E.C.R. I2925 [1991].
65. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v.
Steven Grogan and Others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991).
66. Case 180/83, Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539, [1984]
3 C.M.L.R.720 (1984).
67. Case C-144/95, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin, 1996 E.C.R. I2909. Although the ECJ does not officially recognize precedent, they often act in conformity with their previous decisions. HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 75. However, Kremzow is
particularly interesting since instances where the court directly cites their previous decisions are extremely uncommon. Id. at 76
68. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 264, 1 14.
69. Opinion 2/94, RE the Accession by the Community to the European Human
Rights Convention, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996). The ECJ stated
that, "it is well settled that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures." Opinion 2/94, 2. C.M.L.R. at 290, 1
33. For an excellent discussion on the arguments for European Community accession to
the ECHR, see Tara C. Stever, Protecting Human Rights in the European Union: An Argument for Treaty Reform, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 919 (1997).
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which the Kremzow court relied upon. Opinion 2/94 was an advisory
opinion 70 requested by the Council of the European Community. 71 The
request arose after contemplating the idea of opening negotiations to
72
discuss accession by the Community to the European Convention.
73
Under the authority of Article 228(6) of the Treaty of Rome, the Council asked the ECJ the following question: "Would the accession of the
European Community to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 be compatible
74
with the Treaty establishing the European Community?"
The ECJ responded by describing a two-fold problem with Community accession to the Convention. 75 First, the Community may not be
competent to make such a conclusion; and, second, there may be problems with the compatibility of the Community to the provisions of the
Treaty. 76 The ECJ noted it has the capability to give an opinion when
provided with sufficient information concerning the issue. In that particular instance, adequate information was not provided to the ECJ,
therefore, it was not appropriate to offer an opinion on the issue of
whether accession by the European Community to the European Convention would be compatible with the Treaty of Rome. 77 Second, the
ECJ asserted that both express and implied provisions of the Treaty of
Rome provide the requisite competence. 78 However, no provision within
the Treaty confers the Community institutions any general power to
enact rules on human rights or to conclude international conventions in
79
this field."
In closing, the ECJ noted that Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome8 °
70. See infra notes 165-169 and accompanying text, for a discussion of advisory opinions.
71. The Council of the European Community was created in Articles 145-154 of the
EEC Treaty. The function of the council is described in Article 146, which states in relevant part "[To ensure the objectives set out in the Treaty are attained." EEC TREATY, sUpra note 1, art. 145. The Council has jurisdiction to bring issues before the ECJ through
Article 228(6), see infra note 73 (citing the text of Article 228(6)). Advisory opinions are
discussed in further detail, infra notes 165-169.
72. See Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 267.
73. Article 228(6) states:
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is
compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the
Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may come into force only in
accordance with Article N of the Treaty on European Union.
EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 228(6).

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 269.
See id. at 288, 1 9.
See id.
See id. at 289.
See id. at 289, 1 26.
Id. at 290, 1 27.
Article 235 of the EEC Treaty states:
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can "fill the gap" when the Treaty of Rome does not include provisions
specific to issues raised in the ECJ.81 Article 235, however, cannot be
used to widen the scope of the Treaty of Rome in such a way as to informally amend the Treaty of Rome.8 2 In the end, the ECJ held that the
European Convention had "special significance",8 3 but the Community
had "no competence to accede to the Convention"8 4 without significant
amendments to the Treaty of Rome.85 As in Kremzow, this opinion is
consistently cited by the ECJ as the primary authority against acces86
sion by the Community to the Convention.
The second issue that the ECJ addressed in Kremzow was that
"measures are not acceptable in the Community which are incompatible
with observance of the human rights thus recognized and guaranteed."8 7 To emphasize this point, the Court's opinion relied on Elliniki
Radiofonia TileorassiAnonimi Etairia(ERT AE) and Another v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Another (ERT
AE").88 ERT AE involved a state-owned Greek broadcasting monopoly,
ERT AE, that brought suit against an independent broadcasting agency
for violating ERT AE's exclusive right of monopoly. The Greek Court
asked the ECJ to make ten preliminary rulings about monopolies and
their consistency with European Community law. 8 9 Question nine
asked the Convention to consider whether a monopoly controlling a
major service of a Member State is consistent with the "social objectives" of the Treaty of Rome as well as the provisions of Article 10 of the
ECHR.90 Question ten asked if the freedom of expression guaranty of
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of
the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers,
the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 235.

81. See Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 290, 1 29.
82. See id. at 290, 30.
83. Id. at 291, 1 33.
84. Id. at 291, 36.
85. See id. at 291, 35.
86. See, e.g., Case 260/89, Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia (ERT AE)
and Another v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Another, 1991
E.C.R. 1-2925, 1 41 [hereinafter ERT AE]; Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v. Steven Grogan and Others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685,
[1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, (1991), 1 30.
87. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 14.
88. ERTAE, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925.
89. See id. J 5.
90. Id. J 4. A further discussion of the relationships between Article 10 of the European Convention and the ECJ is outside the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Benjamin L.
Apt., On the Right to Freedom of Expression in the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
69, 88-92 (1998) (noting the ECJ's inconsistency in applying Article 10 of the European
Convention, yet finding that the European Convention is beyond the scope of their juris-
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the ECHR and the social objectives of the Treaty of Rome create implied
obligations on Member States. 91
In deciding questions nine and ten, the ERT AE Court first articulated the idea from Re the Accession of the Community to the European
Human Rights Convention, that fundamental rights are integral to
Community law. 92 These "fundamental rights" are found through a variety of sources including, common constitutional traditions, international treaties to which Member States are parties, and the European
Convention. 93 Measures incompatible with fundamental human rights
are unacceptable in the European Community. 94 Next, the ECJ explained that its jurisdiction to make references sought by Member
States exists only when the issue is within the scope of Community
law, 95 requiring the national court to apply the provisions in accordance
with Community law. 96 The ECJ concluded by finding that the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Rome must be "appraised in the light of
the general principle of freedom of expression embodied in Article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights."97 Through a reference to
ERT AE, the Court in Kremzow acknowledged that Community law
must be read in accordance with the principles set forth in the European Convention when the issue directly involves Community law. 98
The third point that the ECJ made in their analysis of Kremzow
was that when an issue arises in the application of Community law, the
ECJ is obligated to assist the national court to the best of its ability to
act in conformity with both Community law and the European Convention. 99 The caveat is that when the issue falls outside the scope of
Community law, there is no jurisdiction for the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling or interpretative guidance.100 Many see this as one of the
most significant problems with the ECJ and the European Community 101
The ECJ relied upon Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
diction).
91. See ERTAE, 1991 E.C.R.,

92. See id.
93. See id.

4.

41.

94. See id. ("the Community cannot accept measures which are incompatible with
observance of the human rights thus recognized and guaranteed.").

95. See id. 1 42.
96. See id. 44.
97. Id. 1 45.
98. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 1 14 ("measures are not acceptable in the
Community which are incompatible with observance of the human rights thus recognized
and guaranteed.").

99. See id. at 2645, 1 15.
100. See id.
101. See Apt, supra note 90, at 94 ("Grogan represents one of the most difficult instances of incompatibility between cultural values particular to one nation and EU subjective rights.').
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Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v. Steven Grogan and Others (SPUC) to illustrate
this point. 102 This case concerned student groups at three Irish univer10 3
sities that published information about obtaining foreign abortions,
10 4
SPUC, an organization dedibecause abortion is illegal in Ireland.
cated to prevent "the decriminalisation of abortion, and.., protect the
rights of unborn life from the moment of conception 1° 5 brought suit
against the student groups to prohibit them from publishing further information on foreign abortions. 10 6 The Irish Supreme Court found the
student's activities violated the Irish Constitution. The student groups,
however, ignored the decision of the Irish Supreme Court and continued
to publish information on foreign abortions. 107 Following this disobedience by the student groups, SPUC attempted to obtain an injunction
against the student groups from continuing to publish this controversial
information. 0 8 The High Court declined to make an immediate ruling,
and filed preliminary rulings with the ECJ.109 In the meantime, SPUC
appealed to the Supreme Court who granted the injunction, but allowed
the ECJ to decide the preliminary rulings. 110 The students argued that
the actions taken by the Irish courts breached their freedom of expression under Article 10(1) of the European Convention. 11'
The ECJ answered the preliminary rulings by again nodding to the
notion that fundamental rights are integral to the Community. 112 The
ECJ next stated that the function of the ECJ is to "give the national
court all the guidance as to interpretation necessary" to make a decision
in compliance with the European Convention when the issue was
within the scope of Community law. 113 Because this issue fell outside
the scope of Community law, the ECJ could not offer interpretive guidance to the Irish Courts." l4 The ECJ finally held that it was "not contrary to Community law for a Member State... to prohibit students as-

sociations from distributing information.

..

."115

In Kremzow, the ECJ

used this case to illustrate that when an issue falls outside the scope of

102. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v.
Steven Grogan and Others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991) [hereinafter

SPuC].
103. See SPUC, 3 C.M.L.R. at 855.
104. See id. at 887, 1 3.
105. Id. at 887, 1 2.
106. See id. at 855.
107. See id. at 888, 1 7.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 888, 1 8.
110. See id.
111. Article 10(1) states in relevant part, "[elveryone has the right to freedom of expression." European Convention, supranote 13, art. 10(1).
112. See SPUC, 3 C.M.L.R at 892,1 30
113. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 1 15.
114. See SPUC, 3 C.M.L.R at 892, 1 31.
115. Id. at 893.
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Community law, the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to offer interpretive
116
guidance.
The fourth issue the Kremzow Court addressed was that a hypothetical possibility of restraint upon his right to freedom of movement
does not create a "sufficient connection with Community law to justify
the application of Community provisions."117 To emphasize this point,
the ECJ referred to Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg (Moser),
decided in 1984.118 This case centered on Moser, a man prohibited from
earning his teaching certificate due to his affiliation with the German
Communist party. 119 Moser sued the Land authorities for their refusal
to allow him to take the certification exams and to prohibit him from
the possibility of teaching in another Member State. 120 The ECJ
strongly disagreed with Moser's attempt to establish a weak connection
with Community law when there was no German remedy available to
12 1
him.
The ECJ first stated that Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome 122 was
not applicable to exclusively internal issues of a Member State. 123 The
ECJ went on to find that "purely hypothetical"'124 issues brought by a
party are not actionable, and a person cannot rely on Community law
"to contest the application to him of the legislation of his own country."'125 In Kremzow, Moser supported the analysis that hypothetical
situations, created purely to establish a connection to the Community,
are insufficient to apply Treaty of Rome provisions to an individual or a
26
Member State.1
The final analytical point the ECJ made was that Kremzow's pun127
ishment was for the violation of a national law, not a community law.
The crimes he committed (murder and illegal possession of a weapon)
were within the exclusive realm of national law 128 and were not created

116. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 15 ("however, the Court has no such jurisdiction with regard to national legislation lying outside the scope of community law.").
117. Id. at 2645 16. In contrast, actual depravation of a citizen's right to freedom of
movement is actionable by the ECJ. Id.
118. Case 180/83, Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539, [1984]
3 C.M.L.R. 720 (1984).
119. See Moser, 3 C.M.L.R. at 722.
120. See id. at 725, 1 4.
121. See id. at 728, 11 18-20.
122. Article 48(1) of the EEC Treaty states "[F]reedom of movement for workers shall
be secured within the Community ... " EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 48.
123. See Moser, 3 C.M.L.R. at 727, 1 15.
124. Id. at 728, 1 18.
125. Id. at 728, 1 20.
126. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 1 16 ("a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising
that right [right to free movement] does not establish a sufficient connection with Community law to justify the application of Community provisions').
127. See id. at 2646, 1 17
128. See id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY

VOL. 27:4

or intended to comply with Community law.129 The Court referred to a
1996 opinion, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin
(Maurin)to make their final point. 130
The Maurin case involved a man arrested for selling food past the
expiration date on the package. In his defense, Maurin relied on a
French procedural rule, asserting that because the head of the investigation did not sign the police report, the report was void under both
French national law and the European Convention. 131 The case was
brought before the ECJ on a preliminary ruling to determine whether
the French national law was "compatible with the general principles of
law laid down by the ECJ."'1 32 The ECJ found it lacked jurisdiction to
decide a matter of exclusive national legislation that was not within the
purview of Community law. 133 The holding in Moser is substantially
similar to the holding in Kremzow, both refused to give a preliminary
ruling on issues falling outside the scope of Community law.
After the brief discussion of these five cases, the Kremzow Court
held that the question, whether the European Convention is substantively part of Community law allowing the ECJ to give preliminary
rulings on the interpretation of the European Convention, did not fall
inside the scope of Community law. 34 The questions were concerned
with Austrian national legislation not Community law, therefore, the
Court could not give the Austrian Supreme Court a preliminary ruling. 135 The refusal of the ECJ to provide interpretative guidance to the
Austrian Supreme Court demonstrates its attempt to further define the
scope of Community law by refusing to extend ECJ jurisdiction to include the European Convention.
IV. DISCUSSION
This case note will first look briefly at the history and jurisdiction
of the ECJ in order to establish the context for the following discussion.

129. See id.
130. Case C-144/95, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin, 1996 E.C.R. I2909 [1996]. Maurin is similar to Kremzow as both cases concern national criminal proceedings and their relationship to Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. EEC TREATY, supra
note 1, art. 177. It is possible that Maurin heavily influenced the final decision in
Kremzow, as it is the capstone of the Court's analysis.
131. See Maurin, 1996 E.C.R., 1 3.
132. Id. J 6.
133. See id. 12. See also Krenzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, J 17 ("Mr. Kremzow was sentenced for murder and for illegal possession of a firearm under provisions of national law
which were not designed to secure compliance with rules of Community law."). See also
Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwaebisch Gmuend, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, 1 28 (1987).
134. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, 1 19.
135. Id.
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Next, it will examine human rights in Europe and argue that they are
protected through a number of other European and international institutions. These institutions negate the necessity for the ECJ to offer additional protection. Finally, this paper will conclude that it is in the
best interest of Europe to allow the ECJ to limit its authority to matters
exclusively within the scope of Union law, rather than extending its jurisdiction to include human rights issues.
A. History and Jurisdictionof the European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice is the primary judicial branch of the
1 36
European Union, created by Articles 164-188 of the Treaty of Rome.
The main function of the ECJ is to "ensure that in the interpretation
and application of this Treaty, the law is observed."'137 Historically, the
ECJ was the final authority on Union law in terms of its application
within the European Union; between the European Union and Member
States; and, between individuals and the European Union.' 38 Eventually, the extraordinary workload of the ECJ became too burdensome
and the ECJ suggested establishing a secondary court to handle a portion of their caseload. 139 This suggestion lead to the creation of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) in 1989.140 The CFI has the authority to
hear a variety of cases and their decisions are only reviewable by the
ECJ on legal issues.' 4 ' Essentially, the CFI takes away the burden of
routine cases, allowing the ECJ to concentrate on cases that the court
42
can use to further develop and clarify EU law.'
136. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 164-188. For additional information on the
European Union, see generally CAIRNS, supra note 6.
137. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 164. For a provocative analysis of the legal theory and justifications used by the ECJ, see JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL
REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (1992).

138. See CAIRNS, supra note 6, at 34.
139. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & FRANCIS
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 64 (3rd ed. 1989).

G. JACOBS,

THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE

140. See CAIRNS, supra note 6, at 35. The Court of First Instance ("CFI') was created
by Article 168(a) of the EEC Treaty. Article 168(a) reads in relevant part:
A Court of First Instance shall be attached to the Court of Justice with
jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance, subject to a right of
appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only and in accordance
with the conditions laid down by the Statute, certain classes of action
or proceeding defined in accordance with the conditions laid down in
paragraph 2. The Court of First Instance shall not be competent to hear
and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article
177.
EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 168(a).
141. See CAIRNS, supra note 6, at 34

142. See id, at 35. The Court of First Instance has limited jurisdiction and hears all
actions that concern EU trademark laws, staff cases, competition cases, plant variety
rights cases and cases brought by individual plaintiffs. DINNAGE & MURPHY, supra note
6, at 34-35.
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The ECJ has no inherent jurisdiction 143 but derives its broad jurisdiction from the EU Treaty, specifically Articles 177-183.144 There are
three main categories of the ECJ's jurisdiction: judgments, opinions and
145
appellate jurisdiction over the Court of First Instance.
The most common source of jurisdiction for the ECJ are judgments,
a loose term describing any number of actions brought before the
ECJ.146 Judgments concern the intricate relationship between Union
law and Member States' law, and are considered fundamentally imporare
tant in effectuating Union law within the Member States. 147 There
148
two types of judgments: direct actions and preliminary rulings.
Direct actions arise when the ECJ has jurisdiction by agreement or
direct application of the law. 149 Direct actions begin at the ECJ, and
the ECJ is the final decision maker; there is no appellate procedure. 150
This type of judgment concerns issues brought by or against Member
States, any of the Union's institutions, and in rare cases, by private
151
citizens of the EU.
Preliminary rulings are often requested when the national court of
a Member State is faced with an issue that directly relates to the application of EU law within that State. 152 The national court requests a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ, and the ECJ has the jurisdiction to
decide these issues under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. 153 The decision reached by the ECJ on a specific point of EU law is then adopted
by the national court to its own decision. 154 The ECJ has jurisdiction to
make preliminary rulings on three issues: treaty interpretation, questions of validity, and interpretation regarding acts of Union institutions
and interpretation of statutes created by EU institutions. 155 This was
the basis for the Court's jurisdiction in Kremzow, the Austrian Supreme
Court asked the ECJ to make preliminary rulings on two questions
156
dealing with the application of Union law to Austrian national law.
The rationale behind the Court's involvement with preliminary

143.

HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 56.

144.

See EEC TREATY, supra note 5, arts. 177-83.

145.

See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139, at 71-75.

See generally HARTLEY, supra

note 1, at 58-63.
146. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 58-61. See also BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139,
at 71-73.
147. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 58-61.
148. See id. at 59.
149.
150.

See id. at 61. See also BENGOETXEA, supra note 137, at 14-15.
See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 61.

151. See id. at 61.
152. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 59. See also BENGOETXEA, supra note 137, at 15.
153. See EEC TREATY, supra note 6, art. 177. Full text of Article 177 is supra note 55.
154.

See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 59.

155. See EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 177. Full text of Article 177 is supra note 55.
156. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642-44, 1 12.
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rulings is to ensure consistency in terms of application and interpretation of Community law within Member States because consistency is
widely recognized as the hallmark for a successful and functional community. 157 Preliminary rulings have been a primary vehicle for the ECJ
to define and shape Union law.' 58 Recent criticism of the ECJ suggests
the ECJ has not offered Member States adequate guidance in their
opinions on preliminary rulings, leaving Member States to interpret the
judgment as they see fit. 15 9 This significantly increases the potential for
60
inconsistent judgments by the Member States. 1
In addition to preliminary rulings and direct actions, judgments
can be in the form of actions against Member States, 16' judicial review
of community acts, 162 and plenary jurisdiction, 163 although a large part
of the Court's former authority over plenary jurisdiction has been delegated to the CFI.164
The second form of jurisdiction of the ECJ is that of advisory opinions. 165 Article 228(6) of the EU Treaty authorizes this jurisdiction by
explaining:
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may
obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether
an agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of
Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force

157. See, e.g., P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 66 (1985).
It is interesting to compare the system of interpretation of Union law to the system of appellate procedure in the United States. Preliminary rulings are a feature unique to the
ECJ. There is no similar system in the United States, whereby a State court can ask a
Federal court for any kind of interpretive guidance before they reach a decision. Because
interpretation of Union law is such a critical role for national courts throughout the EU
throughout the EU, many issues have been raised before the ECJ before they are decided
by the national court. See DINNAGE & MURPHY, supra note 6, at 360.
158. See BENGOETXEA, supra note 137, at 15.
159. See CAIRNS, supra note 6, at 301.
160. See id. See also Stever, supra note 69, at 943-46 (summarizing the ECJ's decision in Solange I and commenting that the legal consistency of the European Community
is jeopardized when 'Member State courts do not agree on an interpretation of EC law
and apply varying forms of a directive.").
161. See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139, at 76. Actions against Member States occur when a Member State is charged with not fulfilling its obligations under the EEC
Treaty and the ECJ has the jurisdiction to hear these cases based on Articles 169 and 170
of the EEC Treaty. Id.
162. See id. at 95-96. The ECJ has jurisdiction to judicially review acts of the EU under Articles 173 and 179 of the EEC Treaty. Id.
163. See id. at 131-32. Plenary jurisdiction is a French concept that was adopted by
the EU. Id at 131. It refers to the Court's ability to have jurisdiction over issues concerning penalties established by the Treaty. The ECJ derives its plenary jurisdiction
from Articles 172, 178, and 179 of the EEC Treaty. Id.
164. See id. at 132.
165. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 59.
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only in accordance with Article N of the Treaty on Euro1 66
pean Union.
Advisory opinions are used preemptively when the Council, the
Commission, or a Member State is unsure of the compatibility of a future action with the Treaty. 167 Advisory opinions are rarely used because they ask the Court to define the scope of a particular aspect EU
Treaty.168 If the ECJ concludes that the action in question is outside
the purview of the Treaty only an amendment to the Treaty providing
for such action, will legitimate the action.169
The ECJ's final area of jurisdiction is appellate jurisdiction over issues of law arising in the Court of First Instance.' 70 This is a new form
171
of jurisdiction for the ECJ, and is exclusively limited to points of law.
An appeal may arise from any infringement of Union law, including ultra vires actions 172 and procedural errors. 173 When the ECJ accepts an
appeal from the CFI, the decision of the CFI is no longer valid and the
ECJ must either decline a final judgment or remand the case back to
174
the CFI for further proceedings.
Although the CFI relieved some of the burden on the ECJ, the
number of cases pending before the ECJ remains staggering. 175 Therefore, the CFI has done little to reduce the backlog of cases for the ECJ
even though the CFI remains busy in its own right. 176 Adding human
rights issues to the ECJ's already broad jurisdictional base would
greatly increase the already dramatic backlog of cases awaiting decision
by the ECJ.
B. European Human Rights are Protected through other European and
InternationalInstitutions.
The Kremzow decision naturally introduces the question of whether
the European Union offers sufficient human rights protection to its

166. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 228(6). Full text of Article 228(6) is supra, note
73.
167.

See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139, at 203. See also EEC TREATY, supra note

1, art. 228(6).
168. See also HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 59.
169. See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139, at 203. See also EEC TREATY, supra note
1, art. 228(6).
170.
171.

See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139, at 75.
See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 62.

172. The doctrine of ultra vires refers to an action taken by a legislative body that is
outside the scope of their authority. WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2480 (1993).
173. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 62.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 58.
176. See id.
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Member States. At first, it may appear paradoxical that the Kremzow
Court proclaimed fundamental rights as integral to the Union, then refused to make a decision on the human rights issue presented by this
case. 177 However, the issue of human rights in Europe is significantly
more complex. Kremzow should be analyzed within the complete spectrum of human rights protection, both on a European scale and worldwide scale, rather than an exclusive province of the ECJ. The following
paragraphs will discuss the proposition that human rights are more
than adequately protected throughout Europe. 178 Further, there is an
urgent need to allow the ECJ to limit its jurisdiction if it is to remain a
179
legitimate and successful judicial body.
European human rights are protected on multiple levels through a
network of Treaties, State practice, and the European Court of Human
Rights.' 80 The European Convention was established as a regional effort to secure the fundamental human rights described in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.' 8 ' To enforce and protect the ideals set
forth in the European Convention, the Treaty also established the
European Court of Human Rights.' 8 2 The Council of Europe, whose
Member States are all signatories to the European Convention,'8 3 differs in structure, function, and purpose from the EU. 8 4 The Council of
Europe was established as a political body for the promotion of European unity, 8 5 while the EU (and its predecessor the European Economic Community) was created to develop Europe's economic interests.' 8 6 Interestingly, the fifteen Member States of the European Union
are all members of the Council of Europe, and signatories to the European Convention.' 8 7 Because these two bodies are separate, the ECJ
governs only the European Union and has no jurisdiction over issues
arising from the Council of Europe or the European Convention. 8 8 To
further confuse these two institutions, ECJ opinions frequently recog-

177. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2644, 1 13.
178. See, e.g., Brems, supra note 46, at 478-79.

179. Id.
180. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 1 14.
181. See European Convention, supra note 13, at preamble ("Being resolved, as the
Governments of European countries which are likeminded and have a common heritage of
political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration.")
182. See supra,note 13 and accompanying text (describing the ECHR).
183. See supra, note 7 and accompanying text (describing the European Convention).
184. See supra, note 6. See also Sera, supra note 46, at 152.
185. For further information on the Council of Europe, see Leuprecht, supra note 7, at
313-36 (providing a historical analysis of the Council of Europe and its human rights protections).
186. See CLEMENTS, supra note 13, at 2-3.
187. Compare supra note 6 (describing the EU) with supra note 7 (describing the
Council of Europe).
188. See EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 164-88.
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nize that the fundamental freedoms represented by the European Convention are integral to the ideals of the European Union.18 9
When the European Community, now integrated as the EU, was
established through the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty failed to include basic human rights provisions.190 The 1993 amendments to the Treaty of
Rome, the Treaty on European Union, remedied this situation in part
through Article F, which states that "[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome
on 4 November 1950."191 The extent to which Article F should be interpreted as providing human rights protection to the European Union and
its Member States is the subject of current debate. 192 Currently, Article
F is not enforceable by the ECJ based upon Article L of the Treaty on
European Union. 193 The failure of the EU to provide its members with
adequate human rights protection is seen by many people as a fundav4
mental problem of the EU.
As noted above, all members of the EU (which does not provide a
bill of rights for basic human rights) are also members of the Council of
Europe (which does provide a bill of rights for basic human rights). 195
Therefore, all members of the EU receive regional human rights protection through their affiliation with the Council of Europe. Clearly, there
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See Sera, supra note 46, at 161.
See generally EEC TREATY, supra note 1.
TEU, supranote 6, art. F. Full text of Article F is infra, note 231.
See infra, notes 231-235 and accompanying text.
Article L of the TEU states:
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and
the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community concerning the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the exercise of those powers shall apply only to the following
provisions of this Treaty: (a) provisions amending the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with a view to establishing
the European Community, the Treaty establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community and the Treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community; (b) the third subparagraph of Article
K.3(2)(c); (c) Articles L-S.
TEU, supra note 6, art. L (emphasis added).
194. See Sera, supra note 46, at 185. Sera makes the argument that accession to the
European Convention would solve many of the problems faced by the EU resulting from
their lack of a bill of rights. See also Stever, supra note 69, at 991 ("The European Community should amend the EEC TREATY to allow for accession to the ECHR so that the
European Community, along with Member States and institutions, will be held accountable consistently for human rights violations.").
195. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. See also Sera, supra note 46, at 154
('The Council of Europe, an organization entirely independent from the EU, has as its
thirty-nine members all European states, and among them are all the Member-States of
the EU."). This was written before Russia, the 40th member, joined the Council of Europe.
See supra,note 7.
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is a significant overlap between the Member States of these two institutions. There are strong arguments that both institutions are better
served by performing separate tasks. Specifically, to leave the monitoring of human rights exclusively to the Council of Europe while the
European Union focuses on the economic aspect of the Union. The case
196
note will later discuss this issue in detail.
While Europe has a comprehensive set of treaties and conventions
protecting against human rights abuse, further human rights protection
is available to individual Member States by becoming signatories to
various international declarations and conventions. 197 Many European
countries support the international efforts to combat human rights
abuse by signing these declarations and conventions, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 198 the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,199the Convention on Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 200 the Convention Against Torture, 20' the Genocide
Convention, 20 2 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,203 and the
Convention on Discrimination Against Women. 204 Since each Member
State possesses the discretion to ratify international conventions, not
all members of the EU are signatories to all of the conventions listed
above. 20 5 Through these various mechanisms, Europe has successfully
established a multi-layered system of human rights protection for its
206
citizens.
One caveat to any criticism of the European human rights system
is that this issue must be analyzed on a global scale rather than in a
purely regional context. Europe, as a unified community, represents
the most exceptional human rights system currently in place. 207 The
issues arising before the European Courts are relatively sophisticated
196. See infra, notes 237-247 and accompanying text.
197. See Stever, supra note 69, at 968-69.
198. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (1948).
199. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
200. Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M
352.
201. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified 24 I.L.M. 535.
202. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227.
203. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448.
204. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33.
205. See, e.g., signatories to Conventions listed supra, notes 196-204.
206. See ROBERTSON & MERRILS, supra note 8, at 156.
207. "Over the years, the Council of Europe has set up a system of human rights protection which, in spite of certain weaknesses and shortcomings, can be regarded as the
most advanced international human rights structure in the world today." Leuprecht, supra note 7, at 314. See also JANIS, supra note 46, at 3; ROBERTSON & MERRILS, supra note
8, at 156.
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compared to human rights violations occurring in other parts of the
world. 208 When Kremzow is examined through this perspective, the
case takes on a different demeanor. It is not a globally recognized right
or even custom to allow a convicted murderer to appeal their judgment
on human rights grounds. Kremzow's application for relief based on his
inability to defend himself in person would be difficult to sustain in
many parts of the world. Nevertheless, Kremzow was successful at the
ECHR when it recognized this as a violation of his rights under the
20 9
European Convention.
The European multi-layered system for human rights protection
clearly reveals the adequate protection available to both individuals
210
and Member States of various European supranational bodies.
Therefore, the ECJ, created purely as the judicial body for the EU, does
not deny the EU basic human rights when it refuses to define the relationship between the EU and the European Convention. Instead, the
ECJ has the luxury of limiting its jurisdiction and allowing other institutions created expressly for the protection of human rights, the ECHR,
to adjudicate without interference from them. Defining the jurisdictional limits between the ECJ and the ECHR benefits both judicial
bodies; it allows the ECJ to focus on EU law while permitting the
ECHR to be the lone decisionmaker on European human rights is21 1
sues.
C. Jurisdictionof the European Court of Justice Should be Limited to
Matters of Union Law Exclusively.
After Kremzow, the following question remains: is the inability of
the ECJ to provide guidance regarding the European Convention in the
best interest of the European Union and its Member States? The enduring question presented by the Kremzow decision surfaces in the jurisprudence of the ECJ and is the subject of endless debate within the
international human rights field. One position supports accession by
the Union to the European Convention as the most effective way to establish human rights for the Union. 212 Another position asserts that

208. See ROBERTSON & MERRILS, supra note 8, at 156. Robertson and Merrills comment that "[Tihe systematic torture of political prisoners, arrest of persons who then 'disappear', persecution of political opponents, imprisonment of human rights activists, and
other practices which are prevalent elsewhere pose problems which are immeasurably
more serious than those which constitute the day-to-day business of the European organs." Id.
209. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640-41, 1 6.
210. See supra notes 197-209.
211. For an interesting comparison of the relationships between the ECHR, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, and their respective Member States, see Jarmul, supra
note 45, at 311-65
212. Stever, supra note 69, at 919.
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the Treaty of Rome should incorporate a bill of rights. 21 3 Others suggest that perhaps human rights are already sufficiently incorporated
into the EU through Article F of the Treaty on European Union. 21 4 This
case note argues a different position, that human rights are already sufficiently protected in Europe through the multi-layered system discussed earlier, and the ECJ must limit its caseload to issues of Union
law if it is to remain a successful and legitimate judicial body.
The first position mentioned argues that accession to the Union is
the most effective way to establish human rights for the Union. 21 5 This
position asserts that the EU should ratify the European Convention
and amend the Treaty of Rome to allow for individual access to the ECJ
on human rights issues. 216 Procedurally, an individual bringing a human rights claim would first exhaust all national remedies, appeal to
the ECJ, and finally appeal to the ECHR - the final decisionmaker for
human rights issues in Europe. 217 This position, heavily promoted a
219
few years ago, 218 now appears to have lost some of its momentum.
One problem with EU accession to the European Convention is that
it would severely alter the current structure of the ECJ. By allowing
for individual petitions to the ECJ, there is the potential that the effects
of a national court decision would be minimized, which could turn the
ECJ into an appellate court for all forty Member States of the Council of
Europe. Another reason why this suggestion is problematic is that the
ECJ is currently the final judicial authority on EU issues. By subjecting the ECJ to review by the ECHR, the ECJ would be no more than a
supranational appellate court, a position entirely foreign to the ECJ,
and arguably an undesirable position for any supranational court. This
fundamental structural shift would demand a number of ramifications
at both the Member State level and the judicial level. 220 Additionally,
problems could arise, as the ECJ would be responsible for interpreting
another treaty that is already competently interpreted by the ECHR.221

213. See, e.g., Sera, supra note 46, at 178.
214. See infra notes 231-235 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Stever, supra note 69, at 919 (arguing that accession by the Union to
the European Convention is the most desirable solution to promote human rights in the
EU):
216. See Sera, supra note 46, at 178.
217. See id. at 178-79.
218. See, e.g., Stever, supra note 69, at 919; Sera, supra note 46, at 176-85.
219. See Leuprecht, supra note 7, at 335 ("the prospects for Community (or Union)
accession seem rather more remote than a few years ago.").
220. See generally Mary Frances Dominick, Toward a Community Bill of Rights: The
European Community Charterof FundamentalSocial Rights, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 639,
668 (1990/1991) ("As a federated Europe comes closer to reality, it is essential that its institutional framework contain explicit, envocable, and directly effective fundamental protections for those whom the governments are designed to serve.").
221. The ECHR is guided by the European Convention. See supra note 13, arts. 38-
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Accession would place a large burden upon the ECJ by increasing its
caseload, and arguably alter the caseload of the ECHR only minimally,
as human rights issues could still be appealed to the ECHR from the
ECJ.222 It is unclear if this position suggests that the ECHR would exclusively function as a supreme court, or if individuals would be able to
appeal directly to the ECHR and bypass the ECJ.
A different position suggests the Treaty of Rome should incorporate
a bill of rights; establishing human rights protections for the EU and
enforceable by the ECJ.223 An interesting parallel is to compare the
EU's potential to adopt a bill of rights to the United States, as a loose
federation adopting the same document two hundred years ago. Just as
the American Constitution originally failed to provide American citizens
with comprehensive human rights protections, the Treaty of Rome
failed to provide citizens of the EU with such protections. The United
States remedied this situation three years after the ratification of the
Constitution when the States ratified the first ten amendments, collectively known as the "Bill of Rights". 224 Europe approached human
rights protections for its citizens in an entirely different manner. The
Treaty of Rome, establishing what has now become the European Union, was signed in 1957 and, as discussed earlier, did not provide human rights protections. 225 However, the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was passed
and entered into force, four years before Europe had a unifying
treaty. 226 The European Convention established comprehensive human
rights protections for all of Europe and created a special supranational
judicial body to adjudicate this issue, the European Court of Human
Rights. 227 While the United States established a union prior to offering
human rights protections, Europe accomplished human rights protection before creation of their unifying body. 228 It is possible to propose
222. See Sera, supra note 46, at 179 ("Once an individual has exhausted all of her "national remedies" up through the ECJ, she would then have the opportunity to appeal to
[what is now the unified ECHR in Strasbourg].").
223. See, e.g., id. at 178 ("there have been occasions in which the European Community has proposed and agreed to an enumerated list of rights that should be protected in
the Community.").
224. U.S. CONST. arts. 1-10 (1791).
225. See also text accompanying supra notes 185-189 (discussing the failure of the
EEC Treaty to include human rights protections). See generally EEC TREATY, supranote
1.
226. See European Convention, supra note 13. It is important to remember that the
European Convention was created by the Council of Europe, an entirely different body
than the European Union and the extent to which human rights are protected in Europe
today stem from the difference in these two bodies. See supra, notes 13 and accompanying text.
227. See European Convention, supra note 13, arts. 38-56; ECHR, supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
228. Compare U.S. CONST. arts. 1-10 (incorporating the Bill of Rights into the United
States Constitution) with European Convention, supra note 13, arts. 1-66 (providing hu-
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that establishing human rights protections was of greater importance to
Europe than unionization. This comparison will become even more provocative should Europe make the decision to unionize to the extent that
the United States has.
It is unlikely that the EU will adopt a bill of rights for a number of
reasons. First, the Member States of the EU are already provided with
more than adequate human rights protection through their individual
accession to the European Convention. 229 It would be redundant for the
ECJ to enforce the same treaty over similar jurisdiction as the ECHR.
Second, this suggestion is not a solution to the lack of human rights
protection in the EU because there is nothing to suggest that decisions
from the ECJ would be any different than without a bill of rights, as
they already profess that fundamental rights are integral to Union
230
law.
Another position asserts that European human rights are adequately protected through an interpretation of Article F of the Treaty
on European Union as binding the Union to the European Convention.231 A debate of current interest is the extent to which Article F actually incorporates the European Convention into the EU. Article F,
which requires the EU to "respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by
the European Convention", is the primary manner that the EU currently provides human rights protections to its citizens. 232 As previously mentioned, the major drawback to utilizing Article F as the main
human rights enforcement mechanism for the EU is that it is unen-

man rights and fundamental freedoms protection for the Council of Europe).
229. Member States of the EU are listed supra, note 6.
230. See Sera, supra note 46, at 178. Furthermore, Sera argues that this option is
heavily criticized because it does not give citizens of the EU notice of what liberties are
protected by a potential bill of rights. Id. However, this critique is difficult to understand
from an American point of view because notice is traditionally satisfied when it is made
public through an accepted medium. From this perspective, it is hard to imagine that
such a sweeping change in ECJ jurisprudence would not be made public to EU citizens in
an acceptable manner, to put them on notice of these new protections. See also Kremzow,
3 C.M.L.R. at 264, 1 14 ("fundamental rights for an integral part of the general principles
of Community law.").
231. See Sera, supra note 46, at 153. Article F of the Treaty on European Union provides:
1. The Union shall respect the national identities of its member-States,
whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy. 2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the memberStates, as general principles of Community law. 3. The Union shall
prove itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry
through its policies.
TEU, supra note 6, art. F.
232. TEU, supra note 6, art. F. Full text of Article F is supra note 231.
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forceable by the ECJ.233 Due to this anomaly, the ECJ specifically
found that the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed in
the European Convention "form an integral part of the general principles of Community law", 234 a position they frequently reaffirm. 235 Although the ECJ may choose to reaffirm this position in every case, it
does not change the fact that it is not bound to enforce the European
Convention.
The final position and the position articulated by this case note is
that limiting the ECJ case load to issues arising exclusively from the
EU Treaty would best serve the EU. A successful judicial body requires
that the ECJ limits its caseload to some degree. The ECJ has already
done this, in part, by limiting the scope of its jurisdiction to the issues
set out in Articles 164-188 of the EU Treaty. 236 Thus, the ECJ limited
its jurisdiction by excluding issues that are of purely national interest
to Member States and not relevant to Union law. 237 By excluding itself
from the internal jurisprudence of Member States, the ECJ clearly asserts that their function is not to serve as an additional national Supreme Court for each of the fifteen Member States who are signatories
to the EU Treaty. 238 The decision by the ECJ to limit its case load provides the dual function of: (1) offering security to national courts of
knowing that the ECJ will not interfere with their purely internal issues, while (2) providing the ECJ with a more limited function and allowing them to concentrate on the application of EU law.
Within this framework, it becomes easier to understand the ECJ's
predicament when faced with a case such as Kremzow. 2 39 Since there is
240
no legal obligation for the ECJ to follow the European Convention,
they cannot offer interpretive guidance on human rights issues falling
within the scope of Convention law. 241 Therefore, as seen in Kremzow,
the court may acknowledge that human rights exist in Union law, but
may not offer interpretive guidance to the Member State because the

233. See id. art. L. Full text of Article L is supra,note 193.
234. Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 290.
235. See, e.g., Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 264, 1 14; Case 260/89, ERTAE, 1991 E.C.R. I2925, at 41.
236. Jurisdiction over preliminary rulings is set out in Article 177, supra note 56. To
examine the ECJ's jurisdiction in general, see Articles 173-183. EEC TREATY, supra note
1, arts. 164-188.
237. See Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539, [1984] 3
C.M.L.R. 720, 728, 1 20 (1984) ("the provisions of the [EEC] Treaty ... cannot be applied
to situations which are purely an internal concern of a member-State, i.e. which have no
connection with any of the situations envisaged by Community law."); Kremzow, 3
C.M.L.R. at 2646, 19.
238. See EEC TREATY, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
239. See generallyKremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2637-47.
240. See Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 291, 1 36.
241. See generallyKremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, 19.
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In
issue of human rights remains a wholly internal matter. 242
Kremzow, the ECJ performed the necessary limiting function to ensure
that the scope of its jurisdiction remains manageable and is not pushed
beyond the boundaries established by the EU Treaty, and remains at a
2 43
level it can currently maintain.
If the ECJ were to become involved in the human rights arena, it
would not be as effective in interpreting the actual provisions of EU
law. Member States are capable of providing for the enforcement of
both supranational courts' judgments (the ECJ and the ECHR). A
Member State's refusal to enforce the judgment of one court should not
necessarily prompt action by the other. The extent that either court
should begin to enforce judgments of the other raises issues of integration of the two courts. This subject is beyond the scope of this casenote.
What becomes clear is that human rights in the EU are fundamentally
important, yet the issue begs clarification in order for the EU to become
a truly unified body.
In the wake of the complexities surrounding the Kremzow decision,
it can actually supply a defining statement of the scope of Union law.
Since the ECHR does not provide adequate measures for enforcement of
its decisions, there is currently no remedy for a party when the Member
State refuses to enforce a decision of the ECHR.244 Kremzow, attempting to confront and challenge this issue, appealed to the ECJ for a
resolution of this highly debated area of European law. 24 5 Kremzow
may have intended that his action provoke the ECJ into offering a definitive statement of the relationship between the European Union and
the European Convention, but the ECJ refused revisit a previously addressed issue. 246 Instead, the court maintained its position that separation of the various European institutions is essential to the proper function of the Union and refused to expand its already broad jurisdiction.
The ECJ decision in Kremzow exemplifies only one of the many
complexities of European law. Some scholars suggest that perhaps if
they simplified their regional groups Europe could better protect human
rights. 247 Simplification may have lead to a favorable outcome for Mr.
Kremzow, if it was confusion as to each court's role within the Europe
that ultimately led to the non-enforcement of his judgment. However,

242. See id.
243. See EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 164-88.
244. See Jarmul, supra note 45, at 331. See also RALPH BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND EUROPE 22 (1993). Beddard discussed this contradiction by explaining that "[O]ften
applicants have been no better off, except in peace of mind, after applying to the European Commission, although in fact the presence of the Convention and the existence of its
machinery has improved the quality of life of many other European citizens." Id.
245. See Krernzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642-44, 1 12.
246. See generally Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 265-91.
247. See generallyROBERTSON & MERRILS, supranote 8, at 191.
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this suggests a larger problem that unless there are competent enforcement mechanisms available to the ECHR, Member States may
continue to ignore judgments such as in Kremzow.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is surprising that in the more than fifty years of the European
Union, there remains no formal declaration of human rights. 248 While
human rights are adequately protected in Europe through the European Convention, 249 it is important to remember that the ECJ was not
established to protect the human rights of Union members. 250 The
ECHR was created specifically to perform this task, but it is the exact
situation seen in Kremzow that suggests the distinction between these
two supranational courts is not so clear.
In defense of the action taken by the ECJ, the ECJ must clearly define what issues fall within its jurisdiction, and it is not within its jurisdiction to hear cases concerning human rights. Fortunately for citizens
of the EU, that responsibility falls within the jurisdiction of the ECHR.
If one analyzes this decision as a failure by the EU to protect human
rights, a greater message is lost. That message is that the ECJ continues to empower the ECHR by deferring to its better judgment concerning human rights issues.
The ECJ already has an enormous jurisdictional base, partially
demonstrated by its recent need to establish a secondary court. 25 1
Adding another area to the ECJ's jurisdiction would only make the ECJ
less efficient and less effective in implementing the laws it was created
to enforce. This is additionally supported by the fact that Europe has
established the ECHR. The exclusive purpose of the ECHR is to adjudicate potential human rights violations, and to serve as a model for human rights protections throughout the rest of the world.
As Europe moves closer to unionization, a reexamination of the
powers and jurisdiction of these two courts are imminent. Many possibilities exist for the status of these supranational courts if full unionization is reached, and possibly some degree of integration will result.
While the EU concentrates on the economic aspect of unionization for
the moment, the Council of Europe remains Europe's primary human
rights monitor. The Kremzow opinion is therefore a necessary limita248. Sera, supra note 46, at 152. See also EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 1-240.
249. See generally European Convention, supra note 13.
250. While the ECJ defers to the European Convention when issues concerning human rights arise, the European Convention does not bind them. Sera, supra note 46, at
152.
251. See supra, note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the Court of First Instance).
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tion on the ECJ's jurisdiction, rather than a denial of human rights protection for the citizens of the European Union.

JOB CENTRE: THE ONGOING DEMISE OF PUBLIC
MONOPOLIES IN EUROPE
CATHERINE OLSON*

I. INTRODUCTION

'It is ultimately the competitive activities of undertakings driven by
self-interest to trade across frontiers, which makes the single market a
reality."
-

Adam Smith

In the 1990s, the European Union has become highly focused on
competitiveness. 2 The dynamics of economic integration and the need
for job growth in the midst of a more globally competitive and technologically-oriented environment have created this impetus. 3 Community
institutions, primarily the European Commission (Commission), have
focused on promoting economic efficiency via policy harmonization
among national economies and liberalization and privatization within
4
national economies.

*

J.D. Candidate, May 2000.

1. CHRISTOFER BELLAMY & GRAHAM CHILD COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION,
16 & n.2 (3d ed. 1987).
2. The title "European Union" was used after the implementation of the Maastricht
Treaty in November 1993 to reflect the increased economic, political, and social integration of the organization. Prior to that, the organization was referred to as the European
Community. Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Dilemma of the European Union:
Balancing the Power of the SupranationalEU Entity against the Sovereignty of its Independent Member Nations, 9 PACE INT'L L. REV. 111, 111 n.1 (1997). The term Community
will be used throughout this article to refer to the European Union.
3. See Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21", Century: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM(93)700 Final [hereinafter Commission White Paper] (discussing the link between
competition and employment and the necessary conditions to enhance both). In particular, the White Paper states, "[T]he [Member State] regulatory environment is still too
rigid, and administrative and managerial traditions too centralized and compartmentalized ... [G]overnment policies are often still too defensive and do not take sufficient account of the new constraints imposed by global competition." Commission White Paper,
art. II, ch. 2(A).
4. See Dana L. Romaniuk, Note, Regulating Public Monopolies in Furtheranceof the
EEC Free Competition Goal:Article 90 and the Two-Step Approach, 69 CHICAGO-KENT L.
REV. 1025, 1068-69 (1994); Mario Siragusa, Privatizationand EC Competition Law, 19
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The European Court of Justice (Court) has supported the Commission's pro-market efforts. 5 In Job Centre Coop arl, the Court affirmed
its legal approaches to support the Commission objective of limiting
Member State support for public monopolies. 6 The Court held that
Italian legislation prohibiting private entities within Italy from engaging as intermediaries in the State's demand and supply of labor, i.e.,
private employment/recruitment agencies, violated Community Law
7
and thus, was invalid.
In light of legal precedent, as well as political and economic forces
within the Community, this Case comment discusses how the Court
uses the Treaty of the European Union's (EU Treaty) legal mechanisms
or "tools" to promote the Commission's objectives. This comment argues
that Job Centre confirms the Court's legal approach in order to support
The
the Commission's objective of liberalizing public monopolies.
Court's approach has been to rely increasingly upon Article 90 of the
competition articles and to interpret its terms favorably toward the
Commission's perspective, finding Member States liable more frequently for public monopoly behavior. Nevertheless, Job Centre is also
a political reminder to the Court that Community law is reaching into
realms traditionally managed by Member States. Considering that the
Court's ability to influence stems from Member State courts, the Court
needs to balance its support for the Commission with Member State
concerns.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Community "Tools"
The European Union was initially created as the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958.8 The treaty that created the EEC,
commonly known as the Treaty of Rome, ambitiously sought to establish a common market. 9 While the EEC has amended the Treaty of
Rome several times to widen and deepen economic and political integra-

FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 999, 999-1001 (1996). The primary EU institutions are: the Commission, the "executive branch" of the Community, responsible for initiating, implementing
and enforcing EU policy and law; the Council, the primary legislative role, debates and
approves policy; and the European Parliament, originally an advisory body, now plays a
more substantive role in the legislative process following the Maastricht Treaty. George
et al., supranote 2, at 119-201
5. BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 1, at 32-33; Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1068.
6. Case C-55/96, Job Centre Coop. arl, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708 (1997).
7. Id.
8. Rudiger Dohms, Energy Panel: The Development of a Competitive Internal Energy
Market in the European Community, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 805, 805 (1994).
9. Id.
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tion, the fundamental economic tools have remained the same.10 In
particular, the Treaty of Rome has aimed to promote free movement of
goods, services, labor, and capital (the four freedoms)," and to ensure
that competition among the States do not become distorted as a result. 12
The Community framers, however, also envisioned some autonomy for
Member States in maintaining their own economic and social policies.' 3
Thus, while economic integration of Member State policies was the primary goal of the EU Treaty, it also provided Member States with some
ability to manage and control their own individual policies.
For the purpose of this discussion, the EU Treaty articles pertaining to competition will be analyzed. The "competition articles" promote
economic integration by ensuring that Member State markets act efficiently but fairly. 14 Article 86 of the EU Treaty is a mechanism for controlling the abusive nature of monopolistic entities or "undertakings." It
prohibits undertakings from: 1) holding a dominant position within a
substantial part of the common market; 2) and abusing the dominant
position which could potentially affect trade between Member States.' 5
Article 86 has been a powerful tool for the Community to ensure that
European markets remain competitive as integration continues.
Article 90 of the EU Treaty is similar to Article 86, but it focuses on
public undertakings" otherwise known as state monopolies; those undertakings "provided exclusive rights by the State" - otherwise known
as state-supported monopolies.' 6 In particular, Article 90(1) obligates
Member States to refrain from maintaining measures that support a
public or exclusively-granted undertaking, which are contrary to the
EU Treaty, especially the competition articles.' 7 However, the Article
10. See George et al., supra note 2, at 111 n.3. See also TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C-224/1, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EU
TREATY].

11. The freedom articles are primarily aimed at eliminating trade barriers among the
Member States and include: Articles 30 to 36, freedom of goods; Articles 59 to 66 freedom
of services; and Articles 48 to 59 free movement for people and entities. EU TREATY, supra
note 10.
12. See generally Thomas H. Hefti, European Union Competition Law, 18 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 613, 614 (1994). See also EU TREATY, supranote 10, arts. 85-94 (referring
to competition) and art. 3(f) (explicitly obligating the Community to establish a system
ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted).
13. See generally Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1069. For example, Article 222 provides
that the Community will not prejudice national rules governing property ownership, and
Article 37 requires Member States to adjust only those state monopolies of a commercial
character. Id.
14. See HANS MICKLETZ & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW, 136

(1997); EU TREATY, supra note 10, arts. 85-94. Only Article 86 and Article 90 will be discussed in this paper.
15. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 86; BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 1, at 388-90.
16. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 90; BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 1, at 568-78.
17. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 90(1). Although the Court has never defined an
"exclusive right" clearly, it generally means that one undertaking dominates the whole
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does not preclude granting exclusive rights to entities so long as they do
not violate other EC law.18 Therefore, the framers' balancing between
Member State rights and Community objectives creates an inherent
tension between the States and the Community.
Article 90(2) of the EU Treaty focuses on the public undertaking itself and emphasizes that even public undertakings that serve a general
economic interest or have a revenue-producing character can be subject
to the EU Treaty. 19 However, a public undertaking may be exempt if
the application of EU Treaty rules would obstruct the undertaking's
performance. 20 The purpose and nature of the undertaking can thus,
justify its exemption. But, if trade is affected "to such an extent" that it
would be contrary to the interests of the Community, then the public
monopoly might not be exempt. 21 The Community-Member State tension again emerges since public monopolies serving public interests may
be exempt from the EU Treaty, but not in certain circumstances.
Article 90(3) also plays a unique role in the Community-Member
State dynamic. It empowers the Commission "to ensure the application
of the provisions of this Article" and to "address appropriate directives
or decisions to Member States." 22 This section differs from the rest of
the EU Treaty, which only authorizes the Council of Ministers, in conjunction with the European Parliament, to enact legislation. 23 Relying
on Article 90(3), the Commission can issue binding directives and
regulations to Member States on its own. 24 Moreover, Article 90(3) does
not provide Member States with any ability to justify their position in
additional proceedings, as opposed to procedures provided when they
violate the freedom articles. 25 With the Court establishing the legitimacy of Article 90(3), the Commission has used it frequently to enact
legislation that aims to liberalize traditional state monopolies. 26
The EU Treaty also provides a specifically important tool for the
Court for imposing Community law on Member States. Article 177
grants the Court authority to provide preliminary rulings interpreting
the EU Treaty, as well as Community institutional behavior and legislation. 27 The Court's purpose is to guarantee that Community law will
economic activity in that Member State. Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1028 n.17 (citing
Marc Van der Woude, Article 90: "Competingfor Competence" Competition Law Checklist
CompetitionLaw Checklist, EUR. L. REV., 60, 61 (1991)).
18. See Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1070.
19. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 90(2).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 90(3).
23. See BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 1, at 578.

24. See Id.
25. See Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1044-47.

26. Siragusa, supra note 4,at 1079-81.
27. Carl Otto Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the PreliminaryRuling Procedure,18
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remain uniform among all Member States via their national courts. 28
Although the Court is only supposed to "interpret" Community law, it
frequently makes clear to national courts how they should apply the
law. 29 Thus, under Article 177, the Court has considerable influence in
30
the application of Community law among Member States.
B. IncreasedFocus on Competition and Member State Reservations
Community competition policy has monitored the economic integration process via the use of the EU Treaty's freedom and competition articles. 31 However, the drive for completing the common market, and
thus, for increased the use of competition policy became a prime focus
following the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, which
aimed to complete an internal market by 1992.32 The Commission has
been the most pro-market institution in the Community, and coupled
with support from the Court, the Commission increasingly has been involved with initiating legislation and overseeing Member State action
in order to complete the internal market. 33 The Commission, however,
has found that competitiveness continues to be hampered, inter alia, by
a still-rigid and centralized regulatory environment within the Member
States. 34 It specifically has made liberalization of public and statesupported monopolies a main priority. 35 For instance, the Commission,
supported by Court decisions, has been able to introduce competition
into previously state-run services such as telecommunications, broadcasting, electricity, gas, postal delivery, and now employment. 36
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 388, 389 (1994).
28. Id. at 391. Any national court can request the Court to review issues pertaining to
a national judgment that may conflict with Community law. The national court stays the
proceedings until the Court makes a decision, which is then binding upon the national
court. However, the Court does not follow a system of stare decisis, and a national court
may submit the same issues in a different case without being held to previously decided
rulings. Id.
29. See Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme
Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in ComparativeJudicialFederalism, 44
AM. J. COMP. L. 421, 428-434 (1996).
30. Andrew Adonis and Robert Rice, In the Hot Seat of Judgment: The European
Court is Coming Under Fire, Accused of Pushing a PoliticalAgenda, FIN. TIMES, April 3,
1995, at 17.
31. MICKLETZ & WEATHERILL, supra note 14, at 4.
32. Dohms, supra note 8, at 805.
33. Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1027-28.
34. Commission White Paper, supra note 3, art. III, ch. 2(A); Siragusa, supra note 4,
at 1067 (citing Commission of the European Communities, XXth Report on Competition
Policy 1990, at 125-26, 169 (1991), Commission of the European Communities, XXIst Report on Competition Policy 1991, at 25-38, 15-41 (1992), and Commission of the European
Communities, XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 1993, at 30-36 (1994)).
35. Id.
36. MICKLETZ & WEATHERILL, supra note 14, at 185; See Case 320/91, Re Corbeau,
1993 E.C.R. 1-2533, [19931 4 C.M.L.R. 621 (1993) (regarding privatization of postal serv-
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Although the Community's push toward improved competitiveness
through liberalization of state monopolies has been generally supported
by Member States, Member States have been concerned about the
Community's encroachment into their authority to provide public services.3 7 Several States have suggested amending the EU Treaty to consolidate a special place for public services. 38 For instance, France revealed the perspective that public services are not purely economic
entities that should merely respond to market efficiency because they
serve an important purpose in providing "economic and social cohesion
in Europe." 39 In particular, streamlining public employment services
may increase Member State concerns, considering that these services
traditionally fell within the realm of Member States' labor and employment policies. 40 Thus, while liberalization of public monopolies promotes the necessary Community goals of increased competitiveness and
employment, Member States have expressed their reservations about
whole-heartedly subjecting all public entities to market forces.
III. JOB CENTRE: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Job Centre is a company that was in the process of becoming established in Italy.41 The enterprise intended, inter alia,to conduct an employee placement service, providing both permanent and temporary
employment within Italy. 42 Moreover, Job Centre aimed to solicit business from workers or undertakings beyond the Member State. 43 A
mandatory placement system in Italy, however, administered by public
placement offices prevented the establishment of intermediaries in the
labor market. 44 In particular, Civil Code Law No. 264, established in
1949, prohibits pursuit "of any activity, even if unremunerated, as an
intermediary between supply and demand for paid employment," and
Civil Code Law No. 1369, established in 1960, prohibits any entity from
45
hiring out temporary workers.
ices).
37. Commission White Paper,supra note 3, art. III, ch. 2, 2.1; Public Services, Intergovernmental Conference Briefing No. 12 § III. (Second Update: 23rd March 1996) [hereafter Public Services Briefing] <http://../dg7/fiches/en/fichel2.htm>. For general information about Member State concerns regarding Community authority, see generally PAUL
DAVIES, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LABOUR LAW, 49-62 (1996).

38. See Public Services Briefing, supra note 37.
39. Id. at pt. III. In fact, France advocated amending Article 90(2) to make it more
difficult for public services to be subject to EU Treaty rules. Id.
40. DAVIES, supra note 37, at 45-55.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708,
Id.
Id.
Id. 1 6.
Id. 1 6-7.

9.
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On January 28, 1994, Job Centre's chairman applied for confirmation of an instrument, which would legally establish the entity in Italy. 46 Italian courts have the authority to administer these confirmations. On March 31, 1994, the Tribunale Civile e Penale in Milan stayed
Job Centre's confirmation procedure. 47 Under Article 177, Job Centre
submitted two questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling regarding EU Treaty articles. 48 On October 19, 1995, the
Court held that it had no jurisdiction to rule on the questions raised by
the Milan Tribunal because the Italian court was performing a nonjudicial function. 49 On December 18, 1995, the Milan Tribunal then
dismissed Job Centre's application for confirmation because its business
objectives were incompatible with Italy's employment law. 50
Job Centre then appealed to the Corte d'Appello in Milan, which
the Court suggested in its preliminary ruling as a sufficient exercise of
the Italian court's judicial function.5 1 The European Court of Justice
allowed the national court to resubmit the issues under Article 177.52
The Corte d'Appello, then stayed the proceedings and referred the case
to the Court for a preliminary ruling on EU Treaty articles pertaining
53
to freedom of services, freedom of worker movement, and competition.
In particular, Italy raised two significant issues: 1) whether maintenance of Italy's employment laws Article 11(1) of Law No. 264 and Article 1 of Law No. 1369 could be justified as an exercise of official
authority, which, under EU Treaty Articles 66 and 55, precludes a
Member State from applying Community laws; and 2) whether the
Italian laws conflicted with EU Treaty Articles 48 and 49 (freedom of
workers), Articles 59, 60, 62 and 66 (freedom of services), Article 86
(abuse of a dominant position within the market) and Article 90 (abuse
54
by a public undertaking within the market).
IV. JOB CENTRE DECISION

In relation to Articles 86 and 90, the Court held that Italy violated
Article 90(1) because it created a situation where public employment
46. Id. 1 13.
47. Id. at "Decision".
48. Id.
49. Id. 1 2. Under Article 177, a national court cannot submit a question to the Court
unless the national court provides a judgment. See Case C-111/94, Job Centre Coop. arl,
1995 E.C.R. 1-3361(1995) (giving more details about the decision). See EU TREATY, supra
note 10, art. 177.
50. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, 11.
51. Id. J 3 & "Decision."
52. Id.
53. Id. J1 13-14.
54. Id.
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agencies could not avoid infringing Article 86. 55 The Court determined
that an undertaking's inability to avoid abuse of a dominant position
emerges when all the following conditions are met: 1) public placement
offices are "manifestly unable to satisfy demand" on the market for all
types of activity; 2) employee placement by private groups is deemed
"impossible" due to the enforcement of statutory provisions under which
such activities are prohibited; and 3) the placement activities under review could possibly extend to nationals or to the territory of other
Member States. 56 According to the Court, Laws No. 264 and No. 1369
should be set aside.
The Court first focused on whether Job Centre was a public undertaking subject to the EU Treaty under Article 90. The Court has
broadly interpreted public undertaking to include "every entity engaged
in an economic activity regardless of its status and the way in which it
is financed.. .... 57 The Court found the state's employment service was
an undertaking, rejecting Italy's argument that entities supporting national solidarity principles should be considered "non-economic," and
thus, not an undertaking. In terms of the possible exception within Article 90(2), the Court briefly mentioned whether application of the EU
Treaty rules would obstruct the undertaking's performance. 58 It held
that if the undertaking was unable to satisfy demand, then the EU
59
Treaty articles, particularly Article 86, would apply regardless.
The Court then turned to whether Italy was liable under Article
90(1) for causing the monopoly's abuse by maintaining employment
laws No. 264 and No. 1369.60 Although it reiterated that a Member
State will not be liable under Article 86 for the "mere creation" of a
public monopoly, it also stated that the EU Treaty requires Member
States to refrain from maintaining measures, which could destroy the
effectiveness of the competition rules. 6 1 The Court then held that when

55. Id. at "Decision." Article 90(1) states: "[I1n the case of public undertakings and
undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States
shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in
this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 6 [discrimination] and Articles. 85 to 94 [competition articles]." EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 90(1). See supra
notes 8 to 30, and accompanying text (pertaining to Article 90).
56. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision."
57. Id. See also Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980, on the Transparency of Financial Relations Between Member States and Public Undertakings, art. 2,
1980 O.J. (L 195) (1980) (showing how the Commission has also taken a broad view of
public undertakings).
58. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision." The Court did not really analyze
whether the entity was a public undertaking but referred to Case C-41/90, Hofner & Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, (1991) E.C.R. 1-1979, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306 (1993), which first
determined whether public employment services constituted an undertaking.
59. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision."
60. Id.
61. Id. (referring to holding in Case 131/77, NV GB-INNO-BM (INNO) v. Vereniging
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an undertaking cannot avoid abusing its dominant position under Article 86, due to Member State laws supporting its behavior, then the
Member State violates its duty under Article 90(1).62
The Court then analyzed whether, under Article 86, the undertaking abused its position. 63 First, the Court reiterated that a dominant
64
position exists when an undertaking is vested with a legal monopoly.
Second, the Court affirmed that abuse under Article 86(b) amounted to
behavior limiting the service and prejudicing consumers 65 and that the
inability to satisfy market demand met this definition. 66 It found that
an inability to serve "such an extensive and differentiated [employment]
market... subject to enormous changes as a result of economic and social developments" constituted an inability to satisfy demand. 67 Since
Italy's measures completely prohibited private entities from competing
as intermediaries, it directly resulted in the public undertaking's inability to satisfy demand. Third, under Article 86, the abusive conduct
must affect trade, and the Court found that employee placement could
potentially affect individuals from other Member States. 68 Italy, therefore, was liable for violating Article 86 in conjunction with its duty in

Article

90(1).69

The Court also held that because the laws violated Articles 86 and
90(1), it was not necessary to determine whether they also violated Article 59, free movement of services, or Article 52, right to establishment
(which the Advocate General considered relevant).7 0 The Court also
dismissed the use of Articles 48 and 49 (free movement of labor) because if Job Centre had been established, it would be one legal business
71
entity and thus would not be considered a "worker."

van de Kleinhanddelaars in Tabak (ATAB), 1977 E.C.R. 2115, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 283
(1977)).
62. Id.
63. Id. Article 86 states: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States."
EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 86.

64. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708 (referring to holding in Case 311/84, CBEM v.
CLT & IPB, 1985 E.C.R. 3261, 2 C.M.L.R. 558 (1986)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. 11 25-32 & "Decision."
71. ld. at "Decision".
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V. JOB CENTRE CONFIRMS COURT'S APPROACH FOR ACCOMMODATING
COMMISSION ATTACK ON PUBLIC MONOPOLIES

The Commission's perspective, as discussed previously, has become
increasingly hostile toward publicly supported and owned monopolies.
Likewise, the Court has aligned with the Commission's deregulatory
approach. In doing so, the Court has shifted its analytical approach to
increase reliance on Article 90, which was rarely invoked prior to the
1987 Single European Act.7 2 In the 1990's, Article 90 in conjunction
with Article 86 has become a primary force for dismantling state monopolies, and thus, Community liberalization of areas traditionally
managed by Member States, such as telecommunications, broadcasting,
73
insurance, electricity, transport, gas, postal, and employment services.
As a result, State autonomy to enact or maintain domestic legislation
has been restrained.
A. "PublicUndertaking"DefinitionRemains Broad
Job Centre confirms legal precedent defining an undertaking.
When addressing this issue, the Court generally will focus on whether
the entity fits within the definition of undertaking under Article 86 and
Article 90, and in light of increased emphasis on competition and integration, this definition has been defined broadly.
In Hofner & Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, undertaking was clearly defined as encompassing every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way it has been financed. 74 The Court in Hofner found executive recruitment services to
be an economic activity, and thus, an undertaking. 75 However, in
Poucet & Pistre v. Assurances Generales de France & Others, the Court
found that two social security agencies were not considered undertakings. 76 In particular, the Court pointed to the agency's non-profitmaking nature and to the fact that compulsory contribution payments

72. See Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1029-31.
73. See Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1068-69; MICKLETZ & WEATHERILL, supra note 14,
at 185; C-320/91, Corbeau, (1993) ECR 1-2533, [19911 4 C.M.L.R. 621 (regarding deregulation of postal services). See also Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306 and Job Centre, [1998] 4
C.M.L.R. 708 (regarding deregulation of public employment services). Article 90(1) makes
Member States directly liable for legislation supporting monopolies and Article 90(3) gives
the Commission unique authority to legislate and enforce directly against Member States
when they violate the article. See supra,notes 8-30, and accompanying text.
74. Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, at "Judgment," 1 121-24.
75. Id. 1 23.
76. Case C-70/95, Sodamere SA & Others v. Regione Lombardia, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R.
591, J1 24-26 (1997). See also Case C159-160/91, Poucet & Pistre v. Assurances Generales de France and Others (1993) ECR 1-637.
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were indispensable to the principle of solidarity. 77 Solidarity, which involves the redistribution of income, the seems to be the more vital requirement. The Court has found non-profit-making bodies with little
solidarity supporting them to be engaging in economic activity and
78
thus, public undertakings.
In Job Centre, the Court determined public service agencies to be
undertakings as in Hofner.7 9 Italy, however, argued that because employment agencies were established for social objectives, similar to the
social security agencies in Poucet, they were not economic activities and
thus, not public undertakings. 80 The Court in Job Centre, however, distinguished Poucet. It implied that employment agencies were not based
on solidarity, and were not completely non-profit-making.8 1 The Court
justified its decision, stating that in Hofner, employment procurement
was a business activity.8 2 Job Centre affirmed that competition rules
can impact Member State entities, which serve social purposes but fail
to provide redistribution of income.
B. Article 86: Abuse Continues to Be InterpretedBroadly
Job Centre reflected the Court's broad interpretation of abuse under Article 86. Like other terms in Articles 86 and 90, "abuse" also has
undergone broadening. In particular, Article 86(b) requires "limiting
production, markets, or technical development to the prejudice of consumers."8 3 Traditionally, only active behavior by an undertaking constituted abuse of a dominant position.8 4 However, in Hofner, the State's
executive recruitment agency's inability to satisfy market demand passive behavior - constituted abuse as well.8 5
In Job Centre, the Court affirmed the inability-to-satisfy-demand
approach under Article 86(b) and provided further clarification. 86 Advocate General Elmer, who wrote the Advocate General's opinion, agreed
with the Court that the diversity of the employment service market in
terms of consumers and users made it impossible for Italy's employment service to satisfy demand.8 7 However, Elmer suggested that
abuse should not be determined for the composite group, but for each

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id., 1 24-26.
Id.
Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision."
Id. 1 34.
Id. at "Decision."
Id.

83. EU TREATY, supra note 10, art. 86(b).
84. See MICKLETZ & WEATHERILL, supra note 14, at 136-38

85. Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, at "Judgment,"
1076-77.
86. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision."
87. Id.
52-56.

34; Siragusa, supra note 4, at
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sector within that market because of the huge diversity involved.8 8 He
supported his reasoning with previous case law involving goods.8 9 For
instance, in Michelin v. E.C. Commission, the tire market was separated into used and new tires, and the Court then determined whether
the entity could satisfy either. 90 However, in Job Centre, the Court ignored this segmented approach, and stated that because one entity
could not satisfy all of the types of employment services in the market,
it had abused its position. 9 1 As a result, a public monopoly could be
eliminated when in fact, it might be able to satisfy demand in certain
portions of the employment services market. The Court's broadening of
"abuse" by failing to segment the markets reveals its pro-Commission
approach.
C. Member State Liability Increased under Article 90(1)
Most importantly, the Court in Job Centre affirmed its use of Articles 86 and 90(1), making Member States more liable for a state monopoly's abuse of its position. 92 Previously, the Court held in Sacchi that a
Member State under Article 90(1) could not itself violate Article 86, and
so Italian legislation granting public entity, RAI (a radio and television
monopoly), exclusive rights, did not violate the EU Treaty. 93 In Sacchi,
the Commission's perspective was quite different than its deregulatory
approach of the 1990's. 94 It stated that the "grant of exclusive rights [by
a Member State] does not constitute in itself an infringement of Article
90, [and] [slince Article 86 does not prohibit a dominant position [only
abuse of that position] ... Article 90 cannot give rise to liabilities
greater than those arising under Article 86." 9 5 Not surprisingly, the
Court also supported this position, holding that a mere grant or extension of a right to a public undertaking under Article 90(1) "is not as
such incompatible with" Article 86.96 Thus, if the undertaking did engage in abusive conduct, then Article 86 alone applied, and if no abusive
conduct existed, then Article 90(1) could not apply in conjunction with
Article 86. 97 A Member State's duty under Article 90(1) was deemed
mutually exclusive from its duty under Article 86.
However, in 1991, the Court broadened the meaning of Article 90(1)

88. Id.
50.
89. Id.
90. Id. See also Case 322/81, Michelin v. E.C. Commission, [1983] ECR 3461, [1985] 1
C.M.L.R. 282 (1985).
91. Id. at "Decision".
92. See Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1035.
93. Case 155/73, Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 408, 428-30, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 177 (1974).
94. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 414.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 429.
97. Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1071-72.
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to make Member States liable under Article 86 for merely granting exclusive rights to an undertaking. 98 In Hofner, the Commission argued
that under Article 90(1) and Article 86, a Member State should be liable
for maintaining measures that support a monopoly where the "grantee
of the monopoly is not willing or able to carry out that task fully." 99
Reiterating Scacchi, the Court held that Germany was liable under Article 90(1) because even though a Member State cannot be responsible
for "creating a dominant position by granting an exclusive right within
the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty" if that results in a situation
where the public undertaking "cannot avoid abusing its dominant position" under Article 86, then the Member State shall be liable. 10 0 Therefore, Member States could be directly liable for supporting monopolies
that exercised abuse.
The Court has affirmed this new approach in subsequent case law,
but not consistently, making it unclear what behavior triggers Member
State liability. For instance, in Merci Convenzionali Porto Di Genova
SpA v. Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA (Merci) and in Elliniki Radiophonia
TileorassiAE & Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v. Dimotiki Etairia,et al. (ERT), the Court held that a Member State can be liable under Article 86 and Article 90(1) if the undertaking, in merely exercising exclusive rights, "cannot avoid abusing the dominant
position."'101 However, the Court added that liability can also emerge
when the granting of such rights "leads to" or "induces" an undertaking
to infringe Article 86.102 This alternative interpretation of Hofner
makes it easier to find Member States liable. Instead of requiring only
"unavoidable abuse," which suggests that State legislation directly
causes abuse, this alternative language suggests that Member State
legislation can be one of several reasons for an undertaking's abuse, yet
still making Member States liable.
With both Merci and ERT concerning discrimination against other
Member States, 10 3 the Court might have applied a softer Hofner test in
order to find Member States liable. In fact, in non-discrimination cases,

98. Id. at 1069-71; Romaniuk, supranote 4, at 1035-36.
99. Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, at "Judgment," 1 18.
100. Id. at "Judgment," 1 29.
101. Case C-179/90, Merci Convenzionali Porto Di Genova SpA v. Siderurgica Gabrielli
SpA, [19941 C.M.L.R. 422, Decision (1991) [hereinafter Merci]; Case C-260/89, Elliniki
Radiophonia Tileorassi AE & Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v. Dimotiki
Etairia, et al., 1991 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 2506 (1991) [hereinafter ERT].
102. Merci, [1994] C.M.L.R. 422, at "Decision"; ERT, 1991 E.C.J. CELIX LEXIS 2506,
37.
103. Legislation in Merci excluded non-Italian dock workers and dock companies, and
ERT excluded non-Greek entities, compared with Hofner which did not specifically exclude other Member States in favor of its own nationals. See Merci, [1994] C.M.L.R. 422;
ERT, 1991 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 2506; and Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306 (referring to
possible discrimination).
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the Court has applied the strict Hofner test, requiring the causal relationship between Member State legislation and the undertaking's abuse
to be more direct. For instance, in Societe Civile Agricole du Centre
d'Insemination de la Crespelle v. Cooperative d'Elevage et
d'Insemination Artificielle du Departement de la Mayenne, the Court
found that although the Member State granted an exclusive right resulting in a dominant position, the alleged abuse was not the "direct
consequence of the national law." 1° 4 Also, in Chemische Afvalstoffen
Dusseldorp BV & Others v. Minister Van Volkshuisvesting, the Court
stated that liability exists if the entity "caused the breach of Article 86",
and considering the entity's pricing policy was not an "inevitable result"
of any exclusive rights granted, the Netherlands did not violate Article
90(1).105
Discrimination might be a factor, but the Court does not
clearly say so.
Another problem with the Hofner approach is the Court's inconsis10 6
tency in analyzing whether an exclusive right has even been granted.
In Hofner, the Court ignored analyzing whether Germany had conferred
an exclusive right to public service agencies. 107 However, in the Giorgio
Banchero Decision, the Court failed to find any violation because it determined that the State had not granted an exclusive right to the entity.10 8 The Italian legislation, which reserved retail sale of manufactured tobacco products to distributors authorized by the state, did not
"cause" the channeling of sales or prejudice to consumers leading to unsatisfied demand. 10 9 The Court concluded that the legislation "merely
governs [the retailers] access" and does not grant "exclusive distribution
rights" to retailers. 1 0 The different treatment may turn on the nature
of the exclusive right, 1 ' but the Court does not delineate clear factors to
2
help determine the different applications.11
In Job Centre, the Court affirmed the Hofner approach broadening
Sacchi.1 3 The Court held that the Italian measures supporting public
placement agencies directly resulted in the public entity's inability "to
104. Case C-323/93, Societe Civile Agricole du Centre d'Insemination de la Crespelle v.
Cooperative d'Elevage et d'Insemination Artificielle du Departement de la Mayenne, 1994

E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 2581,

18-20 (1994).

105. Case C-203/96, Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV & Others v. Minister Van
Volkshuisvesting, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 873, 101 (1998) [hereinafter Chemische].
106. See generally Romaniuk, supra note 4 (discussing the inconsistent analysis of an
exclusive right).
107. See Romaniuk, supra note 4, at 1047-48.
108. Case 387/93, Giorgio Banchero Decision, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4663, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R.
829 (1995).

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Romaniuk, supra note 4 (discussing the conditions when the Court analyzes
the granting of an exclusive right).
112. See Case C-163/96, Silvano Raso & Others, 4 C.M.L.R. 737, "Opinion,"
113. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708, at "Decision."

61-62.
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avoid abuse." 114 Italy, therefore, was liable for supporting the public
employment agencies. 115 The Court's application of Hofner seems generally consistent with recent case law. Considering that Job Centre did
not involve discrimination," 6 the holding supports the notion that the
strict Hofner test is being used in non-discrimination cases, as well as
in discrimination cases. And, considering Job Centre's facts were very
similar to Hofner, the Court's neglect to analyze whether an exclusive
right even existed is not surprising."1 7 Nevertheless, Italy's argument
that the legislation failed to grant employment agencies any exclusive
rights did not go unnoticed." 8 In Advocate General Elmer's opinion in
Job Centre, he analyzed whether the State conferred an exclusive right
upon the undertaking.11 9 He determined that Law No. 264, which
clearly prohibited any intermediaries, was an exclusive grant to the
Italian employment agency.120 But, he noted that Law No. 1369, prohibiting the hiring of temporary staff, was a general prohibition not
granting an exclusive right to any group. 121 While, Job Centre seems
legally consistent with other cases, Elmer's difference of opinion reflects
the ongoing problem in how to apply Hofner.
One negative consequence of this approach is that it is not clear
when a Member State will be liable for violating the EU Treaty. In not
clearly delineating the boundary line between when a Member State
can allow for the mere establishment of a dominant position and when
it violates the EU Treaty by directly causing an undertaking's abuse,
Member States are less able to predict what is acceptable legislation
under the EU Treaty.
By altering the analysis to increase Member State liability under
Article 90(1) and Article 86, yet failing to clarify how that approach is
applied, the Court has made Member States more vulnerable to deregulation of their public services, and thus, supports the Commission's
objective.
D. Member State JustificationUnder Article 90(2) Remains Narrow
Job Centre revealed the increased difficulty Member States have in
justifying public monopoly behavior for public interest reasons. Under
Article 90(2), a Member State can argue that the public entity is entrusted with the operation of a general economic interest, and that the

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id. 32.
Id.
See Id. 1 3.
Id. 11 36-39.
Id.
Id.
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EU Treaty rules obstruct the performance of the entity's tasks. 122 However, the Court has increasingly narrowed the application of this exception to make it very difficult for public monopolies to remain exempt
123
from the EU Treaty.
The Court has narrowly defined an undertaking "entrusted with a
general economic interest." "Entrusted" requires that certain obligations are imposed on the public entity by the State to satisfy public interest. 124 The Court has required entities serving a general economic
interest to "exhibit special characteristics" compared with other activities. 125 For instance, dock work services do not reveal special characteristics, but universal mooring, postal, and waste management serv26
ices do constitute general economic interests.
Whether the EU Treaty "obstructs performance" of a public undertaking, serving a general economic interest also has been narrowed, but
rather inconsistently. For instance, in Sacchi, obstruction of performance referred to whether the EU Treaty was "incompatible" with the
performance of the television monopoly's task. 127 In Hofner, the Court
referred to Sacchi, but further narrowed Article 90(2) by holding that
"application of Article 86 of the EU Treaty cannot obstruct the performance of the particular task" when the entity "is not in a position to sat128
isfy demand in that area."'
However, another test has emerged. The Court in Corbeau suggested that obstruction was determined by whether restricting or excluding competition was "necessary" to perform its task - in particular,
to provide economically acceptable conditions. 129 If the undertaking has
"economic equilibrium" then it will be able to offset non-profitable sectors with its profitable ones, and thus, can justify restricting competition in its profitable sectors. 30 The Court's narrow definition led to
finding that certain aspects of the postal service would not suffer from
disequilibrium if subjected to competition.' 3 ' Chemische also supports
this "strict scrutiny" approach, since the Court endorsed the Commis-

122. EU TREATY, supra note 10, at art 90(2).

123. See Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1074-78.
124. Chemische, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 873, 1 103.
125. See generally Case C-266/96, Corsica Ferries France SA v. Gruppo Antichi Ormeggiatori Del Porto Di Genova Coop, ARL & Others, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. 402, "Opinion,"
61 (1998) (regarding fees charged for mooring services).
126. See id. Corbeau, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 621(regarding postal service), Merci, [1994] 4
C.M.L.R. 422 (regarding dock workers), and Chemische, 3 C.M.L.R. 873 (regarding waste
service).
127. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R., at 429,
15. The Court in Sacchi did not apply the facts to
Article 90(2) because it did not find Italy liable under Article 90(1). Id. at 428-29, 1 14.
128. Hofner, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 306, at "Judgment," J 25-26.
129. Corbeau, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 621, at "Decision".
130. Id. 1 17-19.
131. See Siragusa, supra note 4, at 1075-76.
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sion's suggestion that obstruction exists when the objective cannot be
carried out "equally well by any other means." 132 Again, the Court does
not make clear when these different tests apply.
In Job Centre, the Court used the "incompatible" language of Sacchi and followed the same reasoning as in Hofner.133 Advocate General
Elmer gave little discussion to Article 90(2), merely reiterating that
Hofner deemed it inapplicable.1 3 4 Job Centre failed to provide any clarity on why this approach was taken, but it is, nevertheless, clear that
Article 90(2) will continue to be construed narrowly.
VI. IMPLICATIONS

The Court's position on public service monopolies in Job Centre and
in other recent cases seems to reflect the Commission's economic perspective and interest in dismantling Member State laws that support
monopolies. The decision in Job Centre has confirmed the broad interpretation of undertaking and abuse, the Member State's increased liability under Article 90(1), and the State's reduced capacity to justify
support for a public service undertaking under Article 90(2). In light of
ongoing challenges to job creation, competition, and integration, the
Court will likely continue to be an ally of the Commission and a strong
promoter of the Community's agenda.
Nevertheless, the Court is also aware of the tension between Member State and Community authority. The debate on the Community's
explicit authority into new realms such as employment policy will likely
continue, as will discussion about the erosion of socially-underpinned
objectives for public services. The Court will, therefore, have to balance
its Community-oriented objectives with national court sentiment and
thus, to a certain extent Member State sentiment, since its primary vehicle for shaping Member State behavior is through the cooperation of
the national courts via Article 177.

132. Chemische, [1998] 3 C.M.L.R. 873, at "Opinion," 1 108.
133. Job Centre, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 708 at "Decision."
134. Id. at opinion.

DIVERSITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: GRANT
V. SWT, THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, AND THE

FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
HEATHER HUNT*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the huge diversity of peoples who make up the human race, there are
a number of universal constants which have always been part of the
human condition. One is that people who are different inspire fear
which often leads to prejudice; another is that a proportion of the human race is homosexual.]

This reality has lead to another phenomenon best summed up by
George Orwell: "All animals are equal, but some animals are more
equal than others." 2 This short and straight-forward characterization
best describes the situation facing the lesbian and gay community with
respect to a number of issues within the European Union ("EU"). One
such issue is the free movement of persons. The EU has confronted this
issue because of the recent focus on European economic unity and the
rise of the gay rights movement during the last several years. This issue has an impact on economic unity because discrimination in the
workplace that significantly affects one sector of the population (i.e. the
homosexual population), directly inhibits the formation of the economic
community the EU is attempting to build.
In the European Union, the European Social Charter promises that
"[e]veryone shall have the opportunity to earn his living in an occupation fully entered upon."3 Unfortunately, this promise does not universally apply. Theoretically, Community Law guarantees to all EU citizens the right to enter and to seek or take up work in any Member

*Juris Doctor, University of Denver, May 1999.
1. Peter Ashman, Introduction, in HOMOSEXUALITY: A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
ISSUE: ESSAYS ON LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 3 (Kees
Waaldijk & Andrew Clapham, eds., 1993).
2. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1946).

3. James D. Wilets, InternationalHuman Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 112 (1994).
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State. 4 This right, however, is limited by the ability of national authorities to impose restrictions on the right to work in their countries. EU
Member States may base these restrictions on public policy, public security, and public health concerns. 5 These limitations, however, must
apply equally to the nationals of the Member State, as they apply to
citizens of other Member States. 6 Thus, in the sexual preference context, when a Member State discriminates against its own nationals,
based on their sexual orientation, so long as the discrimination applies
to nationals of other Member States the same as it applies to nationals
of that Member State, Community law allows such discrimination.
Most Member States, while not per se discriminating against homosexuals, do not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. In
fact, at the time of publication, only France, Ireland, and the Netherlands have laws that give legal protection against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. 7 Consequently, only French,
Irish and Dutch nationals, and nationals of other Member States
working in France, Ireland or the Netherlands have formal protection
against employment discrimination.
In the EU, a case before the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")
brought the issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation to in-

4. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
58, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]; see Andrew Clapham & J.H.H. Weiler,
Lesbians and Gay Men in the European Community Legal Order, in HOMOSEXUALITY, supra note 1, at 39.
5. Clapham & Weiler, supra note 4, at 39. There are restrictions on what Member
States can claim as public policy, and public policy justifications are subject to review by
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Id. However, when the interests involved are those
of homosexuals, many justifications are allowed for limitations set by governments (i.e.
denial of access to gay partners as against public policy; interference with free movement
of gay workers on grounds of public health; barring homoerotic goods based on public morality). Id. at 20.
6. Article 6 of the EEC Treaty prohibits discrimination based on nationality, and
Article 8a provides that every EU citizen has the right to move and reside within the territory of other Member States. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, arts. 6 and 8.
7. Wilets, supra note 3, at 114. Article 416(3) of the French Penal Code and Article
L. 122-145 of the French Code of Labor Law prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. Article 5 of the General Treatment Law of the Netherlands prohibits employers
from making "direct or indirect distinctions based on heterosexual or homosexual orientation or civil status." Article 6 prohibits such distinctions in self-employment. Id. (internal quote and citation omitted). James D. Wilets, The Human Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Comparative and InternationalLaw Perspective, 22 Fall Hum. Rts. 22, 25 (1995).
Denmark prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, but does not limit the prohibition to employment. In Ireland, according to the 'Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred
Act 1989', it is a crime to incite to hatred on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. The military is one area where a number of EU members do not discriminate. Wilets, supra note
3, at 115. The following countries allow homosexuals to serve in their armed forces: Italy,
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway and Spain.
Id. However, Belgium, Finland, France and Germany place restrictions on homosexual
citizens in the military. Id.
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ternational attention. 8 In Grant v. South West Trains, Ltd. ("Grant v.
SWT'), the ECJ addressed the issue of a corporation's obligation to provide same-sex partners of employees the same benefits as those offered
to heterosexual partners of employees. 9 The Court held that:
[t]he refusal by an employer to allow travel concessions to the person of
the same-sex with whom a worker has a stable relationship, where
such concessions are allowed to a worker's spouse or to the person of
the opposite sex with whom a worker has a stable relationship outside
marriage, does not constitute discrimination prohibited by Article 119
of the EC Treaty or Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the

8. See Case C-249/96 Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) 193
[hereinafter Grant]. As of January 1995, the EU is comprised of fifteen (15) Member
States: France, Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Norway. BARRY E. CARTER
& PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, STATES AND OTHER MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES: TREATY OF
ROME OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, INTERNATIONAL LAw: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 209 (1995).
The EU consists of a number of institutions whose functions range from legislative and
administrative to judicial: The European Parliament, which is directly elected by universal suffrage, represents the people of the EU. What is the European Community? (visited
June 6, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/preslqce.htm>. The European Parliament engages in lawmaking and budget setting, but has limited control over EU affairs. Id. The
Parliament also has supervisory powers over the EU Commission. Laurence R. Heifer,
Lesbian and Gay Rights as Human Rights: Strategies for a United Europe, 32 Va. J. Int'l
L. 157, 184 (1991). The European Council, as the executive body of the EU, takes the decisions of the European Parliament and adopts Community Legislation. Id. The Council
is composed of representatives from the fifteen Member States, and its membership depends upon the subject under consideration (i.e. it may be made up of 15 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Transport, Finance, et cetera). What is the European Community? (visited
June 6, 1999) <http://europa.eu.inttcj/en/pres/qce.htm>. The European Commission, composed of 20 independent members, proposes Community legislation for consideration by
the EU Council, monitors compliance with the legislation and administers common policies. Id. See Helfer, supra, at 184. At the center of the EU's judicial arm is the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What is the European Community?: A Court for Europe (visited June 6, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/pres/jeu.htm>.
The ECJ is housed in
Luxembourg, and the main function of the ECJ is to ensure that the EU Member States
observe Community Law uniformly. Id. When making its decisions, the ECJ relies on
"Community Law," which is Community legislation that applies to all fifteen Member
States. Id. EU Community Law, independent and uniform in all Member States, is superior to the national laws of Member States. Id. Unlike other similar institutions (i.e. the
International Court of Justice), the ECJ has jurisdiction over disputes involving not only
Member States and Community Institutions, but also individuals. Id. The ECJ has fifteen judges and nine advocate generals. What is the European Community?: Composition
and Organization (visited June 6, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/pres/co.htm>.
EU
Member States appoint the judges and advocate generals by common accord. Once appointed, judges and advocate generals serve renewable six-year terms. Id. The advocate
generals play a key role in the adjudication of ECJ cases. Prior to the Court rendering its
decisions, an Advocate General delivers an opinion as to how the Court should rule on the
case before it. Id. The opinions of advocate generals are impartial and independent of
the opinions of the Court. Id.
9. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 1.
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application of the principle of equal pay for men and women.' 0
Due to the broad scope of ECJ decision-making power, this decision
has more far-reaching implications than does a decision by a national
court of an EU Member State. 11 One of the concerns raised by this decision is the possibility that allowing corporations within EU Member
States to make discriminatory policies based on an employee's sexual
2
orientation could infringe on that employee's right of free movement.'
For example, if a national of one Member State that does not discriminate against homosexuals receives a job offer in another Member State,
only to discover later that the foreign Member State allows corporations
to discriminate against homosexuals, the national would be inhibited
from moving to the foreign Member State, thereby defeating one main
purpose of economic unity. Additionally, a significant problem arises in
the EU because the right of free movement of persons is fundamental to
the European Union and its underlying purposes. 13 As a result, for the
past several years, the European Parliament has made numerous attempts to discourage the type of discrimination sanctioned by South
West Trains.
In June 1997, in an attempt to inter alia avoid future problems in
the area of discrimination based on sexual orientation, the European
Council passed the Treaty of Amsterdam ("Amsterdam Treaty"). The
Amsterdam Treaty amended the Treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the European Communities and Certain Related
Acts. 14 The Amsterdam Treaty prohibits, among other things, discrimination based on sexual orientation. 15 In light of this new treaty, the
Grant v. SWT decision may not have the far reaching consequences first
anticipated. However, as discussed more fully below, there are still a

10. Id. at 1 51.

11. Decisions of the ECJ affect all EU Member States and are binding on such Member States with respect to Community Law. What is the European Community? (visited
June 6, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/pres/qce.htm>.
12. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, arts. 3 and 48. In the EU context, free movement of
persons means that each Member State must abolish nationality discrimination, between
workers of Member States with regard to employment, remuneration and other work and
employment conditions. Id. art. 48. This right also means that EU citizens can accept
offers of employment; move within the Member States in order to accept employment;
stay within a Member State for the purpose of employment; and remain in the territory of
a Member State after having been employed in the State. Id. This article does not apply
to public service employment. Id. Prohibitions on employment discrimination have extended to sex as well as nationality. Id. art. 119.
13. See id. arts. 3 and 48.
14. See EUROPEAN UNION: CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION AND CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, Oct. 2, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 56 [hereinafter Amsterdam Treaty]. The Amsterdam

Treaty amended the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts. Id.
15. Id. at pt. 1, art. 13.
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number of hurdles the gay and lesbian community must overcome before the prohibition on discrimination based on sexual orientation becomes a reality.
This paper addresses and focuses on the impact the Amsterdam
Treaty will have on EU Member States, concentrating particularly on
the provisions relating to discrimination based on sexual orientation,
and its affect on the free movement of persons. This paper also analyzes how the Amsterdam Treaty affects the Grant v. SWT decision because Grant v. SWT will continue as the controlling Community Law
until the European Council - utilizing the provisions of the Amsterdam
Treaty - changes the law relating to discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Part II of this paper discusses the various laws of EU Member
States regarding same-sex partnerships. Part III analyzes the Grant v.
SWT opinion and its impact on European Community Law. Part IV of
this paper examines the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and the
potential affect this Treaty will have on discrimination based on sexual
orientation and the free movement of people.

II. MEMBER STATE LAWS REGARDING RECOGNITION OF SAME SEX
RELATIONSHIPS

Attempts at fighting discrimination based on sexual orientation
gained momentum as early as the late 1800's in Germany, and the early
1900's in England and America. 16 Unfortunately, the movement in
Europe has only recently, as late as 1989, made definitive strides toward recognizing same-sex relationships and prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Consequently, due to the different social,
political and economic views of the various EU countries, the laws of
EU countries regarding recognition of same-sex relationships vary
widely. For example, a number of Member States recognize same-sex
partnerships and afford people in those relationships many of the same
rights afforded heterosexual couples. 17 While some Member States rec16. Robert P. Cabaj, History of Gay Acceptance and Relationships in ON THE ROAD TO
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A SUPPORTIVE GUIDE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES 11 (Robert P. Cabaj & David W. Purcell eds., 1998).
17. Analysis: Gay Rights: Coming Out of the Shadows, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 9, 1997,
at 17. Deborah M. Henson, A ComparativeAnalysis of Same-Sex PartnershipProtections,
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER 42-43 (Andrew Sullivan, ed., 1997).
One of the significant rights denied same-sex couples is the right to adopt children. Id. at
43. See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text. The laws in some EU countries are
more progressive than in other nations of the world, most notably the United States,
where, in 1996 Congress and President Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act, which
defines marriage as the "union between a man and a woman," and allows states to pass
laws refusing to recognize same-sex marriage. David W. Purcell, Current Trends in
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ognize same-sex marriages, others do not recognize same-sex partnerships at all, let alone marriages. 18 In the future, however, individual
Member States' recognition of same-sex relationships may be irrelevant
in light of the passage of the Amsterdam Treaty. 19 Nevertheless, until
that time, the laws of the Member States in which they live confine homosexual citizens in the EU, and their rights.
The following is a representation, by country, of the various provisions relating to same-sex relationships.
Denmark: Denmark was the first country to legally recognize samesex partnerships. 20 On October 1, 1989, the Danish Parliament passed
a law allowing "registered partnership for two persons of the samesex."2' 1 Public registration allows registered same-sex couples to enjoy
the same legal rights enjoyed by married couples, 22 with the exception
of adopting children, in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, and
church weddings. 23 On limitation is that at least one of the registrants
must be a Danish citizen and live in Denmark. 24 In 1997, the State Lutheran Church approved same-sex marriage in the church, but the
ceremony must be different from heterosexual marriage. 25
Norway: In 1993, Norway passed partnership legislation modeled
on the Danish example. 26 The Norwegian legislation offers same-sex
couples national insurance benefits, pensions, inheritance rights, and
mandates that same-sex couples must be mutually responsible to sup27
port each other financially.
Sweden: Sweden decriminalized homosexuality in 1994.28
On
January 1, 1995, the Swedish Registered Partnership Law became effective. 29 This law granted same-sex couples virtually the same rights
afforded to heterosexual married couples. 30 However, as other Registered Partnership Acts, this law denies same-sex couples access to
adoption, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and church wed-

Same-Sex Marriage,in ON THE ROAD, supra note 16, at 34.
18. No Bias In Same-Sex Ban on Travel Perk, TIMES (London), Feb. 23, 1998, at 41.
19. Id. See Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt. 1, art. 13.
20. Leslie Goransson, InternationalTrends in Same-Sex Marriage,in ON THE ROAD,
supra note 16, at 167.
21. Id. at 171.
22. Id. at 170. Those rights include inheritance, insurance benefits, employment
benefits, financial support obligations, and so on. Id. at 174.
23. Id. at 171.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 173.
26. Goransson, supra note 20, at 173.
27. Id. at 174.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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dings. 3 1 Sweden also has a domestic partner law for those couples who
choose not to register. 32 The domestic partner law provides many of the
same rights as the Registered Partner Act, but a domestic partner does
not automatically inherit a deceased partner's assets, whereas a regis33
tered partner does.
European Union: In 1994, the European Parliament passed a
resolution calling for Member States to pass legislation giving homosexual couples access to marriage, or a similar institution. 34 The resolution also encouraged Member States to allow homosexual partners to
35
adopt and/or foster children.
France: In France, the civil status of homosexuals will come closer
to married status under the proposed Civil Solidarity Pact law. 36 This
law allows unmarried couples to sign civil solidarity pacts at police sta37
tions thereby giving homosexuals rights they do not currently enjoy.

Spain: Several cities have passed a "register of civil actions." 38 On
a local level, these registers give unmarried couples rights commensurate with those enjoyed by married couples. However, these registers
do not afford rights to homosexual couples on a regional or national
level. 39 In June 1997, the Parliament of the region of Catalonia voted to

allow partnerships between homosexuals, giving
them rights identical
40
to those given married couples, except adoption.
Italy: The cities of Pisa and Florence allow homosexuals to record
42
their partnerships. 41 Country-wide legislation has not been passed.
United Kingdom ("UK"): The UK is one of the most hostile EU nations with respect to recognizing homosexual relationships. For example, the UK still makes a distinction between the age of consent for heterosexual relationships (age 16), and homosexual relationships (age
18).43 However, the UK has made strides. For instance, homosexual

31. Id.
32. Goransson, supra note 20, at 174.
33. Id. at 176.
34. Id.
35. Id. Finland has been working on Registered Partner legislation, but as of October
1998, it still had not passed such legislation. From Marriage Rights to Murder: How the
World Treats Gays, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Oct. 7, 1998, in 1998 WL 16614115.
36. From Marriageto Murder,supra note 35.
37. Id. See Ray Moseley, French Debating Legal Status of Unwed Couples: Coalition
Opposes Government-Backed Bill to Extend Rights, Labeling it as Way to Legalize Vice,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1999, at 5.
38. Goransson, supra note 20, at 184.
39. Id. at 183-84.
40. From MarriageRights to Murder, supra note 35.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 27:4

relationships were decriminalized in 1967. 44 In 1996, a homosexual was
45
allowed to adopt a child.
Ireland: In 1993, homosexuality was decriminalized for people seventeen and older. 46 Ireland and the UK do not have any laws giving
homosexual cohabiting couples rights commensurate with those offered
married couples (i.e. inheritance, insurance benefits, employment benefits, financial support obligations, and so on).
The above serves merely as an overview of the differences the
European Parliament, Council and Commission face in attempting to
pass legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Difficulties in passing legislation will continue to exist regardless of the
theoretical ability to pass community-wide legislation as provided for in
the Amsterdam Treaty.
III.

GRANT V.

SWT

This section addresses the Grant v. SWT decision, and its impact on
the EU as a whole. One main function of the ECJ is to give preliminary
rulings on the interpretation of treaties and other secondary legislation
of the EU. 4 7 EU Member States, when unsure of the interpretation of
Community Law, may present a case to the ECJ and request a preliminary ruling on the matter. 48 When the ECJ renders a ruling, the Member State requesting such ruling must enforce the ECJ decision without
modification. 49 Preliminary rulings may serve as guides for all Member
States faced with the same or similar issues. 5° This further ensures
uniformity in the interpretation of Community Law. Once the ECJ
renders a decision, EU citizens, as well as Member States, may seek to
have their national laws officially superseded if they contradict Community Law. 51 In Grant v. SWT, the Industrial Tribunal South Hamp52
ton referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
In 1995, Lisa Grant petitioned her employer, South-West Trains
53
Ltd. ("SWT") for travel benefits for her lesbian partner Jillian Pacey.

44. Id.

45. From MarriageRights to Murder, supranote 35.
46. Id.
47. What is the European Community?: Jurisdiction (visited June 6, 1999)
<http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/pres/comp.htm>o
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. What is the European Community?: The Court of Justice and European Integration (visited June 6, 1999) <http:/leuropa.eu.inttcj/en/pres/cieu.htm>.
52. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 11.
53. Id. at 7.

1999

DIVERSITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

SWT provides travel benefits to "one common law opposite sex spouse of
staff.., subject to a statutory declaration being made that a meaningful relationship has existed for a period of two years or more."54 SWT
extended this provision to include opposite sex cohabiting partners of
employees. 55 At the time of her request, Ms. Grant had lived with Ms.
Pacey for over two years.5 6 SWT denied Ms. Grant's request, asserting
that based on SWT's policies, benefits for unmarried couples are only
given to opposite sex partners.5 7 Ms. Grant then went to the Industrial
Tribunal South Hampton, asserting that SWT's action constituted discrimination based on sex, contrary to the Equal Pay Act of 1970, Article
119 of the EC Treaty and/or Directive 76/207/EEC.58 Ms. Grant's claim
was supported by the fact that one of her colleagues had obtained travel
benefits for his live-in girlfriend. 59 The Tribunal then referred the case
to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling regarding discrimination based on
sexual orientation and its relation to Article 119 of the EC Treaty
and/or Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975.60
Prior to the ECJ rendering its decision in this case, the Advocate
General issued an opinion. The Advocate General's opinion suggested
to the Court that it should decide in favor of Ms. Grant because SWT's
policy regarding travel concessions for same-sex couples violates Article
119 of the EC Treaty. 61 The Advocate General's opinion analyzed the

54. Id. at 5 (emphasis added) (quotes omitted).
55. Id. at 1 8.
56. Paul L. Spackman, Note and Comment, Grant v. South-West Trans: Equality for
Same-Sex Partnershipsin the European Community, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y, 1063,
1102 (1997).
57. No Bias in Same-Sex Ban on Travel Perk, supra note 18, at 41.
58. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 9. Ms. Grant relied on these provisions because
Article 119 provides that "[elach Member State shall during the first stage ensure and
subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work." EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 119. Ms. Grant asserted
that denying her the travel benefits requested constituted discrimination based on sex in
violation of this provision. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 9. Ms. Grant also relied on
Council Directive 76/207/EEC because it is a social policy directive that provides: "The
purpose of this Directive is to put into effect in the Member States the principle of equal
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, including promotion, and
to vocational training and as regards working conditions .. " Council Directive
76/207/EEC, art. 1, 1976 O.J. (L 39) at 40-42 [hereinafter Council Directive 76/207]. The
Directive provides further that "[a]pplication of the principle of equal treatment means
that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex .... " Id art. 3. Together these provisions should have provided Ms. Grant the relief she requested.
59. Grant, 1993 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 9.
60. Id. at I 11.
See EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 119. Council Directive
75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 provides: 'The principle of equal pay for men and women
outlined in Article 119 of the Treaty ... means, for the same work or for work to which
equal value is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration." Council Directive 75/117/EEC, art. 1,
O.J. (L 45) at 19-20 [hereinafter Council Directive 75/117].
61. Grant, Opinion of Advocate General, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 50.
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case from the perspective that SWT's policy constituted discrimination
based on gender, thereby violating previous laws established by the
ECJ in gender reassignment cases. 62 Specifically, the Advocate General
stated:
[w]hether the requirement for obtaining the concessions is satisfied ac-

cordingly depends on the gender both of the employee and of the co-

habitee. Travel concessions for a male cohabitee may only be obtained
if the employee is a woman. Travel concessions for a female cohabitee
may only be obtained if the employee is a man. The fact that cl. 8 of
the ticket regulations does not refer to a specific sex as the criterion for
discrimination, but lays down a more abstract criterion ('opposite sex)
can, in my view, make no difference, since the decisive point as laid
down in P v. S is whether discrimination is exclusively or essentially
63
based on sex.

The Advocate General submitted this opinion to the ECJ. The ECJ,
however, made its own ruling and disregarded the opinion of the Advocate General. 64 This action was unusual because in approximately seventy-five percent of cases, the ECJ relies heavily on the Advocate General opinions, and in some instances the Advocate General opinion gives
insight as to how the ECJ will eventually rule on a case. 65
In Grant v. SWT, the ECJ first determined that Directive
76/207/EEC did not apply to Ms. Grant's case because travel concessions are "pay," as such term is defined in Article 119 of the EC
Treaty. 66
This distinction has significance because Directive
76/207/EEC, which prohibits employment discrimination based on sex,
does not cover pay benefits, and thus, is inapplicable when a complaint
67
involves pay benefits.

62. Id. See Case C-13/94, P v. S & Cornwall County Council, 1996 All E.R. (E.C.)
397, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996) [hereinafter P v. S]. In P v. S, the ECJ held that employers
could not dismiss people who have gender reassignments because such discrimination is
based on the sex of the person, and thus directly prohibited by the relevant provisions of
the EEC Treaty. Grant, Opinion of Advocate General, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 11 24-25.
63. Grant, Opinion of Advocate General, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at I 24-25.
64. See Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 50.
65. Terence Shaw, Lesbian Couple Lose Fight Over Rail Perks: Setback for Gay Rights
Campaignersin Sex DiscriminationCase, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Feb. 18, 1998, at
13. Some people did rely on the Advocate General's opinion as insight into how the ECJ
would rule. See, e.g., Spackman, supranote 56, at 115-19.
66. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 14.
67. Grant, Opinion of Advocate General, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 11. See Case C342/93, Gillespie & Others v. Northern Health & Soc. Serv. Bd. & Others, 1996 All E.R.
(E.C.) 284, 2 C.M.L.R. 969, at 1 37 (1996) [hereinafter Gillespie]. "[T]he underlying rationale of [Directive 76/207/EEC] is clearly set out in the preamble thereto ... It forms
part of the social action programme ... Its aim is to extend the principle of equal treatment for men and women to access to employment and to working conditions other than
pay." Gillespie, 1996 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 37.
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Next, the ECJ had three questions to answer: 1) whether SWT's
travel concession policy constituted discrimination based on sex; 2)
whether Community Law requires employers to regard same-sex relationships the same as heterosexual marriage or other heterosexual relationships; and 3) whether discrimination based on sexual orientation is
68
discrimination based on sex.
In answering the first question, the ECJ determined that the
regulations were not discriminatory based on sex because SWT would
have treated a male co-worker living with a person of the same-sex exactly the same as it treated Ms. Grant. 69 As to the second question, the
ECJ acknowledged that although the European Parliament has declared that it deplores all discrimination based on sexual orientation,
the European Commission, as well as the Parliament, have not yet
adopted rules prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. 70
When addressing the third question, Ms. Grant attempted to invoke the provisions of various international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),71 and the
findings of the Human Rights Commission to support her argument
that discrimination based on sex includes sexual orientation.72 In response, the Court held that although international instruments comprise an integral part of Community Law, they cannot be used to extend
the scope of the EC Treaty (i.e. to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation). 73 In addition, the Court stated that the findings of the
Human Rights Commission do not have the binding force of law because
the Human Rights Commission is not a judicial institution. 74 Consequently, the Human Rights Commission's interpretation of the ICCPR
that "sex" in Article 2 paragraphs 1 and 26 includes sexual orientation,
does not require the ECJ to extend the EC Treaty provisions to include
75
such an interpretation.
The ECJ relied on the fact that despite modern attitudes toward
homosexual relationships, the European Human Rights Convention
does not recognize stable homosexual relationships as within scope of a
key fundamental right: i.e. the right to respect for family life. 76 The
68. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 11-12.
69. Id. at 11 27-28. The ECJ made it clear that the discrimination involved in Grant
was based on sexual orientation, not sex, and therefore, no provision under existing
Community law could protect Ms. Grant.
70. Id. at 11 31-32.
71. Id. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 .... I.L.M... [hereinafter ICCPRI.
72. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 43.
73. Id. at 145.
74. Id. at 1 46.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1 33. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, [hereinafter Human
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ECJ based its findings on the fact that the European Court of Human
Rights has held that Article 12 of the Human Rights Convention only
applies to traditional heterosexual marriages.77 Article 12 provides:
"Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of
this right."7 8 Furthermore, the ECJ concluded that although Article 14
of the Human Rights Convention prohibits discrimination based on sex,
in the interests of protecting family interests, and particularly procreation, more favorable treatment is afforded to heterosexual couples than
homosexual couples.7 9 From this the Court determined that Community Law does not require equivalent treatment for homosexual and
heterosexual relationships, and thus employers do not have to treat
same-sex relationships the same as heterosexual relationships.8 0 Having made that determination, the Court deferred to the legislatures of
the various EU Member States, as well as the European Parliament, to
pass legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation,
8
thereby retaining the status quo. '
Ironically, and in contravention with the analysis of the ECJ, in
1990, the European Parliament recognized that the Community (at
least up to that point) did not have the power to intervene in cases of
82
discriminatory practices by Member States against sexual minorities.
However, despite this, the Parliament took solace in the fact that:
[t]he fundamental rights of sexual minorities are protected by other international instruments. Since all the Member States are members of
the Council of Europe and signatories to the European Convention on
Human Rights, the Commission and the Court of Human Rights are
best able to guarantee the protection of sexual minorities against dis83
crimination.

The ECJ decision in the Grant v. SWT case greatly undermined
this position taken by the European Parliament.

Rights Convention].
77. See Human Rights Convention, supranote 76, art. 12.
78. Id.
79. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 33. Article 14 of the Human Rights Convention
provides: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." Human Rights Convention, supra note 76, art. 14.
80. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 35.
81. Id. at 36.
82. Clapham & Weiler, supra note 4, at 28. Now, in light of the Amsterdam Treaty,
the European Council has a mechanism through which to intervene and prohibit Member
States from discriminating based on sexual orientation. See Amsterdam Treaty, supra
note 14, at pt. 1, art 13.
83. Clapham & Weiler, supranote 4, at 28 n.42 (emphasis added).
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In addition to the above arguments, Ms. Grant attempted to compare her case to cases involving discrimination based on gender reassignment.8 4 The ECJ, in previous decisions, prohibited discrimination
based on gender reassignment.85 In his opinion, the Advocate General
attempted to point this out in reference to Ms. Grant's situation. 86 The
Advocate General argued that the travel benefits afforded to heterosexual married couples and cohabitees were based on gender insofar as the
employee must be the opposite sex of the cohabitee.8 7 Thus, "[w]hether
the requirement for obtaining the concessions is satisfied ...depends
on the gender both of the employee and of the cohabitee. Travel concessions for a male cohabitee may only be obtained if the employee is a
woman,"88 and vice versa. Therefore, according to the Advocate General, SWT's "opposite sex" requirement is based on sex, and the Court
should not tolerate such a policy.
The ECJ, however, distinguished Ms. Grant's case from others involving gender reassignment stating that discrimination based on gender reassignment is based "essentially, if not exclusively, on the sex of
the person concerned;" 89 whereas, in the opinion of the Court, SWT
based its discriminatory policies on sexual orientation, not the sex of
the individual. 90 This distinction is analogous to that made by some
American courts when they hold that although same-sex marriage is
prohibited, so long as people have gone through the process of changing
their sex, they can marry another who is technically their same sex. 91
In addition to its other arguments, the Court pointed out that even
Member States that recognize same-sex partnerships do not afford
84. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 37.
85. See P v. S, 1996 All E.R. (E.C.) at Decision. Gender reassignment means individuals who have had sex change operations. The discrimination in P v. S did not involve
pay, and thus the ECJ invoked the provisions of Council Directive 76/207/EEC to protect
transsexual individuals.
86. Grant, Opinion of Advocate General, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.), at 11 24-25.
87. Id. at 24.
88. Id.
89. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 42.
90. Id.
91. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 1976). Some American
courts allow couples who are technically of the same-sex, to marry if one of them has a sex
change operation (i.e. a man marries another man who has become a woman). Id. However, the sex change has to take place before the marriage occurs. Id. According to some
courts, this does not constitute same-sex marriage. Id. Some people base their opinions
regarding sexual orientation on their perceptions of homosexuality. Some believe that
homosexuality is a changeable characteristic that people choose, whereas characteristics
such as sex, race, and disability are characteristics people have no control over. Relying
on this argument, people can justify making a distinction between protecting classes
based on race, sex and disability, and refusing to protect sexual minorities. However, this
argument begs the question, if sexual orientation is a choice, and thus excepted from protection, why do we protect people from religious persecution? Furthermore, modern technology has proven that sex is no longer an unchangeable characteristic.
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those partnerships all the same rights enjoyed by heterosexual couples,
and, thus, allow at least some level of discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 92 Impliedly, the Court recognized that in the nations that
recognize homosexual partnerships, such partnerships are recognized in
the form of "Registered Partnerships," not marriages. In addition, the
court pointed out that in these nations, homosexual couples do not have
all the rights heterosexual couples have, most significantly, homosexual
citizens are denied the rights to a church marriage, to adopt a child,
and to have artificial insemination. Thus, some level of discrimination
is tolerated even by nations recognizing homosexual relationships as
93
partnerships.
The Grant v. SWT decision by the ECJ surprised many, especially
in light of the Advocate General's opinion. The Court may have based
its decision on social mores that frown upon same-sex partnerships, but
more likely, the Court tried to avoid "trespassing on the role of European legislators." 94 Unfortunately, in its effort to allow Member State
legislatures to pass laws regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation, the ECJ failed to ensure uniformity of interpretation of Community Law regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Consequently, the laws regarding discrimination remain varied. The
impact is most likely temporary in light of the Amsterdam Treaty, but
temporary may consist of a long period of time. The next section addresses the affect the Amsterdam Treaty may have on prohibiting of
discrimination based on sexual orientation and the impact on the free
movement of persons.
IV. THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM & ITS AFFECT ON DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
A. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM

As expressed in the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome,95 one of the
main purposes of the EU - from the perspective of the Member States is "the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of
their peoples." 96 Encompassed within this purpose is the goal of free

92. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 11 31-32. See supra notes 16-46 and accompanying text.
93. Goransson, supra note 20, at 170-75.
94. Shaw, supra note 65. See Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 11 36 and 48.
95. The EEC Treaty (Treaty of Rome) was signed March 25, 1957, and entered into
force January 1, 1958. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 8, at 209. In February 1986, the
EC Member States signed the Single European Act, which entered into force July 1, 1987.
Id. The EC Member States signed the EU Treaty February 2, 1992, and it entered into
force November 1, 1993. Id. The EU Treaty became known as the Maastricht Treaty, after the place where it was signed. Id. Thereafter, the entire European Communities became the European Union (EU). Id.
96. Francis Snyder, et al., Subsidiarity:An Aspect of European Community Law and
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movement of people between Member States. The recent Grant v. SWT
decision had an impact on the free movement of people because it allows
employers to continue to discriminate based on sexual orientation, if the
laws of a Member State allow such conduct. This leads to the unequal
treatment of gay men and lesbians between Member States because, as
previously discussed, the EU Member States have differing social attitudes and laws regarding homosexuality. Out of a population of approximately 365 million people,9 7 the lesbian, gay and bisexual population in the EU includes at least eighty million citizens. 98 Thus, the
unequal treatment of gay men and lesbians could potentially have an
important economic impact for the entire EU, and thus could limit the
EU's ultimate goals of full economic integration, 99 harmonization of social systems, 10 0 and close cooperation in employment, labor law, and
working conditions.' 01
As early as 1981, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe attempted to prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation. ° 2 The Assembly's Committee on Social and Health Questions
proposed that the Assembly adopt a provision guaranteeing "the right
to sexual determination."'' 03 This could be done by adding "sexual preference" to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. 0 4 The Assembly approved other proposals including "abolishing police record-keeping of homosexual activity;
ensuring equal treatment for homosexuals in employment; ending all
medical research designed to alter sexual orientation; guaranteeing
homosexual parents the right to custody of their children; and reducing
the risk of rape and violence against homosexuals in prisons."105 However, the Assembly refused to take the ultimate step of modifying the
text of the Convention because it wanted to allow the case law in the
area to further develop before it took such a significant step. 106 This re-

its Relevance to Lesbians and Gay Men, in HOMOSEXUALITY, supra note 1, at 230.

97. What is the European
//europa.eu.intl/cj/en/pres/qce.htm>.

Community?

(visited

June

6,

1999)

<http:

98. PETER TATCHELL, EUROPE IN THE PINK: LESBIAN & GAY EQUALITY IN THE NEW
EUROPE 15 (1992).

99. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 2.
100. Id. art. 117. See Kees Waaldijk, The Legal Situation in the Member States, in
HOMOSEXUALITY, supra note 1, at 75.

101. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 118. See Tatchell, supra note 98, at 55 (discussing Article 118).
102. Helfer, supra note 8, at 183. The Assembly is composed of representatives appointed by the Parliaments of each nation that has ratified the European Convention.
The Parliament makes recommendations related to human rights. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 183-84.
106. Id. at 184.
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In 1984 the European Parliament made a statement deploring "all
forms of discrimination based on an individual's sexual tendencies," and
asked Member States to take action to stop legal and social antihomosexual discrimination.108 The Parliament proposed a resolution
requesting that EC 109 Member States take action similar to the proposals of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 110 However, the European Commission took no further action because it
claimed that the EC Treaty provided no guidance regarding gay and
lesbian rights, and thus it had no competence to take action prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation."'
In 1989 the European Parliament reiterated its support for equal
treatment of homosexuals by proposing that the European Social Charter ensure the right of all workers to equal protection regardless of sexual preference. 112 However, the Parliament did not take any further acIn 1994, the European Parliament again attempted to
tion." 3
encourage Member States to protect sexual minorities. 1' 4 As mentioned
above, the Parliament passed a resolution asking Member States to
pass legislation that provides homosexuals and lesbians access to "marriage or an equivalent legal framework and to adoption and fostering of
children." 115 Thus far, most Member States have not passed such legislation.
The most recent attempt to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation is contained in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. Before addressing specific articles of the Amsterdam Treaty, a background that
led to the drafting of the Amsterdam Treaty is necessary. In 1992 the
EC Member States decided to expand European law beyond the provisions of the Treaty of Rome." 6 In order to do this, the EC Member
States signed the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). 1' 7 The TEU expanded EU law through: 1) increasing monetary union provisions; 2)
granting citizenship in the EU to all citizens of the Member States; 3)
heightened social provisions; and 4) including different areas of empha-

107. Id.
108. Waaldijk, supra note 100, at 75. See Heifer, supra note 8, at 184 (referring to
proposed resolution that advocated Member State action).
109. At the time the EU was called the European Community (EC).
110. Helfer, supra note 8, at 184-85.
111. Id. at 185.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Goransson, supra note 20, at 176.
115. Id.
116. Daniel T. Murphy, The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy: It
Is Not FarFrom Maastricht to Amsterdam, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 871, 872 (1998).
117. Id.
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sis between Member States and the EC Treaty institutions. ' 18 The TEU
established a set of relationships between the Treaty, EU institutions,
and the Member States. 1 9 These relationships rest on "three pil12
lars."'120 The first pillar consists of the EC Treaty and its related acts. '
The other two pillars are the Common Security and Foreign Policy, and
22
Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs.'
At the direction of the TEU, the Member States held an Intergovernmental Conference. 123 This Conference was held over sixteen
months, and culminated in June 1997 with agreement on the text of a
draft treaty - the Amsterdam Treaty.' 24 In October 1997, the EU
125
Member States signed the final version of the Amsterdam Treaty.
The Amsterdam Treaty "shall enter into force on the first day of the
second month following that in which the last Member State deposits
the instrument of ratification with the Italian government." 126 France
was the last EU Member State to ratify the Amsterdam Treaty. It did
so in March 1999.127
With respect to the issues addressed in this paper, the most significant provision of the Amsterdam Treaty provides:
[w]ithout prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the
limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or be128

lief, disability, age or sexual orientation.

This provision has significance because it constitutes the first official action taken by the EU that may definitively prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation on a Community-wide basis. Unlike
the Amsterdam Treaty, all previous efforts have been contingent upon
the legislatures of the various Member States passing laws prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, as addressed below, there is one caveat -- this provision is based on the unanimous action of the EU Council.
Some critics lobbied heavily

against passing the Amsterdam

118. Id.
119. Id. at 874.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Murphy, supra note 116, at 874.
123. Id. at 875.
124. Id. at 872.
125. Id.
126. Youri Devuyst, Introductory Note, in Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14.
127. FranceRatifies EU Amsterdam Treaty Amid Criticism, AGENCE-FR. PRESSE, Mar.
3, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2556911.
128. Amsterdam Treaty, supranote 14, at pt. 1, art. 13 (emphasis added).
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Treaty. 129 A main concern for one critic, Justice Rory O'Hanlon, was
the loss of sovereignty for small nations such as Ireland. This concerned Justice O'Hanlon because nations are not compensated for sovereignty they agree to sacrifice. 130 Justice O'Hanlon wrote that the Amsterdam Treaty is a step toward giving up all sovereignty, and is on a
path toward a "vast, unwieldy conglomerate of states with different
languages, traditions and cultures." 131 Part 1, Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, which provides the mechanism to stop discrimination
based on sexual orientation, bothered Justice O'Hanlon the most.1 32 In
Justice O'Hanlon's opinion, this provision defeats "the will of the Irish
people."

13 3

This argument fails to acknowledge the fact that measures cannot
be passed without the support of the entire Membership of the EU
Council, including Ireland. Thus, if prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation truly undermines the will of the Irish people, theoretically, such a provision will not pass through the EU Council because
Ireland will have the ability to veto any provision it disagrees with.
In order to implement prohibitions on discrimination based on sexual orientation, the EU Council must act unanimously, and the European Parliament must be consulted.13 4 This means that one Member
State can act unilaterally to prevent the Council from passing provisions prohibiting discrimination. This raises problems because most
Member States, particularly the United Kingdom, do not allow homo1 35
sexuals to have the same rights and privileges as heterosexuals.

129. See Patricia McKenna, Vote No So We Can Renegotiate a More Democratic
Europe: Voters Should Ask Why They Are DeliberatelyBeing Kept in the Dark, by a Campaign of Insults and Abuse, About the Implications for Ireland of the Amsterdam Treaty,
IRISH TIMES, May 12, 1998, at 16; Justice Rory O'Hanlon, We Must Reject Further International Interference in our Domestic Affairs: The Amsterdam Treaty is a Bridge Too Far;
We Should Not be Bludgeoned Into Accepting Political Union, IRISH TIMES, May 20, 1998,
at 16.
130. O'Hanlon, supra note 129
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Ms. McKenna argued that the EU Member States should not have passed the
Amsterdam Treaty because the Treaty takes away too much decision-making power in
major political areas from national governments, and gives it to Brussels. McKenna, supra note 129.
134. Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt. 1, art. 13.
135. Historically, England has been one of the most outwardly hostile nations toward
homosexual relationships. Jorge Martin, Note, English Polygamy Law and the Danish
Registered PartnershipAct: A Case for the Consistent Treatment of Foreign Polygamous
Marriagesand Danish Same-sex Marriagesin England, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 419, 42830 (1994). Some examples of English hostility are: 1) The Sexual Offences Act of 1967 defines privacy so narrowly that when applied to same-sex relationships, if a same-sex couple has sex in a bedroom when someone is in another room of the house, they are in violation of the act. Therefore, same-sex couples having sex in a hotel are in violation of the
act. Id. at 428. 2) Section 28 of the Local Government Act of 1988 "prohibits local authori-
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Thus, although the Amsterdam Treaty allows for action prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, the unanimity requirement
allows those nations wary of giving up too much of their sovereignty to
the EU Community to veto legislation prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation. 136 The unanimity requirement thus makes it
more difficult to get measures passed. Consequently, the Amsterdam
Treaty is only a framework for passing laws in the future; it does not
constitute a current prohibition on discrimination based on sexual ori37
entation.'
Further complicating matters was the resignation of the entire
membersip of the EU Commission following accusations of wrongdoing. 138 This has an especially detrimental affect on the Amsterdam
Treaty because before EU Member States are obligated to pass laws
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, the EU Commission must propose such legislation. 139 Although a new commission
has been selected, the political turmoil and economic crises in the EU
make the proposal of legislation prohibiting discrimination based on
40
sexual orientation a hope for the distant future.'
Although the Amsterdam Treaty is a step in the right direction,
"any progress under [the provisions prohibiting discrimination based on
ties from intentionally promoting homosexuality as a pretended family relationship." Id.
at 428-29 (internal citation omitted). 3) Section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act of
1973 makes a marriage void if it is not "respectively male and female." Id. at 429 (citation
omitted). Ironically, despite English hostility toward rights for homosexuals, Cherie
Blair, wife of Prime Minister Tony Blair, served as counsel for Lisa Grant in her case before the ECJ. Ben Fenton, Cherie Booth, QC, Puts CaseAgainst the Government: Blair's
Wife Takes Lesbian Cause to Europe, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), July 10, 1997, at 8.
136. See generally Padraig Flynn, Amsterdam Will Create a Union Responsive to People's Needs: Opponents of the Amsterdam Treaty Have Made Wild and Misleading Claims
While the Reality is That the Treaty Gives the Irish Public all the Guaranteesits (sic) Requires on the Issue of Defence, IRISH TIMES, May, 18, 1998, at 14 (arguing for the passage
of the Amsterdam Treaty despite the fact that it requires further surrender of sovereignty
to the EU Community because the Amsterdam Treaty will "create a union responsive to
the people's needs").
137. Angela Broughton, et al., International Employment, 32 INT'L LAW. 303, 305
(1998). Many recognize the reality that it is unlikely that the EU Commission will have
the ability to pass laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, at least
not for a while, because of the unanimity requirement. See Charles Bremner, Gay Workers Have No Right To Equal Benefits, TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 18, 1998, at 14.
138. Phillip J. Longman, The High Price of Staying Together: A Scandal Highlights
Problemsin Euro-land,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 29, 1999, at 46. Finally, after six
months, the EU Parliament approved the appointment of a new president of the EU
Commission - Romano Prodi, former Italian prime minister. Prodi has selected his commission, but this setback has delayed a number of crucial decisions, many which are more
pressing than banning discrimination based on sexual orientation. And So to Business,
GULF NEWS, Sept. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21060955.
139. See Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt. 1, art. 13.
140. See generally Longman, supra note 138 (discussing the political and economic
turmoil of the EU since the implementation of the euro - the European single currency).
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sexual orientation] will depend on the work of committed and determined activists.141 Furthermore, because the Amsterdam Treaty only
requires the Council of Ministers to take appropriate action to combat
discrimination based on sexual orientation, this may only consist of directives, thus requiring each EU Member government to pass its own
legislation complying with the directives. 142 This puts prohibitions on
discrimination based on sexual orientation back to the position they
were in before the Amsterdam Treaty. "This could add years to the
time it would take a non-discrimination ban to go into effect."'143

B. THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
One fundamental right affected by discrimination based on sexual
orientation is the free movement of persons. This infringment makes
prohibitions on such discrimination even more important. The Amsterdam Treaty, with its emphasis on equal treatment and nondiscrimination, is a small step toward furthering the European integration process, particularly the free movement of persons, though there is
still much work to be done.
The free movement of persons is a fundamental right under the EU
Treaty, but only to the extent that such a right helps further the Community objective of a fully integrated free market economy. 144 In the
EU context, a fundamental right is not defined the same as a fundamental right under the United States Constitution.
Fundamental
rights in the EU are "capitalist principles that promote free trade and
movement across national borders." 145 The EU Treaty guarantees the
free movement of persons to workers under Article 48 of the EU Treaty,
and to the self-employed who have the right of establishment under Article 52.146 However, as mentioned above, Member States may impose
limitations on the right of EU citizens to enter and take up work in
their states. 147 Member States may base these limitations on public
policy, public security and/or public health. In addition, states are free
"to determine the requirements of public policy in light of their national
needs." 148 However, these limitations must be justified, and the ECJ
may review such to ensure that the justification complies with the
149
terms and purposes of the EU.
141. Flynn, supra note 136.
142. Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt. 1, art. 13; Edwin Unsworth, E.U. Rejects
Same-Sex Benefits, BUS. INS., Mar. 2, 1998, at 31.
143. Unsworth, supranote 142, at 31.
144. Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The Court of
Justice, Social Policy, and Individual Rights Under the European Community's Legal Order, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 341 (1996).
145. Id. at 308.
146. Id. at 346-47.
147. Clapham & Weiler, supra note 4, at 39.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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The ECJ analyzed the definition of "worker" and the scope of the
right to free movement in Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie.1 50 In
that case, the Court discussed the objectives of the EU Treaty and
stated that "according to Articles 2 and 3, [one of the objectives of the
EU Treaty is] the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to
freedom of movement for persons, with the purpose inter alia of promoting throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities and a raising of the standard of living." 51 Based on this
objective, the Court held that Mrs. Levin, as a part-time worker, had
the right to freely move and work in any EU Member State "because the
denial of such a right to her and to other part-time workers would have
undermined the successful attainment of the Community's economic
objectives."1 52 Thus, for the right of free movement to apply to EU citi53
zens, it must assist in the creation of an integrated common market.
Therefore, the determination as to whether an individual is entitled to
the right of free movement stems from "whether he or she is an active
54
participant in the economy."'
The main goal of the EU is economic integration, thus social policy
issues are secondary and only addressed to the extent that they impact
economic integration. 155 Unfortunately, because of this secondary
status, the social policies related to same-sex couples and free movement have not moved toward protecting homosexuals' "fundamental
right" to free movement, although discrimination in employment in any
form does impact economic integration.
Most Member States probably prefer to ignore the long-term economic impact discrimination has, rather than address the social policies
impacted by discrimination based on sexual orientation. Most significantly, the criteria set forth in Levin (i.e. whether a citizen is an active
participant in the economy determines their entitlement to a right of
free movement), have not applied to homosexual employees within the
EU. At present, most states do not prohibit employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation. 56 This causes a problem because discrimination based on sexual orientation is a disincentive for homosexual citizens of non-discriminatory states Member States to move to and
157
find employment in discriminatory Member States.
Other factors such as higher taxes and higher crime rates may also

150. Ball, supra note 144, at 349.
151. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
152. Id. at 350.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 308-09.
156. Only France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland prohibit such discrimination. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
157. Ball, supra note 144, at 382.
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affect free movement, however, discrimination in employment directly
affects a fundamental objective of the Community - freedom of movement to allow citizens of Member States to compete in the EU's labor
market.' 58 Thus, Member States should work harder to actively prohibit such discrimination.
As the laws of the Member States currently stand, homosexual employees receive different treatment depending upon the Member State
they live in. This inequality of treatment impedes free movement because "employees in countries where they are guaranteed legal protection against discrimination may be loathe to relocate in other [EU]
[Mlember [SItates where no such protection exists because they would
thereby be vulnerable to discrimination." 15 9 For example, homosexual
citizens in Denmark, France, Ireland and the Netherlands have their
rights of free movement infringed because no other countries offer protection against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. 160 In addition, homosexual employees of other Member States may
move to France, Ireland or the Netherlands because they currently are
the only Member States offering such protection, thereby distorting free
competition in labor markets, and putting employers in EU countries
without protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation
at a disadvantage. 16 1 These employers may be disadvantaged in a
number of ways, but most significantly they may be unable to attract
some "high calibre" employees merely because the employees are homo162
sexual.

158. Id. at 382-83.
159. TATCHELL, supra note 98, at 56.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Following are a few examples of the ways in which homosexuals may be discriminated against in nations that are hostile toward homosexual relationships: 1) A
French lesbian may accept seasonal work in Germany, thereby availing herself of the
privilege of free movement. While in Germany, she could be confronted with harassment
from her employer if he or she discovers her sexuality. However, unlike in France, she
will have no legal recourse in Germany to stop the harassment or ensure that she will receive compensation for her services; 2) An American company may locate its headquarters
in the United Kingdom. Citizens from all the various EU countries staff the headquarters. While in the UK, homosexual staff members will face the following discrimination
and persecution: a) they will have no legal protection against sexual discrimination in the
workplace, including unfair dismissal or harassment; b) they will have no legal protection
against sexual discrimination in the provision of public and private services, such as
housing; c) the male staff members could be prosecuted if they have sex with other men,
unless both are at least 21, and the sexual acts occur in a private dwelling with doors
locked, windows shut, and no other person is in any part of the house; and d) the gay male
staff members, and in some instances lesbian staff members, may be prosecuted for consensual non-genital contact (i.e. kissing, caressing, exchanging telephone numbers in a
public place, etc.). Id. at 56-57. These types of issues will have the greatest impact on
free movement until the European Council passes some type of community-wide legislation prohibiting this type of treatment. However, as mentioned above, passing such laws
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Another issue raised by Grant v. SWT involves the inability of homosexual citizens to move from one Member State to another as guaranteed by Article 8 of the EU Treaty. Current laws in most Member
States infringe upon this right because some Member States allow homosexual citizens to receive employment benefits for their same-sex
partners, whereas other Member States deny such benefits. Furthermore, some Member States allow Registered Partnerships that provide
invaluable benefits equivalent to those offered to married couples. Despite potential better employment opportunities in other Member
States, homosexual citizens may not want to leave non-discriminating
Member States because they would then have to forfeit these benefits.
Some may argue that if emigration occurs within the EU, the losses
will be internalized, thereby minimizing the overall impact to the EU. 163
Although the overall costs to the EU as a whole will not be excessive,
certain regions will likely suffer unnecessary "brain drain" and economic disparity. 16 4 This would lead to an unequal allocation of the EU
work force. 16 5 Thus, although the right of free movement is not overtly
denied to same-sex couples or homosexual citizens, discrimination inringes on such a right.
The most recent attempt made by the EU institutions through the
Amsterdam Treaty can potentially protect the lesbian and gay community against discrimination in areas already within the competence of
the Community (i.e. employment conditions and the free movement of
labor). 166 Such an approach couches the protection in terms of economic
fairness and equality, rather than morality, thereby making it easier for
EU Member States less open to equal treatment for homosexuals, to
implement measures prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.16 7 These Member States can justify their actions based on economic rather than social considerations because denying the right of
free movement, whether direct or indirect, to one portion of the citi68
zenry, impairs economic expansion and stability.'
V. CONCLUSION

Although the EU has proceeded in the right direction toward pro-

may not occur for a long time. See supranotes 138-40 and accompanying text.
163. Russell Child, The Economic Situation in the Member States, in HOMOSEXUALITY,
supra note 1, at 171.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Ball, supra note 144, at 385.
167. See id.
168. See generally Waaldijk, supra note 100, at 75 (referring to the ongoing existence
of homosexual discrimination).
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hibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Grant v.SWT
decision still prevails as the current law in the EU. This decision unfortunately represents a setback in the homosexual rights movement that
has made various strides in the last thirty years. Aware of the impending passage of the Amsterdam Treaty, the ECJ took a conservative
approach to its decision in Grant v. SWT. This allowed the ECJ to
maintain the "status quo," and left the definitive decision-making to the
legislative branch of the EU.
Grant v. SWT presented the ECJ with the opportunity to definitively decide this issue, but it chose not to capitalize on that opportunity, and has now left the decision-making power to the members of the
European Council and the European Parliament. This causes problems
because the ability of the European Council to pass community-wide
legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation is
predicated on the unanimous vote of the European Council after consultation with the European Parliament, and a proposal from the European Commission. 169 Due to the recent political and economic instability in the EU, passage of the necessary legislation will be difficult. 170
Thus, rather than ensuring that the Member States apply the law
of the EU uniformly, the ECJ ensured that it will take a long time before uniformity exists with respect to discrimination against sexual minorities. Despite failed attempts to do so in the past, the legislative and
executive institutions within the EU must continue to promote the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation in order for the
Community to achieve the full economic and social integration for
which it strives. Until then, it is clear that "[a]ll animals are equal, but
171
some animals are more equal than others."'

169. Grant, 1998 All E.R. (E.C.) at 1 48. See Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 14, at pt.
1, art. 13.
170. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
171. Orwell, supra note 2, at 112.

ARTICLE 177 REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN

COURT
VLADIMIR SHIFRIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
In many ways the most important aspect of the work of the European Court of Justice (ECJ or Court of Justice) is its jurisdiction to give
"preliminary rulings" under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome'. Disputes involving Community law never come directly before the Court of
Justice, but rather before the courts and tribunals of the Member
States. Treaty provisions enable the Court of Justice to rule on questions of Community law, which arise in such litigation. 2 The system of
"preliminary rulings" has proved a particularly effective means of securing rights claimed under Community law. 3 The term "preliminary
ruling" is somewhat of a misnomer. The ruling is requested and given
in the course of proceedings before the national court. 4 It is therefore
an interlocutory ruling, a step in the proceeding before the national
court. 5 The effect is that any question of Community law in an issue be-

Vladimir Shifrin is currently a third year law student at the University of Denver
College of Law, and a 1989 graduate of the University of Colorado at Denver, B.S, Business Information Systems Analysis, Management and Design.
1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, U.J. (C224) 1 (1992),
[1992] (C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
2. Article 177 EEC Treaty provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: the interpretation of this Treaty; the validity and interpretation of
acts of the institutions of the Community; the interpretation of the statutes
of the bodies established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so
provide. Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a
Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on
the question is necessary to enable it to give judgement, request the Court
of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a
case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shallbring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Id. art. 177.
3. See generally NEVILLE BROWN & FRANCIS G. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (3rd ed. 1989).
4. Id. at 172.
5. Id. at 171.
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fore a national court may be authoritatively determined by the Court of
Justice. A national court is in all cases entitled, and in some cases, required to make a reference to the Court; and the Court is the final arbiter on matters of Community law, though the case is heard in a national
forum.6 The need for a system of preliminary rulings can be seen most
7
clearly in relation to questions of validity of Community legislation.
For a national court to declare Community legislation invalid would
lead to intolerable confusion.8 Furthermore, a similar line of reasoning
may apply equally well to questions of interpretation. The applicability
of Community law in a particular case depends as much upon its interpretation as upon its validity. 9 A narrow interpretation of legislation
could be tantamount to holding it invalid, or the actual validity may depend on strict construction. 10 Thus, uniform interpretation of Community law is necessary for uniform application of Community law. 1
Without uniform application, Community law would be liable to frag12
ment and become overlaid by various national legal systems.
This article will examine the implications for Article 177(3) references in light of the holding and analysis by the Court of Justice in Par13
fums ChristianDior SA & Parfumes Christian Dior BV v. Evora BV.
This case re-examined what constitutes a national court whose decisions are final for the purpose of Article 177(3) and solidified the circumstances when such a court must refer to the ECJ for a preliminary
ruling. However, in not following the opinion of the Advocate General
the ECJ missed an opportunity to finally overrule a loophole in the review process first established in CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo Spa v.
4
Ministry of Health.'

6. BROWN & Jacobs, supra note 2 at 172.

7. See id. at 173.
8. See id.
9. Id. at 174.

10. Id.
11. "Article 177 is essential for the preservation of the Community character of the
law established by the Treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances
this law is the same in all States of the Community." Id. (quoting Case 166/73 Rheinmuhlen [1974] ECR 33 at 38).
12. See id. at 175
13. Case 337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA & Parfumes Christian Dior BV v. Evora
BV, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 4641 [hereinafter Dior].
14. Case 283/81 CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo Spa v. Ministry of Health 1982 ECR
3415, ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1474 [hereinafter CILFI1.
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II.CASE DESCRIPTION
A.

Summary of Facts

Dior 15 commenced proceedings against Evora 16 on the grounds of
trademark infringement. Dior put forth two claims: (1) that the marks
have been used in breach of its exclusive right to use the marks in respect to the same goods in violation of Article 13A of the Uniform
Benelux Law on Trademarks; or, (2) that the marks have been used in
circumstances liable to cause damage by impairing the prestige and image of the marks. 17 Dior further claimed that Evora infringed on its

15. Parfums Christian Dior SA (Dior France) owns the exclusive rights to Eau Sauvage, Poison, Fahrenheit, Svelte, and Dune trademarks in the Benelux countries. The
marks consist of package illustrations for perfume bottles. Additionaly, Dior France
owns the copyright to the packaging and the bottles. The second plaintiff, Parfums
Christian Dior BV (Dior Netherlands) is the exclusive franchisee of Dior France in the
Netherlands. Dior Netherlands uses a selective distribution system to sell the products in
the Netherlands. Selective distribution systems are lawful in the luxury cosmetics sector. Selected retailers can only sell the products to the ultimate consumer or another selected retailer. Selective distribution systems can be justified by the particular nature of
the products: Selective distribution systems constitute an element of competition which
is in conformity with Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty if four conditions are satisfied: first,
that the characteristics of the product in question necessitate a selective distribution system, in the sense that such a system constitutes a legitimate requirement having regard
to the nature of the product concerned, in particular its high quality or technical sophistication, in order to preserve its quality and ensure proper use; second, that resellers are
chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature which are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and not applied in a discriminatory fashion; third, that
the system in question seeks to achieve a result which enhances competition and thus
counterbalances the restriction of competition inherent in selective distribution systems,
in particular as regards price; and fourth, that the criteria laid down do not go beyond
what is necessary. Case T-88/92, Groupement d'achat Edouard Leclerc v. Commission of
the European Communities, 1996 E.C.R., ECJ CELEX LEXIS 4474 1 106 (Ct. First Instance 1996).
16. The defendant, Evora BV (Evora), operates a chain of chemist shops under the
name of its subsidiary Kruidvat. Kruidvat shops are not part of the selected distribution
system, but sell Dior products obtained by parallel imports. Parallel imports are products which are not obtained directly from Dior or its distributors, but which have already
been marketed by Dior or with its consent. Parallel importers purchase products in
batches in Member States where prices are relatively low and import them to sell below
the manufactures official price while still making a profit. In a Christmas promotion in
1993, Kruidvat advertised, without Dior's consent, Eau Sauvage, Poison, Fahrenheit,
Dune and Svelte perfumes, using depictions of the packaging and bottles of those products. Kruidvat carried out the advertising in a manner customary to retailers in the parallel imports sector.
17. Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS
3 (opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs, delivered 29 April 1997) (second indent of the first paragraph of Article 13A of the Benelux
Law entitled a trade mark owner to oppose any other use of the mark or a similar sign,
in circumstances, which in the field of commerce, and without just cause, were liable to
prejudice the trade mark owner).
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copyright regarding bottles and packaging used for its goods.18 Dior
sought an order that Evora "should desist and continue to desist from
making any use of Dior picture trade marks, and from any publication
or reproduction of Diors' products. 19
B.

ProceduralHistory in the Netherlands

The Arrondissementsrechtbank Haarlem (District Court) upheld
Dior's claim and issued an injunction ordering Evora to desist and to
continue to desist from using any of Dior's trademarks in "catalogues,
brochures, advertisement or otherwise, in a manner not conforming to
Dior's customary manner of advertising." 20 The injunction was set aside
on appeal to the Gerechtshof (Regional Court of Appeals), against which
Dior took the matter to Hoge Raad (Supreme Court). 21 In some circumstances requiring interpretation of Benelux Law, the Hoge Raad is required to refer questions to the Benelux Court for a preliminary ruling.22 Hoge Raad decided that questions on the interpretation of the
Uniform Benelux Law on Trade Marks should be referred to the Benelux Court, and questions on Community law should be refereed to the
Court of Justice, and therefore stayed proceedings. 23 The Benelux
Court also stayed its proceedings before it on the grounds that replies to
questions submitted to the Court of Justice will effect its own re24
sponse.
The Court of Justice faced the following procedural question: in
proceedings relating to interpretation of Uniform Benelux Law on

18. See id.
19. See id. 1 7.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. 1 26. The Benelux Court may be asked by any court in the Benelux countries, under Article 6, to rule on a question of interpretation of Benelux law where there
is a difficulty of interpretation and the national court considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment. By the third paragraph of the same
article, a national court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required to refer to the Benelux court. Article 7(2) of the treaty establishing
the Benelux court provides that the national courts which take decisions subsequently in
the action are bound by the interpretation adopted by the Benelux court. Id.
23. Id. The Benelux Convention on Trade Marks (Benelux Convention) (concluded
between Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) established the Benelux Court,
which is composed of judges of the supreme courts of each of those three States. Article
10 of the Benelux Convention was concluded on 19 March 1962, and Article 6(3), concluded 31 March 1965, established the Benelux Court. Under Article 177(3) of the EC
Treaty, a court of the Member State against whose decisions there is no remedy under
national law is obliged to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Id.
24. See id.
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Trade Marks and interpretation of Council Directive 89/104/EEC25, is
the highest national court or the Benelux Court to be regarded as the
court against whose decisions there is no remedy under national law
and which is therefore required to refer to the Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling under Article 177.26
C. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs
The Advocate General first noted that the appeal in the present
case is in the context of an interlocutory proceeding.27 Therefore, neither court is obliged to refer to the Court of Justice, provided that each
party is entitled to continue proceedings on the substance of the case,
and any question decided in the interlocutory proceeding may be the
subject of a future reference to the Court. 28 However, the Advocate
General thought it might be useful to complete the analyses. 29 He
opinioned that interlocutory proceedings before the Benelux Court are a
step in the proceedings before a national court; the answer given by the
Benelux Court is binding on the referring national court; therefore, the
Benelux Court is obligated to refer to the Court of Justice when the
question presented depends on interpretation of Community law. 30 The
only exception the Advocate General envisioned to a mandatory Article
177 reference centers on a lower court, in the same proceeding, already
having made reference on the same question. 31 Simply, a court of a
Member State "whose decisions are final should not decide a question of
Community law" without a ruling from the Court of Justice. 32 The requirements of Article 177(3) will be satisfied so long as the Court of Jus33
tice gives a ruling at some stage of the case.

25. At the time in question the law amending the Benelux Law in light of the First
Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988, to approximate the laws of the
Member States, known as the Trade Mark Directive, had not come into force. However,
where an individual relies on a directive which has not been transposed in the national
legal system within the period laid down, the national rules are to be interpreted, as far
as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive. See Case 91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb, 1994 ECR 1-3325. Furthermore, this rule does not apply as the implementation period expired prior to events giving rise to this action.
26. Id. 1 14.
27. Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS (Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs delivered 29 April 1997).
28. See id.
29. See id. 1 25.
30. Id. 1 27.
31. Id.
32. Id. 1 28.
33. See id.
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D. Court's Holding and Analysis
The court held that both the Benelux Court and the Hoge Raad are
courts "against whose decisions there is no remedy under national
law." 34 Therefore, both must make a reference to the Court of Justice
under Article 177(3), when interpreting Uniform Benelux Law on Trade
Marks in light of First Council Directive to approximate the laws of
Member States relating to trade marks. 35 However, this obligation is
not required when the question is substantially the same as one that
has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in the same na36
tional proceeding.
In starting the analysis on the issue, the Court of Justice first examined whether a supranational court may refer questions for a preliminary ruling, and if so, whether there are circumstances when it
would be obliged to do so. 37 In answering the question presented, the
ECJ began with the premise that the Benelux Court could submit questions for a preliminary ruling. 3 Therefore, as reasoned by the ECJ
there is no good reason why a court, common to a number of Member
States, should not be able to submit questions for a preliminary ruling. 39 The Benelux Court has the task of ensuring that the Benelux
countries uniformly apply the common legal rules. 40 It follows that a
procedure before the Benelux Court is a step in the proceedings before
the national courts, leading to a final interpretation of common legal
rules. 41 Therefore, a national court faced with a task of interpreting
Community legal rules should be allowed to follow the procedure established by Article 177 in order to serve the purposes of that provision. 42
Since the Benelux Court is a court of a Member State, if a question
of Community law is raised in a case, and there is no judicial remedy
against its decision under national law, pursuant to Article 177(3), a
reference for a preliminary ruling must be made to the Court of Justice. 43 This obligation to refer is based on cooperation, and ensures the
proper application of Community law in all Member States. 44 The pur-

34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 19.
38. Id.
20.
39. Id.
21.
40. See id. at 1 22.
41. See id.
42. See id. 1 23 (the purpose of Article 177 is to ensure uniform interpretation of
Community law).
43. See id. 1 24 (a court like the Benelux Court may be under an obligation to refer a
question to the Court of Justice).
44. See id. 1 25. See also CILFIT, 1982 ECR 3415, 1 7.
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pose of Article 177(3) is to prevent the creation of a body of national
case law, that is not in accord with the rules of Community law. 45 The
Court of Justice reasoned that where no appeal is possible against a decision of a supranational court of Member States, the court may be
obliged to make a reference under Article 177(3), where a question of
46
Community law is raised.
However, in the situation faced by the Hoge Raad, it does not follow
that both courts are obliged to make a reference to the Court of Justice. 47 If a substantially the same question has been raised as one that
already has been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case,
the obligation of the ECJ to provide an interpretation may be without
purpose. 48 It follows that if the question raised is the same as a question that has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in the
same national proceedings, the court of last resort is not obliged to refer
the question to the Court of Justice. 49 Therefore, the law does not oblige
the Benelux court to make a reference for a preliminary ruling if the
Hoge Raad has already done so in the same case on the same question.50
However, if the Hoge Raad made no such reference, then a supranational court, like the Benelux Court, is required to submit the question
prior to giving its final judgement. 51 This answer differed slightly from
the response given in the advocate general opinion. The advocate general opinion called for only one exception to requirements of an Article
177(3) reference. 52 The Court of Justice did not follow the Advocate
General opinion in allowing only one exception to requirements of Article 177(3) reference, but instead followed established case law on the issue.

53

45. Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS. See also Case 107/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm, 1977 ECR 957, 1 5, ECJ CELEX LEXIS 914.

46. Id.

1 26.

47. See id. 1 28 (a reference by Hoge Raad and the Benelux Court in deciding the
same case is not necessarily required).
48. See id. "According to the established case-law of the Court... the authority of an
interpretation provided by the Court under Article 177 may deprive that obligation of its
purpose and thus empty it of its substance. This is especially so when the question
raised is substantially the same as a question which has already been the subject of a
preliminary ruling in a similar case." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. 1 30.
51. Id.
52. Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1 27 ("[Slince the answer given.., is binding on
the referring court, the Benelux Court is ...obliged to refer when the answer to a question referred depends upon the interpretation of a provision of Community Law. The
only exception would be where the referring court has itself made a reference to this
Court.').
53. See id. See generally Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingsadministratie, 1963 ECR 31; CILFIT, 1982 ECR 3415,
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III. ANALYSIS
The Court of Justice has on several prior occasions considered the
definition of a court or tribunal of a Member State under Article 177.
The Court has left itself free to determine the notion of a national court
or tribunal for the purpose of Article 177 only. 54 In the past, to ensure
the ECJ does not deprive itself of the competence to issue preliminary
rulings, the ECJ widely and liberally construed this notion.55 However,
the Court is rather reserved in its analysis of the issue. 56 This case did
not depart from that precedent. The Court simply could have found no
"good reason" why a supranational court should not be able to submit
questions for a preliminary ruling.5 7 Judging by prior case law and this
decision, what constitutes a 'national court' under Article 177 is not the
same as under national laws. 58 Only on one prior occasion did the ECJ
elaborate its views on this issue. 59 In Vaassen, an arbitration tribunal,
established under Dutch law for settling social security disputes, made
a reference to the ECJ. The ECJ considered the nature of the tribunal,
its functions, its jurisdiction, its powers, the rules of procedure, and the
law to be applied. 60 The Court of Justice further stressed the permanent nature of the tribunal and the compulsory jurisdiction of the tribunal. 61 According to case law, it is of no importance whether the referring body is considered a court under national law. 62 Instead, the
decisive factors are rather the judicial functions of the body, application
of procedural rules, and operation within consent of the public. 63 In
64
case of doubt, the Court of Justice will make this decision.
Given past analysis and case law, it is not a surprise that a supranational court of some Member States might be required to make an Article 177 reference. However, in not following the opinion provided by
the Advocate General the court lost an opportunity to close a significant

54. See generally GERHARD BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1981).

55. Id. at 368. See generally Preliminary ruling No. 61/65, [1966] ECR 261 (dealing
with a request for a preliminary ruling from a Dutch social security arbitration panel).
56. Id.
57. Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1 21.
58. BEBR, supra note 54 at 368 (citing Case 61/65 Vaassen v. Beambtenfonds
Mijnbedrif 1966 ECR 280, 281).
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See MADS ANDENAS, ARTICLE 177 REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT-POLICY
AND PRACTICE (1994).

63. Id. at 149.
64. Id.

1999

ARTICLE 177 REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT

665

loophole in Article 177 review process. Two exceptions created by case
law are available to a court facing the question whether or not a reference should be made to the Court of Justice. 65 The exceptions, acte
eclaire and acte clair, were developed in two judgements of the Court of
66
Justice: Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingsadministratie(Da Costa)
and CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo Spa v. Ministry of Health
(CILFIT).67
A. Acte Eclaire
The doctrine of acte eclaire68 allows a court falling under Article
177(3) to be exempt from the obligation to refer where previous decisions of the Court of Justice have already dealt with the point of law in
question. This doctrine applies irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to those decisions, even though the questions at issue are not strictly identical. 69 This doctrine, clarified by the Court in
Da Costa,70 alleviated the obligation to refer under the condition that it
already interpreted the same provision of Community law. 7 1 In the
opinion of the Court, such a preliminary ruling "may deprive the obligation of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance." 72 "Such is the
case,"reasoned the Court, "when the question raised is materially identical with a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case." 73 This language, echoed in the current
case, might be too simple to ensure consistent application of Article 177
review.7 4 The obligation of the courts of last resort is liberalized if they
are trying to interpret the same Community laws provision under
"similar" circumstances] 5 This identification of a "similar" question is
deceptive, offering national courts a loophole, or leading them to a
wrong conclusion.7 6 In the past some courts have taken the requirements of this rule too liberally.7 7 As a result, they did not make a refer65. Id. at 17.
66. Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingsadministratie, 1963
ECR 31.
67. CILFIT,1982 ECR 3415, 1 7.
68. "Well informed act."
MARIE-HELENE CORREARD & VALERIE GRUNDY,
CONCISE OXFORD-HACHETTE FRENCH DICTIONARY (1995).

69. ANDENAS supra note 62 (citingCILFIT, 1982 ECR 3415, 3429
70. De Costa, 1963 ECR 31.

THE

14).

71. BEBR, supra note 54, at 511.

72. Id. (citingDa Costa, 1963 ECR 31).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See generally van Boven v. Etat beige, 27 Recueil de jurisprudence du droit administatif et du Conseil d'Etat 287 (1972) (Belgian court deciding whether an unemployment compensation is governed by the provision for equal pay between sexes by using a
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ence to the Court of Justice in instances where they interpreted a provision of similar content of another Community rule.78 This practice becomes a threat to uniformity of Community law if the highest national
courts interpret a provision by analogy with a preliminary ruling interpreting another provision, or by disregarding the preliminary ruling
and interpreting the provision in their own way.7 9 It is doubtful that Da
Costa intended to provide such a wide margin of discretion to national
courts.80 Unfortunately, the Court of Justice in the present case missed
an opportunity to close this loophole for national courts to avoid their
obligation under Article 177(3).81
B. Acte Clair
The doctrine of acte clair 2, derived from French law, subsumes the
acte eclaire and goes beyond it, giving national courts authority to interpret Community law.83 Acte clair exempts national courts from the
requirement of making a reference if the answer to the question presented is sufficiently obvious, even if there is no decision of the ECJ directly on point.84 In CILFIT,85 the Court of Justice spelled out the conditions that must be satisfied before a national court of last instance can
invoke acte clair.8 6 The national court must bear in mind the risk of its
87
decision diverging with prior judicial decisions in the Community.
Furthermore, the national court must be convinced that the matter is
equally obvious to the courts of other Member States and to the Court of
Justice.88 In reaching this conclusion, the national court must consider
"[t]he specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise, and the risk of divergences in

previous preliminary ruling from a case dealing with pension rights); 16 Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebsberaters 230 (1970) (German court deciding whether a special turnover tax on exports is a customs duty, prohibited by Article 12, by using several
preliminary rulings dealing with compensatory taxes pursuant to agriculture regulations); 3 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Erop6en 681-696 (1967) (French court deciding
whether a para-fiscal charge on processing tomatoes infringed Article 91 and 92. The
court held that Article 93 interpretation applies to Article 92, thereby refusing to make a
reference to the ECJ).
78. BEBR, supra note 54, at 512.

79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
See id.
See id.
"Absolutely clear act". CORREARD, supra note 68.

83. ANDENAS, supra note 62, at 18.

84. Id.
85. CILFIT, 1982 ECR 3415 ("... the correct application of Community Law is so
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt").
86. See ANDENAS, supranote 62, at 18
87. Id.
88. Id.
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judicial decisions within the Community."89 In its decision the national
court must look at:
the need to compare the different language versions of Community
legislation, each of which is equally authentic; the issue of terminology
which is peculiar to Community law, or which has a different meaning
in Community law from its meaning in the law of the Member States;
and the need to place every provision of Community law in context and
to interpret it in light of the provisions of Community law as a whole,
regard being had to the objectives of Community law and to its state of
evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied. 90
The strict requirement developed in CILFIT would seem not a relaxation of the duty to refer under Article 177(3), but an attempt to deter national courts from the use of acte clair by setting forth conditions
that no national court could realistically satisfy. 91 However, examples
abound of Member States' supreme courts not making a reference under
Article 177(3) on the grounds of acte clair.92
Even if the national supreme court interprets Community law impeccably, this does not minimize the potential infringement of Article
177(3). 93 In disregarding an obligation under Article 177(3) there is an
ever-present danger that the national court may misinterpret Community law. 94 This is an intolerable situation towards the goal of Article
177: the prevention of a body of national case law that is not in accord
with the rules of Community law from coming into existence in any
Member State. 95 An infringement of Article 177(3) prevents the Court
of Justice from exercising its exclusive jurisdiction to interpret Community law. 96 Acte clair is a serious concern to the uniformity of Community law, if used by supreme national courts as a convenient instrument
for restricting their obligation to refer. 97 Article 177(3) does not degrade
courts of last instance to judicial automation, meaning requiring them
to simply refer questions to the Court of Justice as soon as they occur. 98
Courts of last instance have the discretion to determine whether or not

89. CILFIT, 1982 ECR 3415.
90. ANDENAS, supra note 60, at 18.
91. See id.
92. See generally id. (citing Sixth Annual Report to the European Parliament on
Commission Monitoring of the Application of Community law - 1988, Appendix, 'The Attitude of National Supreme Courts to Community Law", 1989 O.J. (C 330) 146.
93. See BEBR, supra note 54, at 516.
94. Id. at 511.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 518.
98. See id.
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such a question is relevant to the outcome of the case. 99 But this must
to be the limit of their discretion, irrespective of how they may intend to
interpret Community law, even if they consider the rule clear they must
request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice. 100 Acte clair implies a larger margin than the one granted by Article 177(3).101 Finding
that a provision is clear already implies its interpretation, which is exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 0 2 Such a strict interpretation of Article 177 is the only way to ensure uniform interpretation of
Community law. 10 3 In the present case the Court of Justice had the opportunity to close this serious threat to uniform application of Community rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this case, the Court of Justice had an opportunity to decisively
rule on the issue of the requirements of an Article 177(3) reference.
However, by not following the opinion of the Advocate General the
Court passed up an opportunity to close loopholes available to national
courts interpreting Community law. The language of the opinion issued
by the Court makes it clear that acte eclaire is still alive and well in
Community case law. By allowing a national court to forgo its obligation to refer when the question raised is materially identical with a
question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a
"similar case", the court allowed a danger to uniformity of Community
law to remain. If instead, the Court would have followed the language
of the Advocate General opinion only one exception would be available
to the supreme national court.104
The resolution of the acte clair issue is not that clear. The Court of
Justice passed up the opportunity to clearly put the precedent established by CILFIT to rest. It remains to be seen if any national supreme
court will invoke this controversial doctrine in a future case in light of
this holding.

99. See id. at 519.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1 27 ("[S]ince the answer given.., is binding
on the referring court, the Benelux Court is... obliged to refer when the answer to a
question referred depends upon the interpretation of a provision of Community Law.
The only exception would be where the referring court has itself made a reference to this
Court."). Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Unrestricted trade is an essential step in the equalization and integration of the European Community.1 This case note proposes that the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) is correct in encouraging parallel imports as a means of promoting unrestricted intra-Community trade.
Similarly, assuming parallel imports provide an important benefit to
the community, manufacturers should not be able to side-step such
benefits by imposing artificial limits on parallel importers' ability to advertise the products legally imported and offered for sale. Parfumes
Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV provides a basis upon which future
courts may balance the rights conferred by a trademark and the Community's interest in the free movement of goods.
Price discrepancies among Member States of the European Union
(EU) have resulted in a practice known as "parallel imports," whereby
individuals purchase products on the market in low-price countries, export them to high-price countries for resale at a profit, and still undercut the manufacturer's official selling price.2 General principles of economics suggest that such actions will continue as long as the costs of
transportation are less than the profit derived on resale. Thus, from a
consumer's standpoint, parallel imports are beneficial, providing the
same product at lower costs and in turn leading to price equalization
throughout the EU.
Unsurprisingly, manufacturers have a different viewpoint.
A
trademark confers a right to proprietors to prevent, in the course of
trade, unauthorized use of the trademark that takes unfair advantage

Douglas R. Hegg is a third year law student at the University of Denver College of
Law. The author wishes to thank his family and friends for their support and encouragement throughout his scholastic career. He wishes to extend special thanks to Sheila
for helping him through the rigors of law school.
1. See generally Andreas Reindl, Intellectual Property and Intra-Community Trade,
20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 819 (1997) (analyzing trademark functions, costs and benefits).
2. See Joined Cases C 427, 429 & 436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova [1996]
ECR 1-3457, 13 [hereinafter Bristol-Meyers-Squibb].
*
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of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the
trademark.' Since consumers regard a trademark as an indication of
the quality and identity of the manufacturer of a given product, proprietors of a trademark have a legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of the trademark.4
Manufacturers initially attempted to restrain parallel imports
through claims of trademark infringement resulting from the repackaging of the product.' In Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm
Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse GmbH, the ECJ
held that Article 36, in principle, grants a right to restrict the import of
repackaged goods upon which the trademark had been reattached.6 Article 36 of the EC Treaty permits quantitative restrictions on imports,
exports, or goods in transit that fall within specific categories of public
7
concern.
Nevertheless, the EC Treaty also provides that any such prohibitions or restrictions may not "constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States."8
The ECJ concluded that restrictions were an impermissible "disguised
restriction" on trade where: (1) use of the trademark right contributes
to the artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States; (2)
repackaging cannot adversely affect the original condition of the product; (3) the proprietor of the mark receives prior notice of the marketing
of the repackaged product; and (4) it is stated on the new packaging by
whom the product has been repackaged.' Thus, though the limits are
ambiguous, Article 36 provides a measure of restraint from undue interference with free trade. The adoption of the First Council Directive (Directive) raised additional questions as to the scope of Article 36."° Arti-

3. See First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trademarks, No. 89/104/EEC [1988], art. 5(2) 1989 O.J. (L 40)1 [hereinafter
First Council Directive].
4. See generally Reindl, supra note 1, at 854-57; See, e.g., N. Wilkof, Same Old
Tricks or Something New? A View of Trademark Licensing and Quality Control, 18 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 261, 268 (1996).
5. See also, Reindl, supra note 1, at 854-55. See generally Bristol-Meyers Squibb,
supra note 2.
6. Case 102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse GmbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1039, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (1978).
7. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Treaty of Rome), Feb. 7,
1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) art. 86 [hereinafter EC TREATY]
(grounds of public morality, public policy, or public security; the protection of health and
life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic,
historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property).
8. Id.
9. Id.
44.
10. See generally First Council Directive, supra note 3.
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cle 5 of the Directive codifies the rights conferred by a trademark. 1 It
purports to grant broad rights against unauthorized third party use
which takes "unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the repute of the trademark."' 2 Such unauthorized use includes: a) affixing the sign to the goods or to the package thereof; b) offering the goods, or putting them on the market under that sign; c) importing or exporting the goods under the sign; and d) using the sign on
business papers and in advertising.'"
Nevertheless, the sweeping grant of rights to trademark proprietors in Article 5 is limited by the doctrine of Exhaustion of Rights provided in Article 7.14 Pursuant to Article 7, a proprietor may not restrict
the use of his trademark in goods marketed within the Community by
the proprietor without his consent, unless a legitimate reason exists to
oppose further commercialization.'" A "legitimate reason" includes alteration or impairment to the goods after entering the Community
market.'
In Parfums ChristianDior SA & Anor v Evora BV (Dior), Christian
Dior took an alternate approach to limiting parallel imports. 17 Dior
sought to prohibit resellers from advertising its products acquired
through parallel imports, thereby limiting the product's marketability
by parallel importers.' 8
The ECJ held that unauthorized advertising of parallel products
may only be opposed where such advertising results in significant damage to the reputation of the trademark and its owner.' 9 The ECJ concluded that what constitutes "significant damage" is a question of fact
for the national court. However, it did provide some guidance. As a
general rule, proprietors of a trademark should not be entitled to object
to "respectable advertising by respectable traders", even if there is some
damage to the product's luxurious image, resulting in advertising inferior to that of selected distributors.2" The ECJ stated, however, that it
might be justifiable for a trademark proprietor of luxury perfumes to
oppose an advertisement which "depicted his perfumes heaped in a
sale-bin at cut-price prices along with rolls of toilet paper and tooth-

11. See id. art. 5.
12. See id. art. 5(2).
13. See id. art. 5(3).
14. See id art. 7.
15. See id. art. 7(1).
16. Id.
17. Case C-337/95, Parfumes Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV 1997 CELEX LEXIS
[1997] [hereinafter Dior].

18. See id. 1 6.
19. See id. 61.
20. See id. 1 51.
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brushes."2 Without explaining its reasoning, the ECJ concluded that
"resellers cannot be required to comply with the same conditions as selected distributors.

22

With this holding, the ECJ promoted the equalization of pricing by
extending the principle of the Exhaustion of Rights to the advertising
and marketing of trademarked goods. In doing so, it eliminated a potential "disguised restriction on trade between Member States," and effectively promoted the use of parallel imports as a means of price
equalization. 2' The holding makes clear that the rights of a trademark
proprietor cannot outweigh the interests of the European Community.
II.

THE CASE IN CHIEF

A. Facts
In Dior, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands), referred six questions for preliminary ruling to the
ECJ. 24 The essential question was whether a trademark conveys upon
the proprietor authority to prevent unauthorized advertising, even
when conducted in a manner customary to the trade.25
Parfums Christian Dior SA (Dior France) is the manufacturer of
"luxury" perfumes and other cosmetic products, which it sells at premium prices. It utilizes a selective distribution system, whereby selected retailers only supply ultimate customers or other selected retailers.2" Parfums Christian Dior (Dior Netherlands) is Dior France's sole
representative in the Netherlands. In addition, Dior France has exclusive trademark rights in Benelux, including illustrations of the packaging of the perfumes.27
The defendant, Evora, operates a chain of approximately 300
"health and beauty" retail stores under the subsidiary name Kruidvat.2"
Consumers in the Netherlands regard the stores as the "undisputed
number one" for the sale of luxury perfumes. 29 Kruidvat obtained
Christian Dior products by means of parallel imports, whereby products
21. Id. (nonetheless, the court further noted that the advertiser could not be prevented from simply cutting prices).
22. Id.
23. EC TREATY, supranote 7, art. 36.
24. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, at 11.
25. Id. 1 1.
26. See id. 1 2.
27. See id. 1 3.
28. See Case T-87/92, BVBA Kruidvat v. EC Commission, 1996, 4 C.M.L.R. 1046 (Ct.
First Instance 1997).
29. Id.
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are purchased in low priced markets, exported to higher priced markets
for resale at a profit, and yet still undercut the manufacturer's official
selling price.3 0 As part of a 1993 Christmas promotion, Kruidvat advertised several Dior perfumes.3 1 The advertisements depicted the packaging and bottles of some Christian Dior products in a manner customary to retail traders in the relevant sector.12 Nevertheless, Dior France
had not consented to the advertising and commenced proceedings to
prohibit Evora from making any use of its picture trademarks. 3
Dior claimed that its trademark had been used "either in breach of
its exclusive right to use the mark in respect of the same or similar
goods," or "in circumstances liable to cause it damage, by, inter alia,
impairing the prestige and image of the marks."34 Dior sought an order
to prevent Evora from making any publication or reproduction of Dior's
trademarks in unauthorized catalogues, brochures, advertisements, or
otherwise."
B.

ProceduralHistory

The Arrondissementsrechtbank Haarlem (district court) ordered
Evora to desist from using Dior's trademark "in a manner not conforming to Dior's customary manner of advertising."36 Evora appealed to the
Gerechtshof (regional court of appeals). Dior argued before the Gerechtshof that a change in the "condition of the products" required under
Article 7(2) of the First Council Directive (89/104)" 7 and in paragraph 3
of Article 13A of the Benelux Law, 8 included "mental condition," 9 described as a product's "allure, prestigious image, and aura of luxury
surrounding the goods."40 The Gerechtshof reversed the district court
ruling and Dior appealed to the Hoge Raad.
As the highest national court, the Hoge Raad is obliged under Article 10 of the Benelux Law to refer certain questions that interpret

30. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, at 14. See also Bristol-Myers Squibb, supra note
3.
31. E.g. Eau Sauvage, Poison, Fahrenheit, Dune, and Svelte. See Dior, 1997 CELEX
LEXIS, 1 5.
2,

32. Id.
33. Id. 16.
34. Id.
35. Id. J7.

36. Id.
37. First Council Directive supra note 3, art. 7(2) (to approximate the laws of the
Member States relating to trademarks).
38. Uniform Benelux Law on Trademarks concluded between Belgium, Luxembourg,
and Netherlands on March 19, 1962.
39. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 11 9-12.

40. Id. 1 12.
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Benelux Law to the Benelux Court for a preliminary ruling. Similarly,
under Article 177 of the EC Treaty, a "court or tribunal of a Member
State" must refer certain questions of EC Treaty interpretation to the
ECJ. 4 In the interest of "procedural economy" the Hoge Raad referred
similar questions to both courts.4 2 It also asked the ECJ whether for
proceedings related to Benelux law, the highest national court or the
Benelux court is the court "against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law for purposes of Article 177. 4"
With respect to the jurisdictional issue, the ECJ initially determined that the Benelux court is a "court or tribunal of a member state"
within the meaning of Article 177. 4" In addition, the court concluded
that the requirements of Article 177 are satisfied provided that the ECJ
has given a ruling at "some stage in the proceedings before the national
court takes a final decision."4 Thus, it makes little difference which
court (highest national court or the Benelux court) requests the ruling.4 6 Nevertheless, the Court indicated that the purpose of Article 177,
as well as the interest of procedural economy, will often be best served,
if the ECJ is given the opportunity to rule in advance of the Benelux
court.47
C.

Court's Holding and Analysis

The ECJ held that the principle of exhaustion of rights extends to
the advertising of trademarked goods.4 8 Article 7 permits the resale of
goods placed on the market in the Community by, or with the permission of, the proprietor of the trademark. 9 Therefore, the ECJ concluded that "in principle" a reseller must be entitled to advertise the
goods which he is entitled to sell. °

41. See EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 177(c).
42. Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, at 1 13-14.
43. Id.
14.
44. Id. 1 27-28.
45. Id. 1 28.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Id. 1 30-33.
49. See First Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 7. Article 7- Exhaustion of the
rights conferred by a trademark states:
1. The trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under
that trademark by the proprietor or with his consent.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the
proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where
the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on
the market. EC TREATY, supra note 7, art.7.
50. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS 31.
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In support of this principle, the Court looked to the wording of Articles 5 and 7.51 Article 5(3)(d) specifies that the rights conferred by the
trademark extend to preventing others from "using the sign on business
papers and in advertising."2 Article 7(1), in espousing the exhaustion
principle, also refers to the "use" of the trademark. Thus, the Court

51.

Article 5 of the EC TREATY, Rights Conferred by a Trademark states:
1. The registered trademark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights
therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is Identical with the trademark in relation to goods or
services which are Identical with those for which the trademark is registered;
(b) any sign where, because of its Identity with, or similarity to, the trademark and the Identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the
trademark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of
the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and
the trademark.
2. Any Member State may also provIde that the proprietor shall be entitled
to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of
trade any sign which is Identical with, or similar to, the trademark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trademark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State
and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is
detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trademark.
3. The following, inter alia, may be prohibited under paragraphs 1 and 2:
(a) affixing the sign to the goods or to the packaging thereof;
(b) offering the goods, or putting them on the market or stocking them for
these purposes under that sign, or offering or supplying services thereunder;
(c) importing or exporting the goods under the sign;
(d) using the sign on business papers and in advertising.
4. Where, under the law of the Member State, the use of a sign under the
conditions referred to in 1 (b) or 2 could not be prohibited before the date on
which the provisions necessary to comply with this Directive entered into
force in the Member State concerned, the rights conferred by the trademark
may not be relied on to prevent the continued use of the sign.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not affect provisions in any Member State relating to the protection against the use of a sign other than for the purposes of
distinguishing goods or services, where use of that sign without due cause
takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or
the repute of the trademark.
EC TREATY, supraI note 7, art.5. Article 7 of the EC Treaty, Exhaustion of the Rights
Conferred by a Trademark, states:
1. The trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under
that trademark by the proprietor or with his consent.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the
proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where
the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on
the market.
EC TREATY, supra note 7, art.7.
52. Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 1 32.

676

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 27:4

concluded that "use" extends to advertising and therefore, application of
the exhaustion principle permits resellers not only to resell such goods,
but also to advertise. 3
The ECJ then considered whether any exceptions existed to the
general rule of exhaustion as applied to advertising.5 4 In Bristol-Myers
Squibb v. Paranova(Bristol-Meyers Squibb), the ECJ held that damage
to a trademark owner's reputation can be a legitimate reason within the
meaning of Article 7(2) for a trademark owner to oppose the further
marketing of goods placed on the market in the Community by the proprietor or with his consent.5 " In light of that holding, the ECJ concluded
that the repackaging must not be "defective, of poor quality, or untidy." 6
The ECJ reasoned from Bristol-Meyers Squibb that a proprietor of
a trademark is similarly entitled to oppose shoddy advertising that
Nonetheless, "condition of the goods" is disdamages his reputation."
tinguishable from "mental condition of the goods."5 8 The phrase "condition of the goods" in Article 7(2) merely refers to the condition of the
goods inside the packaging.9 Thus, change or impairment of the condition of the goods is one example of a "legitimate reason" within the
meaning of Article 7(2) and damage to reputation is another.6 °
In establishing damage to reputation, the proprietor need only
show risk of significant damage to his reputation, and need not show
that the public believed the retailer to be connected to, or authorized by
him.6 ' Whether or not there is a risk of significant damage is a question of fact for the national court.6 2
The ECJ did note, however, several factors that may indicate
whether or not there is a risk of significant damage including: 1) evidence that authorized distributors have carried out similar advertising
without complaint from the trademark owner; 2) evidence that the selective distribution system is objectionable under the provisions of the
treaty as unnecessary for the type of product in question; or 3) evidence
that the trademark owner had not taken the trouble to set up a "water63
tight" distribution system.

53. Id. 133.
54. Id. 1 34-55.
55. See generally Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 2.
56. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, at

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. 1 36.
Id. 38.
Id. 58.
Id. 38.
Id. 1 39.
Id. 1 50.

63. Id.

1 35.
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The appropriateness of the advertising is also essentially a question
of fact for the national court." But the ECJ did propose that where the
advertising is similar to authorized distributors, there is no risk of significant damage to the reputation of the trademark." Additionally,
even where such advertising is inferior to that of selected distributors,
the court proposed that such evidence itself is insufficient. "Resellers
cannot be required to comply with the same conditions as selected distributors. ' 66 Nonetheless, there may be "exceptional" circumstances to
which the proprietor of the trademark may object.67
The sales in question were from chemist shops, and Dior conceded
that Kruidvat's advertising complied with customary retail standards in
the relevant sector. 8 Thus, the ECJ concluded that although a trademark owner may object to advertising, and such damage may include
damage to a product's luxurious image, the proprietor must properly
substantiate claims of significant damage to the reputation of the
trademark.69
III. RELEVANT LAW
Dior's claims relied upon the rights conferred by Articles 5 and 7 of
the First Council Directive. 0 The ECJ balanced these rights against
the mandate of7 free
movement of goods provided in Articles 30 and 36 of
1
the EC Treaty.
Article 5 establishes the rights conferred by a trademark and provides the basis of Dior's claims. Specifically, Article 5(2) protects the
proprietor of a trademark from unauthorized use of its trademark
where such use takes "unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trademark. 7 2 In addition, Article
5(3) includes using the trademark in advertising as a possible prohibited use. 3
The rights conferred by Article 5 are constrained by the exhaustion
principle of Article 7. Article 7(1) establishes the principle of exhaus-

64. Id. 1 51.
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. See id.
51-52 (sale of luxury perfumes in "bargain bin" with toilet paper, or
sales by "Seedy" red-light district shops).
68. Id. 141.

69. Id. 161.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See First Council Directive, supra note 3, arts. 5, 7.
See EC TREATY, supra note 7, arts. 30, 36.
First Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 5(2).
See First Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 5(3)(b).
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tion of trademark rights, whereby a trademark owner cannot rely on his
trademark to oppose the importation or marketing of a product marketed by him or with his consent in another Member State. 4 Article
7(2) excludes from that principle commercialization of goods where the
condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put
on the market. 5
In Dior, the products in issue were not altered physically after being placed on the market. Therefore, Dior claimed that the advertising
used to promote Kruidvat's sale of the product was detrimental to the
product's "mental condition."7 " Thus, Dior sought to assert the rights
conferred by Article 5 and avoid the exhaustion principle of Article 7 by
claiming that the advertising was detrimental to the "luxurious image"
of Dior.
Article 30 of the EC Treaty prohibits quantitative restrictions on
imports between Member States. 7 However, Article 36 provides exceptions to import restrictions on the following grounds: (1) public morality, policy, or security; (2) protection of health or life of humans, animals or plants; (3) protection of national artistic, historic, or
archaeological treasures; or (4) protection of industrial or commercial
property. 8 Yet such restrictions are permitted only if they do not constitute a means of "arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States."7 9
IV. ANALYSIS

The free movement of goods, as established in Article 1 of the EC
Treaty, is one of the most important principles of European law."0 Article 30 is another fundamental provision of the EC Treaty, clearly reflecting the drafters' intent to ensure a single European market."' Parallel imports are a reaction to intra-Community price discrepancies that
provides a means of price equalization. Parallel importers, therefore,
play an important role in market integration and equalization.
Critics of parallel imports argue that unrestricted parallel trade

74. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 1 30.
75. First Council Directive, supra note 3, art. 7(2).

76. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS 1 12.
77. EC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 30 ("Quantitative restrictions on imports and all
measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States").
78. See EC TREATY, supranote 7, art. 36.
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 1.
81. See Case 249/81, In Re "Buy Irish" Campaign, 1982 E.C.R. 4005, 4021-23, (1982]
2 C.M.L.R. 104, 123-24 (1983).
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may result in higher uniform prices at which low demand countries
may be unable or unwilling to purchase such goods.8 2 The result would
be lower demand, reduced output, and higher prices. Additionally, the
critics argue, removing price discrepancies may serve 8as3 a disincentive
to research, development, and production output levels.
Both notions disregard the basic assumption that the issue of parallel imports will only arise where the importer may make a profit. The
importer must determine what products have sufficient discrepancies in
prices to outweigh the costs of transportation and importation. The
parallel importer, in effect, provides marketing information to the
manufacturer as to appropriate pricing. Thus, the parallel importer,
provides the proprietor notice of the inadequate pricing, distribution, or
marketing in both the home market and in the nation of export.
Furthermore, parallel imports will not eliminate price discrepancies, they will only limit the spread. Where the costs of importation and
transportation for the parallel importer outweigh the profit, the importation will cease. Economies of scale favor the proprietor in transportation and distribution. In addition, since the proprietor sets the initial
price, there is necessarily a delay before the parallel importer realizes
the discrepancy exists and determines that it is sufficient to act. The
proprietor thus benefits from the initial imperfect market information.
He can also capitalize on the parallel importer's imperfect marketing
information to head off unauthorized sales of his products. Furthermore, since the proprietor always maintains the option of altering its
pricing scheme, he may decrease the price discrepancy by simply lowering his prices, thereby making it not worth the parallel importer's
while.
Another concern about parallel imports arises from one interpretation of the function of a trademark. The ECJ traditionally has emphasized the role of trademarks as an indication of the origin of products.84
Other functions of a trademark include communication, investment, or
advertising. 5 These additional functions arguably go to the goodwill of
the product in question. 6 As such, a primary purpose of the trademark

82. See generally W. Bishop, Price Discrimination Under Article 86: Political Economy in the European Court, 44 MOD L. REV. 282 (1981); Malueg & Schwartz, ParallelImports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price Discrimination, Economic Analysis
Group DiscussionPaper 6-12 (1993); Reindl, supra note 1, at 830-31.
83. See Reindl, supra note 1, at 831.
84. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS 139.
85. Id. See generally DAVID C.L. PERKINS & MARLEEN VAN KERCKHOVE, LICENSING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE EU: THE COMMUNITY EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE,
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY

PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (1997); Reindl, supra note 1, at 855.
86. See generally Reindl, supra note 1, at 855.
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is to provide assurance of the quality as well as the origin of the product.
The ECJ defined the essential function of the trademark as "to enable the consumer, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish
the marked product from products of different origins."87 Such guarantee of origin includes the assurance that the marked product has not
been subject to interference by a third party, without authorization of
the proprietor of the trademark.8 8
Legitimate concerns arise when the parallel importer repackages a
product prior to importation. Such occasions are due to diversified
packaging requirements for various Member States.89 However, the
ECJ concluded that restrictions on parallel imports were an impermissible disguised restriction on intra-Community trade unless four requirements were met: (1) use of the trademark right contributed to the
artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States; (2) repackaging adversely affected the original condition of the product; (3)
the proprietor of the mark did not receive prior notice of the marketing
of the repackaged product; and (4) the new packaging did not contain
information concerning by whom the product had been repackaged.9
Thus, so long as the integrity of the product remains intact, the proprietor of the trademark may not oppose repackaging and marketing of its
product.
The general proposition remains that the primary purpose of a
trademark is to signify the origin of the product to the purchaser. This
signal includes the perceived quality, manufacturer, and any goodwill
associated with the product. So long as the integrity of the product remains intact, the proprietor is assured that the product they marketed
in one Member State is equivalent to the parallel imported product into
another Member State. The only adverse consequence to the manufacturer, therefore, is that any price discrepancy results in profits for the
parallel importer, and not the proprietor. Thus, parallel imports encourage price equalization, at least to the point where the importer's
transportation and importation costs outweigh the profit resulting from
the price discrepancy.
The present case provides an example of a manufacturer's attempt
to prohibit parallel imports in order to maintain their exclusive market.
The product was unaltered in content and packaging. In addition, the
advertising complied with the general practice in the relevant industry.

87. See Case 107/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm Vertiebsgesellchaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH ECR 957 (1977).
88. Id.
89. See Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 2.
90. Id.
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Dior asserted that by not selling its product in an approved distributorship, the parallel import damaged the luxurious image of its product.
This argument was merely smoke and mirrors.
In reality, Dior's trademark was secure. The product sold was the
identical product sold in approved distributorships. The marketing was
appropriate for the product in the market in which it was being sold.
Furthermore, there was no question as to whether Kruidvat was an
authorized Dior retailer. Thus, the only damage to Dior was the loss of
its exclusive market.
The ECJ was careful to assert that the risk of serious damage to a
trademark's reputation was a question of fact for the national court.
This provides trademark proprietors with protection from actions seriously detrimental to its trademark, such as where a luxurious perfume
is sold in a "seedy" red-light district shop, or advertised in a "sale-bin at
cut-price prices along with rolls of toilet paper and toothbrushes."9 It
does not, however, provide the blanket trademark protection that Dior
sought. Furthermore, the opinion indicates that only such extreme
situations should result in protection.2
With the Dior decision, the ECJ promoted the goals of the EC
Treaty, especially that of encouraging the free movement of goods. Parallel imports provide a means of encouraging the concommitant price
equalization. So long as the manufacturer's product is secure in quality
and appearance, the market should dictate its cost. Allowing trademark proprietors to assert rights prohibiting the free movement of
goods discourages market equalization and perpetuates price discrepancies, contrary to those goals.
Finally, the principles of market equalization only apply to intraCommunity trade. 3 Proprietors control the prices at which they sell
their product within the Community. They may choose the markets to
distribute their product with an understanding of potential parallel
trade. They may then weigh the costs and benefits of price discrepancies. Additionally, the proprietor controls the quantity of the product
introduced into a given market. Where parallel imports originate from
a particular Member State, the trademark proprietor may increase its
costs or limit the quantity of product marketed within that State,
thereby economically achieving the same result.
As a result, there remains no reason to perpetuate price discrepancies. The benefits accrue only to the proprietor of the trademark, and
91. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 11 51-52.
92. Id. 1 51-52.
93. See EC TREATY, surpra note 7, art. 30 (restrictions prohibited between Member
States); id. art. 36 (prohibiting arbitrary or disguised restrictions on trade between Member States).
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such practice defeats the specific purpose of the EC Treaty. Dior and
Bristol Meyers Squibb maintain the necessary protection to the trademarked product, while encouraging the free movement of goods.

V. CONCLUSION

Through the guise of protecting the "luxurious image" of its products, Dior sought to perpetuate favorable price discrepancies among the
Community nations. 4 The ECJ rejected Dior's argument that damage
to the "condition of the goods" includes not only actual damage, but also
"mental damage." It also concluded that the proper interpretation of
Article 7, accounting for the Community goal of free movement of goods,
prohibited the owners of trademarks from encouraging price discrepancies between countries.9 '
As discussed above, utilization of parallel imports encourages
equalization. The ECJ, through its limited reading of Article 5 of the
EC Treaty, further protected parallel importers. To hold otherwise
would have provided the proprietors of a trademark with excessive control over their products' marketing, perpetuating price discrepancies.
Through the threat of lawsuits, proprietors could also have made it all
but impossible for parallel importers to advertise their products. This
would give exclusive distributors and retailers a competitive edge, contradicting and frustrating the purpose of the "exhaustion of rights" in
Article 7.
That is not to say that a reseller's rights are absolute in regards to
advertising of trademarked goods. The ECJ acknowledged, in principle,
that protection of a proprietor's trademark from damage to its reputation may be a legitimate interest under Article 7(2). Nevertheless, it
placed the burden of establishing "serious damage" to a trademark upon
the owner of the trademark. The ECJ further noted that where a reseller habitually markets articles of the same kind, although not of the
same quality, the trademark owner must provide specific circumstances
of serious damage to the reputation of the trademark.
The ECJ additionally limited trademark owner's rights to control
reseller's advertising under Article 30 of the EC Treaty. Article 30 prohibits obstacles to the free movement of goods, unless justified under
the exceptions set forth in Article 36. Citing Bristol-Meyers Squibb, the
ECJ initially noted that Article 7 of the Directive and Article 36 of the

94. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 1 48 (the Gerechtshof concluded that Dior wished
to prohibit all advertising and thus hinder the sale of products so as to protect its selective
distribution system against parallel importers).
95. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 1 32-38.
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EC Treaty must be interpreted in the same way. 6 The ECJ thus concluded that the proper interpretation of Articles 30 and 36 prohibited
the proprietor of a trademark from opposing marketing by resellers."
The ECJ further expanded its holding to copyrighted materials.
Citing Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. Gesellschaft fuer Musikalische Auffuhrngs-und Mechanishe Vervielfaeltigungsrechte,98 the ECJ
concluded that the grounds of protection conferred by Article 36 to industrial and commercial property also included protection of copyrighted items. The ECJ further noted, however, that the protection afforded copyrighted material may not be broader that that conferred on a
trademark owner. 99
The ECJ's holding in Dior eliminated a potential barrier to parallel
imports, promoted price equalization, and furthered the EC Treaty goal
of free movement of goods. In the final analysis, therefore, the holding
was good for the European economy.

96. See Dior, 1997 CELEX LEXIS, 1 53 (citing Bristol-Meyers Squibb supra note 2.
97. Id. 54.
98. Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. Gesellschaft
fuer Musikalische Auffuhrngs-und Mechanishe Vervielfaeltigungsrechte [1981].
99. Id. 58.
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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LEGAL INTEGRATION:
A CASE STUDY OF LIVING UP TO THE DENVER
SUMMIT OF EIGHT
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I. INTRODUCTION

In Denver, Colorado the Twenty-Third Annual Summit of the Eight
convened and hosted issues of global importance in 1997.1 The seven
leading industrial democracies plus Russia discussed international, regional, and domestic steps to promote economic, political, and global
prosperity and integration and environmental reforms to foster a
healthy global ecosystem. 2 The national delegates determined:
[t]he process of globalization [is] a major factor underlying the growth
of world prosperity.... The increasing openness and interdependence
of our economies means that problems in one country can spill over
more easily to affect the rest. We must cooperate to promote global
growth and prosperity .... 3 This is a pivotal year for efforts to promote
sustainable development and protect the environment. We are determined to address the environmental challenges that will affect the
quality of life of future generations .... 4 We must all take advantage of
the possibilities for growth to address... economic insecurity [and]
sound economic policies and structural reforms necessary to allow
markets to function properly .... 5

The above statement begs the question, what has the world done to
Joint Degree J.D. and M.B.A. Candidate, August 2000, University of Denver College of Law; B.A. , 1996 honors and cum laude Miami University. I thank my family and
friends for their constant love, support, and encouragement. I especially thank my little
sister, Brenda and my Oma for inspiring me to follow my dreams.
1. Final Communiqu6 of the Denver Summit of the Eight, June 23, 1997 (including
the United States, England, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Japan, and Russia) [herinafter Final Communique'].
2. Id. at Introduction.
3. Id. at Economic and Social Issues 1 3-4.
4. Id. at Global Issues para. 11 & Environment 12.
5. Id. at Economic and Social Issues 1 5.
*
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implement the ideas of the 1997 Denver Summit of the Eight? Has any
part of the world demonstrated that the idealistic language of the
eigheen-page final communiqu6 is much more than a mere wish-list for
the world? Perhaps one of the best examples of effectuating the ideals
of the final communiqu6 of the Denver Summit of Eight is the legal development within the European Union. The European Union continues
to modify its laws to ensure international, regional, and domestic integration and prosperity. In particular, within the civil legal system, the
European Union has found a way to use laws to harmonize multinational legislation in order to reach the ideal ends. The European
Union's legal reformation in the area of competition law, environmental
regulations, and monetary union poignantly demonstrate the successful
and persistent steps the European Union has taken toward the Denver
Summit's objective of promoting global harmonization. Through these
three areas of legal reform, the European Union has reached both a
broader and deeper legal harmony within the European Union, the region, and the entire world. The European Union's broad interpretation
of EU competition and environmental laws exemplify the flexibility of
existing laws, which uniformly apply to the more diverse sovereign
Member States. This broad interpretation of EU laws is especially important as additional Central and Eastern European nations transform
their laws in harmony with EU laws in hopes of joining the Union. In
comparison, however, the deepening of the European Union's legal integration demonstrates a different means to accomplish the Denver
Summit's ends. The EU deepens this legal integration through such
plans as the recent monetary union of eligible states, where the new
laws are bringing the current EU members even closer.
It is in light of these two legal movements in the EU, the broadening and deepening of integrated laws, that the European Union epitomizes the successful reality of the Denver Summit of Eight ideals
within its own region of the world.
II. BROADENING LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE EU
The Diego Cali & Figli Srl v. Servici Econogici Porto di Genova SpA
decision, delivered in March, 1997, demonstrates the expansive new legal concept for the European Union (EU) was well underway even before the meeting of the Denver Summit. 6 In this decision, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) broadened the flexibility of Union laws by declaring that competition rules do not apply to the private companies
monitoring and executing the anti-pollution surveillance schemes hired

6. Case 343/95, Diego Cali & Figli Sri v. Servizi Econogici Porto di Genova SpA,
1997 E.C.R. 1-1547.
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by public authorities. 7 In general, the court held that Servici Econogici
Porto di Genova's (SEPG's) environmental protections, which are public
interest activities, do not present an economic impact warranting appli8
cation of competition laws.
Traditionally, the ECJ narrowly considered competition and environmental laws as distinctly separate areas of law. The Cali case, however, uniquely and broadly integrates both competition law, ensuring a
free market economy, and environmental law, preventing marine pollution. 9 The ECJ analyzed whether a private limited company, established and empowered by a national port authority, violated the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome of the European Communities (EC
Traeaty) by levying charges on behalf of Italy. 10 The Court questioned
SEPG's private business right to enforce national and regional antipollution standards." However, pursuant EU competition laws, Articles 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty, the ECJ ruled that SEPG did not abuse
their dominant market power. 12 The ECJ further held that when a private company receives its authority from the state government, the environmental protection of a public interest does not violate EU competition laws.' 3
Therefore, the preventative anti-pollution services
performed by SEPG in the oil port of Genova, as authorized by the
Italian government, were not abusive anti-competitive acts according to
EU competition law; and Cali, who violated the environmental stan14
dards, was required to pay the port fees.
The result of the Cali decision exemplifies the broadening flexibility
of EU legislation. The decision suggests that pollution prevention is not
a strictly private industrial or commercial activity, even if monitored
and enforced by a private business. SEPG was not simply a private
business seeking a profit.15 Therefore, the private anti-pollution surveillance and prevention with the proper State or EU authorization is
loosely interpreted as an essential function of the State. 16 This dual
7. Competition Rules Do Not Cover Pollution Surveillance Firms, THE REUTER
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORT, Mar. 18, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, Current News
Library, European Union File [hereinafter Competition Rules].
8. EU: Anti-Pollution Monitoring in the Port of Genoa is a General Interest Service
not Subject to Competition Rules, THE REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Mar. 19, 1997, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Current News Library, European Union File.
9. Court Judgement on Anti-Pollution Services Payments, THE REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP., Apr. 15, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, Current News Library, European Union File [hereinafter Court Judgment].
10. Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 1 25.
11. Id. J1 19, 22.
12. Id. 1 25.
13. Id.1 23; see also Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft v. Europcontrol, 1994 E.C.R.
1-43, 1 30.
14. Id. 1 25.
15. Competition Rules, supra note 7, at 1.
16. Court Judgement, supra note 9, at 2.
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approach of classifying private and public activities when enforcing environmental standards according to competition law provides a general,
definitional framework for applying the EU laws. It also allows Member States to place a high importance on public, environmental interests, even if the services are achieved through unfair competition by
private businesses. 17 In addition and of even greater importance, the
broad interpretation of EU law by the ECJ allows more sovereign nations within Europe to enthusiastically, efficiently, and uniformly apply
the flexible EU legislation. In contrast, the broad interpretation of EU
law does present difficulties and uncertainties when specifically determining how or what EU regional law applies to private business activities for both the current members of the EU and aspiring future members.18
In recognition of this evolving problem and potentially confusing
legal approach of the Cali case, the first part of this article analyzes the
development and reasons for the legal evolution of integrating competition and environmental EU law as an example of broadening international legal integration. The expansive legal integration is examined in
three distinct sections: EU Competition and Environmental Laws, Integration of EU Environmental and Competition Law, and Impact of Legal Integration on the EU Expansion.
Sections A and B of Part II explain the histories of EU competition
and environmental laws, respectively. They present a brief foundation
and developmental explanation of both EU laws. Historically, for example, when the European Community (EC) originated in 1957, under
the EC Treaty of Rome, Europe's main legal concerns focused upon economic coordination and free market competition.1 9 Thus, the EC Treaty
contains specific laws, such as Articles 85, 86, and 90, which ensure fair
economic competition. 20 In comparison, however, the EC did not specifically regulate the environment until the early 1970s. 21 In fact, the

17. Competition Rules, supra note 7, at 1.
18. Diego Cali & Figli Srl v. Servici Ecologici PortoDi Genova SpA (SEPG), in ENVTL
L. REP. 31, 31-35 (Environmental Law Institute ed., 1998).
19. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art.

85(1), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EC TREATY]. The EC Treaty, amended several times
appears in its most current form as The Treaty Establishing the European Union, Feb.7,
1992, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter MAASTRICHT TREATY]. Because the 1992 Maastricht Treaty is a revision of the original 1957 EC Treaty, it contains essentially all of the
previous EC Treaty articles regarding competition law. Therefore, in the Competition
Law section the EC and Maastricht Treaty will be used interchangeably. However, the
Environmental provisions and Monetary Union provisions were first legally introduced to
the EU through the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, the two sections of this article will differentiate between the two distinct Treaties when appropriate.
20. Id. arts. 85, 86, and 90.
21. Marcel Brus, Balancing National and European Competence in Environmental
Law, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 633, 634 (1994).
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original EC Treaty never even mentioned the word "environment."22
Rather, EU environmental law evolved more slowly through several
conventions, programs, directives, and eventually resulted in a revision
of the EC Treaty, including Articles 100a and 130r-t. 23
Part II, Section C focuses on the current status of coordinating environmental and competition law. This section presents in detail the
choice of law issues that challenge the environmental businesses in the
EU when attempting to apply the proper environmental law. For instance, current environmental law applied by businesses integrates international, regional, and national regulations based on governmental
authority. 24 This is especially true in the environmental area at issue
in the Cali case, marine pollution prevention. However, as private
companies continue to acquire the responsibility of enforcing government standards, they must simultaneously balance the natural, capitalistic objective of earning a competitive profit. Due to this conflicting
balance of interests, the defining line of public and private activities as
a legal basis becomes less distinct and more ambiguously integrated. 25
Finally, the unique issue presented by the Cali case of integrating
EU competition and environmental laws affects not only the current
Member States of the EU,26 but also future members, and/or current associate members of the EU.27 In order for the Central and Eastern
European countries to earn membership to the EU, they must first
harmonize their legal systems with the EU standards. 28 For this reason, Part II, Section D of this article discusses the effect of integrating
competition and environmental laws on the prospect of eastward EU
expansion.
The four Sections of Part II of this article regarding the Cali case
present an opportunity to better understand the ramifications of the
broadening EU laws and the relevant factors for determining the specific effects of integrating environmental and competition laws.
A.

European Union Competition and Environmental Law

Economic integration and the creation of a common market established the goals of forming the European Economic Community in

22. See EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 85(1).
23. Brus, supra note 21, at 634-71.
24. ALEXANDER KISS & DINAH SHELTON, MANUAL OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW 342 (1997).
25. Herbert Ungerer, EC Competition Law in the Telecommunications, Media, and
Information Technology Sectors, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1111, 1112 (1996).
26. John F. Casalino, Shaping Environmental Law and Policy of Central and Eastern
Europe: The European Union's CriticalRole, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 227 (1995).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 234-55.
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1957.29 The original economic integration incorporated four essential
freedoms; the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital between the Member States of the Community. 30 The EC Treaty created
the institution and legal provisions to ensure free and fair competition
in the common market by requiring the harmonization of Member
States' laws. 31 The Community, now known as the European Union
(EU) continues the momentum of an ever expanding union as it coordinates not only transnational trade and commerce, but also as the EU
harmonizes competition and environmental policies. 32 Therefore, the
importance of the EU legal development exists not only because the
economic strength of the common market, but also because of the extensive regional integration of policies and laws extends well beyond the
33
basics of market economics.
1. Development of EU Competition Law
As mentioned above, initially the EC Treaty established the basic
legal framework for free, fair, and equal economic competition within
the common market. 34 The Community's mainstream, neoclassical view
of competition is founded on the economic notion that the equilibrium
will encourage the optimal allocation of resources. 35 In ideal economic
terms, this means that if people demanding a resource, such as a good
or service, can freely pay a price equal to the fair market value, the resource supply will be used for its best value and most efficient purpose. 36 However, the EC Treaty also recognized the imperfections of
free economic competition such as monopoly power, externalizes, and
public goods. 37 Firms that possess an unequal and dominant degree of
market power have the ability to unfairly influence the market price
and distort the socially optimal allocation of resources. 38 Not surprisingly, the Community set forth provisions that monitor the Member

29. Rudiger Dohms, The Development of a Competitive Internal Energy Market in the
European Community, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 805 (1994).
30. Dr. Klause Sommerlad & Peter Scherer, The Provision of Utility Services in a
Unified Europe, 4 U. MIAMI Y. B. INT'L L. 73, 74 (1995).
31. See Dohms, supra note 29, at 805.
32. Alexander Black, European Law and Public Utility Open Access, 10 FLA. J. INT'L
L. 117, 119 (1995).
33. Todd R. Overton, Substantive Distinctions Between United States Antitrust Law
and the Competition Policy of the European Community, 13 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 315, 317
(1991).
34. See Black, supra note 32, at 119.
35. M.J. Arts & N. Lee, Competition Policy, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION: POLICY AND ANALYSIS 119, 123 (1994).

36. Id. at 120.
37. See EC TREATY, supra note 19, arts. 85, 86.
38. David Young & Stan Metcalfe, Competition Policy, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, 119-38 (1994).
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States' anti-competition behaviors. 39 The primary provisions of the EC
Treaty that preserve fair competition are Articles 85, 86, and 90.40 In
general, Article 85 deals with restrictive agreements creating anticompetitive behavior; Article 86 deals with the abuse of dominant market power which effectively prevents competition; and finally, Article 90
deals with exceptions that allow monopoly conduct for efficient public
41
enterprises.
a.

Article 85 of the EC Treaty

Article 85 focuses specifically on the prohibition of anti-competitive
cooperation resulting from agreements or concerted practices between
independent enterprises. 42 The substantive test of anti-competitive activity from Article 85(1) is "the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition within the common market."43 The primary application of
the article is concerned with the behavior and the coordination of commercial procedures, rather than the structural changes in the market
place. 44 For example, a business agreement by a dominant corporation
to purchase or privatize one of its less threatening competitors, suppliers, or customers, which would increase the privatized entity's market
power, may violate Article 85 of the EC Treaty. The violation depends
upon the "object or effect" of the agreement strenthening the entity's
market power. 45 Namely, if the purchase agreement creates a "twoway" flow of information that generates advantages for the two entities
of the agreement, while disadvantaging the non-integrated competition,
the agreement is prohibited anti-competitive behavior pursuant Article
85(1).46

On the other hand, the EU Commission may grant "negative clearance" in accordance with Article 85(3), which allows an exemption to
the agreement's facial violation of Article 85(1).47 For example, the EU
applied negative clearance exceptions in the following two business
mergers because each agreement provided superior consumer products
at lower prices. 48 The EU allowed the anti-competitive merger of a
German manufacturing firm, Hummel and its Belgium distributing

39. See Arts & Lee, supranote 35, at 119.
40. Id. See also, EC Treaty, supranote 19, arts. 85, 86, and 90.
41. PATIRZIo BIANCHI, INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 91-100

(1998).
42. Mario Siragusa, Privatizationand EC Competition Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
999, 1027 (1996).
43. EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 85(1).
44. See Siragusa, supra note 42, at 1044.
45. See BIANCHI, supra note 41, at 95-97.

46. Siragusa, supranote 42, at 1045.
47. Id. at 1045, 1060.
48. Id.
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firm, Isbeque in 1965. 49 Again in 1988, the EU permitted a merger between AEI and its supplier, Reyroll Parsons. 50
b.

Article 86 of the EC Treaty

Like Article 85, Article 86 specifically prohibits abusive conduct by
dominant enterprises, such as direct, unilateral exploitation of market
power that causes a substantial reduction of competition.5 1 Market
dominance is not prohibited by Article 86 per se. Rather, Article 86
prohibits conduct that strengthens unequal market control by reducing
efficient competition. 52 In contrast with Article 85, however, Article 86
focuses more narrowly on the behavior of the entity and not on the concerted agreement forming the monopoly. 53 Furthermore, the application of Article 86 depends again, on the "object or effects" doctrine by
"taking into account the nature of the reciprocal undertakings entered
into and the competitive position of the various contracting parties on
the market or markets in which they operated." 54 Article 86 does not
prohibit ex anti the merger agreement between firms even if it is evident that monopoly power will result from the behavior. Rather, Article
86 frequently establishes a loophole for an Article 85 violation by,
again, only enforcing anticompetition sanctions for exploitative economic behaviors by dominant market powers ex post. 5
Despite the same "object or effect" doctrine as Article 85, the EU
Commission's application of Article 86 provides a much stricter enforcement of regulation against anti-competitive behavior. For example, the judgment in Philip Morris Holland BV v. Commission of the
European Communities indicated that the acquisition of a minority interest by a dominant competitor that "results in effective control of the
other company or at least in some influence on its commercial policy"
may violate Article 86 as an abuse of a dominant position. 56 Later in

49. See BIANCHI, supra note 41, at 97.
50. Id.
51. See EC TREATY, supranote 19, art. 86.
52. See Case T-78/89, Societa Italiana Vetro, 1992 E.C.R. 11-14033
360; see also
Case 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 245.
53. See BIANCHI, supra note 41, at 1048.

54. See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 550 1 116.
55. See Case 43/88, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen & Silver Line Reiseb Degreesuro v. Zentrale Zu Bek Degreesampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerb, 1989 E.C.R. 803
37. The Commission applied Article 86 of the EC Treaty and excused the behavior of the undertakings
based on the oligopoly market exception, even as it found concerted action contrary to Article 85. Id.
56. See Case 730/79, Philip Morris Holland BV v. Commission of the European Communitie, 1980 E.C.R. 2671, 2 C.M.L.R. 321 (1981) 1 65. The European Court declined the
application of Articles 85 and 86 to this acquisition because the transaction at issue did
not enable Philip Morris to control or influence Rothmans' conduct nor did it grant the
entities concerted or coordinated activities. Id.
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1992, the Commission applied the Philip Morris doctrine to the Gillette
case, in which it ruled Article 86 applied to a passive investment made
by Gillette because the new entity earned new company rights and held
a dominant position in the EU market.5 7 The Commission simply determined the Gillette behavior weakened competition in the market and
created new barriers to potential entry and therefore amounted to an
5
abuse of dominant position within the EU. 8
In light of the EU Commission's evolving application of Article 85
and 86 of the EC Treaty, the following generalizations of EU competition law indicate when that law will be applied to regulate competitive
behavior. First, the agreement or behavior must aim to acquire influence over an entity to syndicate a competitive, normally vertical relationship. 59 Second, the relationship must be likely to result in effective
control over the target market, or at least significant commercial influence. 60 Finally, the arrangement should not merely constitute a passive
investment conveying no rights or authoritative influence over the
61
market power.
c.

Article 90 of the EC Treaty

In addition to Articles 85 and 86, which define EU competition law,
Article 90 of the EC Treaty grants Member States the liberty to protect
certain enterprises that provide goods and services for public consumers. 62 As mentioned above, because the EU continues to develop environmental laws to serve and protect the general public, competition and
63
environmental laws continue to merge in case law.
Article 90 establishes an exception to EU competition law by allowing Member States to develop monopolies or oligopolies. 64 The exclusive rights are conditioned on the necessity to preserve a general,
public economic interest and must be entrusted to the State under Article 90(2) as established by the 1993 Re Corbeau judgment. 65 However,
57. Commission Decision No. 93/252/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 116) 21 [hereinafter Gillette].
58. See Siragusa, supranote 42, at 1031.
59. See YOUNG & METCALFE, supra note 38, at 138. The EU Commission recognizes
both horizontal, meaning two competitors in the same production position, i.e. manufacturer and manufacturer, as well as vertical cooperative relationships, meaning supplier
and manufacturer. The EU case law is, however, much more prevalent for vertical anticompetition. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. See also Siragusa, supra note 42, at 1035.
62. In correlation with Article 90, Article 222 further allows Member States to freely
develop a sovereign system of property ownership, which may include state enterprises.
63. See, Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 16.
64. See Dohms, supra note 29, at 814; see also Dana L. Romaniuk, Regulating Public
Monopolies in Furtheranceof the EEC Free Competition Goal: Article 90 and the Two-Step
Approach, 69 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1025, 1026 (1994).
65. Case 320/91, Re Carbeau, 1993 ECR 1-2533; see also Dohms, supra note 29, at
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pursuant to 90(1), public enterprises may not grant exclusive rights
that unnecessarily violate EU competition regulations. 66 Although Article 90 is commonly applied to public entities, it is neutral as to the
ownership of the business and only distinguishes between public and
private enterprises on a functional level. 67 This means the purpose of
Article 90 is not to simply protect State-granted exclusive rights or
authorized monopolies. Rather, it ensures that certain services of general economic interest for public consumers are protected from competition.68 For example, one of the most often and closely examined applications of Article 90 is the public energy sector, whereby the
neoclassical economic equilibrium is superseded by the efficiency of ensuring universal services. 69 The ECJ acknowledged this perspective of
EU Competition laws in the 1994 Almelo v. Energiebedriff Ijsselmij
judgment. 70 In the Almelo case, the ECJ concluded that despite the
Dutch electricity sector's violation of Article 85 and 86 by exploiting a
dominant position, Article 90(2) allowed the restriction of competition
because it was necessary to the particular mission of providing national
71
electricity.
In overview, the enforcement of Article 90 concerns three objectives. First, 90(1) legalizes state monopolies. 72 Second, 90(2) focuses on
the derivative application of Article 90 in relation to services in the
public sector. 73 Third, the competence of the EU to enact decisions and
directives is the concern of Article 90(3).74
One of the first legal interpretations of Article 90's objectives occurred in the Guiseppe Sacchi case. 75 In Sacchi, the ECJ allowed Italy
to grant special and exclusive rights to a television broadcasting enterprise because it provided public services, yet it did not specifically regard the market behavior as incompatible with Article 86 of the EC
Treaty. 76 Furthermore, the ECJ expanded the Sacchi ruling in the ERT

821.
66. Romaniuk, supra note 64, at 1004.
67. See Case 41/90, Hoefner v. Macrotron, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979, 2016 21 (citing previous decision where ECJ ruled that "in the context of competition law.., the concept of
an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of
the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.")
68. See Dohms, supra note 29, at 821.
69. For additional analysis of the EU Competition Law and the Energy sector see,
Alexander J. Black, EuropeanLaw and Public Utility Open Access, 10 FLA. J. INT'L L. 117
(1995). See also Sommerlad & Scherer, supra note 30.
70. Case 393/92, Almelo v. Energiebedriff ljsselmij, 1994 E.R.C. 1-1477.
71. See Dohms, supra note 29, at 824-827.
72. WOLF SAUTER, COMPETITION LAW AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE EU 148 (1997).

73.
74.
75.
Biella),
76.

Id.
Id.
Case 155/73, Guiseppe Sacchi (Preliminary ruling requested by the Tribunale di
1974 E.R.C. 409, 2 C.M.L.R. 177 (1974).
Id.
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v. Dimotiki case 77 by prohibiting exclusive monopoly rights in situations
where the behavior directly violated Article 86 of the EC Treaty.
The legal interpretation of upholding Article 86 relative to Article
90 is not, however, without legal contradiction. Although Article 86
trumps Article 90 in the majority of EU cases, occasionally, the ECJ
rules in favor of permitting monopolistic dominant positions, even if the
behavior itself infringes on the provisions of Article 86, as exemplified
in the Hoefner v. Macrotronand Regie des Telegraphes et des Telephones
v. SA GB INNO-BM cases.78 Usually, the ECJ grants justification for
preserving exclusive, monopoly rights when the enterprise protects a
public interest and fulfills the proportionality test.79 This two-pronged
requirement is defined by Article 90(2) of the EC Treaty, providing that
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest may be exempted from the application of competition
rules contained in the Treaty. These rules apply in so far as is necessary to restrict competition, or even to exclude all competition, from
other economic operators in order to ensure the performance of the par80
ticular tasks assigned to them.
The third issue concerning interpretation of Article 90 is the EU's
right to enact directives and decisions under Article 90(3).81 This legislative power of the Commission has been contested because the directives are enforceable against the Member States without approval by
the Council or European Parliament. This structure disrupts the EU
institutional balance of power.8 2 Despite contradictory, unilateral
Commission power, Article 90(3) has been further approved by the ECJ
in the Terminal Directive and Spain, Belgium & Italy v. E.C. Commission cases.8 3 The Terminal Directive decision defined the Commission's
power to issue directives under Article 90(3) regarding legal monopolies, as well as the power to suppress them.8 4 Furthermore, the cases
reiterated the Commission's right to make general directives which
specify the application of Article 90(3) and suggested the article's application could be enacted for the postal service, gas, electricity, insurance,
and transport markets.85 In summary, the EU regulates business competition behavior primarily through the provisions of Articles 85, 86,

77. Case 260/89, ERT v. Dimotiki, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925, 2962 37.
78. See Macrotron, supra note 67, at 1 21; see also Case 18/88, Regie des Telegraphes
et des Telephones v. SA GB INNO-BM, 1991 E.R.C. 1-5951.
79. See EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 90(2).
80. Id.
81. See Siragusa, supra note 42, at 1079.
82. See SAUTER, supra note 72, at 154-55.
83. Case 202/88, French Republic v. Commission, 1991 E.R.C. 1-1223; Joined Cases
271, 281 & 289/90, Spain, Belgium and Italy v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. 1-5833.
84. See French Republic, 1991 E.R.C. 1233 at n. 162.
85. See Joined Cases 271, 281 & 289/90, Spain, Belgium & Italy v. E.C. Commission
1992 E.C.R 5834.
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and 90. Although the EC Treaty includes additional articles and reguprovide the most
lations relating to competition, these three articles
86
fundamental understanding of EU competition law.
B. Development of EU Environmental Law
As Europe integrates economically through trade and various business transactions, the competition laws are not the only broadening legal developments that affect transnational boundaries within the European Union.8 7 The environmental policies of nations, regions, and the
world as a whole are assuming integrated dimensions as well.88 Several
catastrophes in Europe exemplify the scope of the environmental crisis
and the international need to coordinate laws to protect the environment. For example, in 1976, Seveson, Italy experienced a chemical explosion that forced food restrictions and evacuations in contaminated
areas of Italy and Switzerland.8 9 In 1986, Switzerland fought a chemical fire which resulted in the release of 824 tons of insecticide, seventyone tons of herbicide, thirty-nine tons of fungicide, four tons of solvents,
and twelve tons of organic compounds containing mercury that contaminated the Rhine river and devastated France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. 90 Therefore, as environmental issues know
no national boundaries, it is essential to better understand the expansive application of environmental law in the EU as a whole. The following analysis will briefly explain the primary environmental legal development within the Community.
1. EC Treaty and Community Legislation
As mentioned before, the original version of EC Treaty, which
formed the original European Common Market, neglected to address
the environment. The EC Treaty of 1957 neither expressly referred to
concerns nor even included the words "environment" or
environmental
"pollution." 91 However, in the 1960's when environmental issues began
to earn importance in the world, the EC led the legal development by
broadly defining its jurisdiction over regional environmental issues
through Articles 36, 100, and 235.92 Specifically, Article 36 provides
Member States the authority to limit imports and exports in order to

86. Jan H. Jans, State Aid and Article 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty: Does the Polluter
Really Pay, 75 EUR. ENVTL L. REV. 108, 108-115 (1995).
87. Susan Polizzotto & Patricia L. LaTulippe, The European Community in 1992: An
Integrated Approach to Economy and Ecology, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1759 (1990).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1759-60.
90. Id.
91. See generally EC TREATY, supra note 19.
92. Id. arts. 36, 100, and 235.
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protect the health and life of persons, animals, and plants. 93 Article 100
enables the Community to harmonize Member States' laws through
94
various directives that uphold the functioning of the common market.
Article 235 grants the European Council the authority to take "appropriate measures" to "attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community" when the "[t]reaty
has not provided the necessary powers" to do so. 95
Because the original EC Treaty provisions presented only generalized authority for the EC to regulate the environment, the individual
Member States retained the primary responsibility for enacting environmental policy. 96 Thus, in addition to the EC Treaty provisions, the
EC began to issue Community-wide environmental standards in the
early 1970s, that harmonized Member States' responsibilities through
three types of legislation: regulations, decisions, and directives. In the
EC, and currently in the EU, a regulation assumes immediate effect in
the Member States automatically, without national government approval. A decision also binds the Member States automatically, but
usually addresses specific, non-common legislative or legal issues. In
comparison, a directive instructs the Member States to adopt or amend
particular legislation in conformity with the EU directive within a particular time period.9 7 Due to the greater respect for the Member State's
sovereignty, the EC mainly created environmental law in the 1970s
through directives. For instance, the EC drafted directives regarding
regulations against air pollution caused by motor vehicles, 98 biodegradability of detergents, 99 and the sulfur content of certain fuel oils. 100
Early in the development of EC environmental law, the desire to
unify the economies in Europe through efficient harmonization of environmental standards was not the only catalyst for environmental policy.
Additionally, and more sobering than the economic incentives, the occurrence of the devastating 1967 "Torrey Canyon" and 1978 "Amoco
Cadiz" disasters also encouraged the EC to coordinate environmental
laws.O1 Both of these tanker accidents resulted in massive oil spills,
which polluted long stretches of the beach and reduced biodiversity by
killing many plants and animals of the regional ecosystem. 10 2 These
events forced Europe to realize that something more needed to be done
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. art. 36.
Id art. 100.
Id. art. 235.
See Polizzotto & LaTulippe, supra note 87, at 1763.
Id.
See, e.g., Council Directive 70/220, 1970 O.J. (L 76) 1.
See, e.g., Council Directive 73/404, 1973 O.J. (L 347) 51.
See, e.g., Council Directive 75/716, 1975 O.J. (L 307) 22.
Brus, supra note 21, at 634-671; see also KisS & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 342;

see generally,EC TREATY, supra note 19.

102. Brus, supra note 21, at 636.
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in order to coordinate the environmental policy of the Community. 103
2.

Environmental Action Programmes I-V

In 1972, the Member States met in Paris to establish an environmental program that did not sacrifice economic harmonization. Rather,
the Paris Summit Conference created the opportunity to diminish variances in living standards and improve the quality of life through EC
environmental standards. 104 The First Environmental Action Programme (EAP) resulted from the Paris Summit in the form of a "Decla10 5
ration of the Council and the Representatives of the Member States."'
Four years later, the EC created the Second Environmental Action
Programme of 1977 that focused on the reduction of regional pollution
and rational, efficient resource management. 10 6 In 1983, the Third Environmental Action Programme added the prevention policies and declared that social and economic EC policies should not exacerbate environmental problems. 107 The Fourth Environmental Action Programme
focused on the adoption of high protection and quality standards in
1987.108 Most importantly, it coordinated environmental policy with all
other EC policies.10 9 Finally, the Fifth Environmental Action Programme covers 1992-2000.110 The fifth policy aims to sustain the status
quo of the environment while maintaining economic and social development in the EU.111
Although the EAP's established clear and novel institutional environmental standards, they are only declarations of harmonized policy.
The EAP's neither provide an automatically binding legal basis for EU
legislation nor attribute any legal power to the Community under Arti-

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 1973-1977 O.J. SPEC. ED. (C 112) 1.
The legal effect of the EC declaration is similar to a regulation, in that the Member
States' governments must approve and accept the official decision of the Community. In
contrast, however, the declaration does not have to be accepted as a whole, rather the national governments may only conditionally adopt the EC legislation. Id. at 3 n.8.
106. Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment, 1977 O.J. (C 139) 1.
107. See Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment 1982-1986 SPEC. ED. O.J.
(C 46) 1.
108. See id.
109. See Council Resolution on the Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment, 1987-1992 SPEC. ED. O.J.
(C 328) 1.
110. See Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States, 1993 O.J. (C 138) 1.
111. Id.
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cle 189 of the EC Treaty. 1 2 Again, the Community could only rely on
the general EC Treaty provisions of Article 100 and 235 as the prelimi13
nary legal basis of the instituted environmental policy.'
Nonetheless, the first judicial recognition of the environmental
policy occurred in 1985, when the ECJ acknowledged the environmental
policy as an important Community objective.' 14 A year later in Commission v. Denmark, the Court ruled again, that EC environmental
policy is an essential mission of the Community, based upon Articles
100 and 235.115 In this landmark case, the Commission changed Denmark's environmental restrictions because they unduly violated EC free
trade provisions. 116 The ECJ held that a Member State could enact and
enforce economic restrictions based upon "necessary" national environmental standards only if they do not excessively restrict competing
countries or infringe upon free trade. 117 Therefore, to the extent Denmark's environmental regulations unduly restricted trade and did not
exercise the least drastic enforcement measures, the Court did not uphold the national environmental policy." i8 Nevertheless, the principle
of environmental protection as a mandatory requirement of legal and
economic consideration was finally recognized in the EC. 119
3.

Single European Act and Maastricht Treaty

Eventually, in 1987, the EC amended the original EC Treaty with
the Single European Act (SEA), which dealt specifically with the environment.' 20 The SEA introduced Title VII, explicitly granting the EC
legal power to legislate environmental policy. 12 1 The EC added Article
100a, enabling harmonization of environmental legislation. 122 Additionally, new Articles 130r, 130s, and 130t presented the objectives of the
EC environmental policy, standardized the procedure for implementing
environmental policy, and provided the opportunity to create more
strict national environmental measures. 123 Furthermore, the newly
added provisions provided that environmental damage should be prevented at the source and reiterated the First EAP's principle, the pol112. See Brus, supra note 21, at 637.
113. See KISS & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 243-46.
114. Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v. Association de defense des bruleurs
d'huiles usagees (ADBHU), 1985 E.C.R. 5331 549.
115. Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark (In re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R.
4607 at 4630 [hereinafter Disposable Beer Cans].
116. Id.
117. See Polizzotto & LaTulippe, supra note 87, at 1773.
118. See Disposable Beer Cans, 1988 E.C.R. at 4627-30.
119. See Polizzotto & LaTulippe, supra note 87, at 1773-74.
120. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
121. Id at 3.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 5-6.
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luter is responsible to pay damage costs.124 Even though most of the
previous environmental legislation was adopted through Articles 100
and 235, the new provisions allowed the EC to streamline and unionize
the standards in order to more realistically and efficiently complete the
EC goal of a Single Market by 1992.125 The anticipated economic
growth associated with the establishment of the Internal Market introduced fear of diverse environmental standards that would inhibit free
126
and fair EC trade.
The Treaty on the European Union, also known as the Maastricht
Treaty, enumerated a number of new environmental policies that became effective November 1, 1993.127 The Maastricht Treaty retained
the new SEA provisions, specifically Articles 100a, 130r, 130s, and
130t.1 28 Additionally, one of the primary principles inserted in EU en129
vironmental law was the precautionary principle of Article 130r(2).
The principle idea originated in Germany and has grown in popularity
within the EU because it grants Member States the ability to adopt na130
tional preventative environmental standards before harm occurs.
Furthermore, due to the ambiguous requirements of the precautionary
environmental policy within the Maastricht Treaty, the EU adopted
specific definitions of environmental law through agreements such as
the United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes that defines the precautionary principle as:
Action to avoid the potential transboundary impact of the release of
hazardous substances shall not be postponed on the grounds that scientific research has not fully proved a causal link between those substances, on the one hand, and the potential transboundary impact, on
131
the other hand.
The Maastricht Treaty further integrated the obligation of harmonizing environmental law with other EU legislation. For example, the
revised Article 130r(2) states that "environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of

124. See Polizzotto & LaTulippe, supra note 87, at 1766.
125. See Brus, supra note 21, at 640.
126. Isabelle Martin, The Limitations of a Uniform EnvironmentalPolicy in the European Union, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 675 (1994).
127. See generally MAASTRICHT TREATY, supranote 19.
128. See Brus, supra note 21, at 652-655 (citing a detailed analysis of the procedure,
objectives, and principle provisions of the reiterated SEA Articles 100a, 130r, 130s, and
130t).
129. See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 19, art. 130r(2).
130. B. VERHOEVE ET AL., INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN
MAASTRICHT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 12, 15 (1992).

ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY,

131. Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
151/PC/W9.11/L.26 (Vol. I) (1992).
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other Community policies." 132 Thus, the EU established that the new
priority is avoiding environmental nuisances with preventative measures, while still upholding other EU economic policies, rather than responding to environmental damages that clash with other EU poli33
cies.1
Another primary principle integrated in the Maastricht Treaty is
the polluter pays principle. Although the EC previously established
this legal responsibility in the First EAP, the EU ensured the principle
as automatically binding EU law through the Maastricht Treaty by imposing the burden of the pollution costs on the emitter of the pollution,
34
rather than on the general public.
In 1996, a number of EU studies and assessments evaluated the
implementation of regional environmental regulations. The European
Commission adopted a communication that proposed minimum regional
standards for environmental inspections by Member States entitled
"Implementing Community Environmental Law." 135 Furthermore, Directive 96/61/EC created the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) plan, which established a committee structure for Member
States, the industry, and the European Commission together to define
136
the pollution control standards.
The Member States are still challenged with the difficulty of interpreting community directives in accordance with national laws. For example, Finland struggled with this in 1996. Pursuant to Directive
67/548/EEC, as a new EU member, Finland was required to transpose
all successive EC environmental regulations in accordance with national requirements. Recognizing this is a time consuming and difficult
process for the new Member States, the Commission expanded the national freedom for implementing EU measures. 137 The EU also proposed uniform implementation and enforcement assistance through
Implementation & Enforcement of EU Environmental Law (IMPEL).138
IMPEL has become increasingly influential in the past few years, especially as the EU expands eastward with new members. 139

132. See Martin, supra note 126, at 690.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 650.
135. Fourteenth Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community law
(1996), EUR. COM., 14th Sess., Doc. No. C 332 (May 29, 1997) 65.
136. Id. at 67.
137. Id. at 70 (citing the EU Directive 90/313/EEC as the legislative basis for the expanding national liberty with environmental regulations.)
138. Id. at 70-71.
139. Id.
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C. Integrationof EU Competition and Environmental Law
1.

Choosing the Appropriate Legal Basis

After understanding the basic development of EU environmental
law, it becomes clear that numerous legal approaches are possible in a
particular anti-pollution situation. 40 Therefore, it is not always clear
which legal basis is most appropriate, especially in situations of preventative protection of the marine environment such as at issue in the Cali
case. However it is conceivable to organize the EU environmental law
applicable to the Cali case into three levels of law: international, re4
gional, and national.' '
a.

International EU Environmental Law

In the area of preventative marine environment protection, international law plays a very large part, primarily because many marine
waters lie outside national jurisdiction.1 42 For instance, the territorial
waters may be one nationality, the shipping vessel traveling the waters
may be from another country, while the captain and crew may be a
third nationality. In such an internationally diverse situation, numerous countries must coordinate their laws in order to achieve the ultimate goal of protecting the marine environment. 143
For this reason, the international community organized international principles governing the subject of international law of the sea in
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). 144 The United Nations Environmental Program also elaborated international marine protection through a system of regulating
"regional seas." 145 The Mediterranean Sea program established protocols against pollution by oil and other hazardous substances in 1976.146
The Convention to protect the Black Sea against pollution caused by
harmful dumping came into force in Bucharest on April 21, 1992. 147
Even more specific to the Cali case is the subject of shipping oil,
which is addressed as international law monitoring vessel-source pollution pursuant to Articles 194(3)(b), 211, 217 through 221 of
UNCLOS.148 These provisions regulate the specifics of transport vessels
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See Martin, supra note 126, at 695-97.
See KIss & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 470.
Id.
See VERHOEVE, supranote 130, at 15.
See Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 471.
Id.
Mediterranean Sea Program, 1976 O.J. (L 129).
KISS & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 342.
Id. at 343.
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and adopt norms to prevent, reduce, and control pollution. Essentially,
the primary enforcement responsibilities for protecting the marine environment are allocated according to the 360 kilometer exclusive eco149
nomic zone.
Another important body of international law preventing marine
pollution is the Marine Pollution global conference (MARPOL) adopted
on November 2, 1973.150 Similar to the UNCLOS articles, MARPOL defined state obligations to regulate behaviors which may pollute the marine environment.
b.

Regional EU Environmental Law

Continuing the standards set forth by MARPOL, the 1974 Baltic
Sea Convention and revised Helsinki Convention of 1992 further refined the international marine regulations according to stricter European, regional specifications and control.11
Additionally, the EU marine environment law consists of approximately twenty directives. 152 The most important is Directive 76/464 of
May 4, 1976, which relates to harmful substances discharged into the
waters of the Community.' 53 Few laws relate specifically to the territorial marine waters and the precautionary protection of the marine environment as does Directive 79/923 on the quality of water. 5 4 Also, to
preempt environmental damage from marine pollution, Regulation
2978/94 institutes community standards for the carrying allowances of
55
the regional oil tankers.'
c.

National EU Environmental Law

Because the EU consists of sovereign countries, the enforcement
responsibility of environmental standards is frequently deferrred to the
Member States.'5 6 Therefore, the national laws are much like regional
or Community law. As the EU continues to integrate economically, socially, environmentally, and legally, the variances decrease between EU
and Member State laws.' 5 7 In fact, little national legislation exclusively
deals with marine environment protection. Instead, most countries
simply organize legislation which regulates the water-quality stan-

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 344.
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 345.
See Martin, supra note 126, at 658-66.
Council Directive 76/464, 1976 O.J. (112) 1.
Council Directive 78/176, 1984 O.J. (54) 1.
Council Regulation 2978/94, 1994 O.J. (319) 1.
Id.
Id.
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simply enact EU Directives. The Pretura Unificata di
nas Unknown case exemplified the EU's allowance
authority to enforce and even exceed the Community's
standard.159
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Torino v. Persoof the national
water pollution

Another example in which the ECJ ruled the national environmental enforcement is limited by the EU directives is Commission v.
Denmark.160 The ECJ decided that based on Directives 79/831 and
67/548, the Danish law did not sufficiently protect the marine environment from the risk of pollution from new substances. 61 Thus, the
holding established that although Member States assume the responsibility to enforce the EU legislation, the EU remains the superseding
authority to ensure proper national enforcement.162
The Cali case is a primary example where a national public
authority, Consorzio Autonomo del Porto (CAP), monitors and manages
the administrative and economic functions of the port of Genoa in accordance with the EU legislative expectations. Pursuant to EU maritime law, the national government conferred the regulating capacity
and surveillance enforcement of the oil port of Genoa-Multedo to CAP in
1986, through Order Number Fourteen. 63
In sum, the most important formal procedure by the EU in relation
to national environmental law functions is to ensure correct implementation of the provisions of Community environmental law.1 64
2.

Integration
a.

Original Case Law

In lieu of recognizing the various levels of choosing which EU environmental law to apply to a case, the ECJ has specifically addressed
this problem in several cases. For instance, in Commission v. Council 65
the ECJ stated that the legal basis for an environmental measure may
not depend simply on an institution's objective. In contrast, the ECJ
held that the measures appropriate for the case depended on the harmonization of both conditions to maintain competition and to reduce

158. See KISS & SHELTON, supra note 24, at 345-46.
159. Case 228/87, Pretura Unificata di Torino v. Persons Unknown, 1988 E.C.R. 5099.
160. Case 278/85, Commission v. Denmark, 1987 E.C.R. 4069.
161. Id.
162. See Brus, supra note 21, at 659.
163. See, Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 11 3-6.
164. See Brus, supra note 21, at 659.
165. Case 300/89, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493; Case 45/87, Commission
v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5545.
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66
environmental pollution.1

In Commission v. Italy 67 the Court acknowledged that the differences in national environmental laws can create unequal competition.
Furthermore, the ECJ defined the authority to harmonize the environmental standards based on Articles 100a and 130r. 168 Therefore, resulting from this case is the general EU standard that if the national
environmental regulations unfairly affects free trade and competition,
Article 100a entitles the EU to modify and harmonize the two essential
objectives of fair competition and environmental preservation. 169 However, the ECJ clouded this decision with the 1993 case, Commission v.
Council.170 The ECJ held that if the objective of a directive is to protect
the environment in accordance with Article 130s, the environmental
17
measures may affect the EU conditions of competition. '
b.

The Cali Case

Again turning to the recent Cali decision, the ECJ questioned the
power of a national port authority to uphold preventative pollution
standards for the marine environment of Genoa in light of allegations of
anti-competitive acts per Article 86.172 The basic facts of the case concern Genoa, an Italian marine port that was managed by the CAP, a
73
public administrative body established by the Italian legislature.'
Pursuant to Decree No. 1186 of August 31, 1991, the President of CAP
contracted the service of SEPG to protect the maritime environment
against pollution and accidental spillage. 174 The private Italian oil
shipper, Diego Cali refused to pay anti-pollution surveillance charges to
SEPG. 17 Cali brought a case before the Italian court claiming SEPG
abusively used its dominant market position, as a private environ76
mental company, to charge the anti-pollution fees. 1
The ECJ addressed this question concerning market dominance by
first considering whether SEPG's activity in this case is within the
scope of Article 86 of the EC Treaty. 177 Again, an act that violates EU

166. See Brus, supranote 21, at 633-34.
167. Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1099; Case 92/79, Commission v.
Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1115.
168. Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1099
169. See Brus, supranote 21, at 658.
170. Case 155/91, Commission v. Council, 1993 E.C.R. 1-939.
171. See Brus, supra note 21, at 658.
172. See, Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1547.
173. Court Judgment on Anti-Pollution Services Payments, THE REUTER EUR.
COMMUNITY REP., April 15, 1997, at 1.
174. See, Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 11 1-10.
175. Id. 12.
176. Id. 11 13-14.
177. Id. 1 14.
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competition laws is an act that is an economic activity of a legal person,
individual or corporate, that is commercial in nature by offering goods
or services. In contrast, if the act is a State exercising official authority
for the public good, Article 86 does not apply to the activity. Here,
SEPG's anti-pollution surveillance fees were charged directly under the
direction and auspices of the Italian government for the purpose of protecting the marine environment, a public good. Therefore, the State
was acting in accordance with its official authority, and EU competition
law did not apply. 178 Specifically, the ECJ said, "such surveillance is
connected by its nature, its aim and'. . . the exercise of powers relating
to the protection of the environment which are typically those of public
authority. It is not of an economic nature justifying the application of
the treaty rules on competition."'179 Furthermore, the Court held that a
port company, which is entrusted by public authorities to protect the
environment, "even where the port users must pay dues to finance that
surveillance service.. .does not constitute an undertaking within the
meaning of Articles 86 and 90 of the Treaty."' 8 0 Thus, the Court held
the application of the competition rules depended upon the classification of the activity as public or commercial.' 8 '
The ECJ ruling in the Cali case falls in line with previous application of EU competition laws. 82 Although the act may be arguably classified as an economic private act under the definition of Article 86, Article 90 grants Member States the right to protect public interest,
especially environmental interests, in line with the EU environmental
policy. In the Cali case, the ECJ found that the surveillance protection
of the marine environment under the auspices of a public administration is exempt from EU competition law, even if a private company is
providing the protection service. 8 3 This case demonstrates how the EU
relies on Article 90 to balance the obligation of preserving a free and
competitive market economy with protecting exclusive, environmental
rights for the public interest. 8 4 Thus, it seems that with such broad
national government discretion under EU competition laws, the regional government is simultaneously building credibility for national
protection of the environment, so long as the basic national principles of
the laws are in harmony with the EU principles.

178. See Competition Rules do not Cover Pollution Surveillance Firms, THE REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Mar. 18, 1997, at 1.
179. See Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 23.
180. See id. 1 24-25; see also Competition Rules, supra note 7, at 1.
181. See Diego Cali, 1997 E.C.R. 1 26-27.
182. See, e.g. id.
183. Id. 1 23; see also Case 346/92, SAT Fluggesellschaft v. Eurocontrol, 1994 E.C.R. I43, 1 30.
184. See Siragusa, supra note 42, at 1068-79.
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D. Impact of Legal Integrationon the EU Expansion
As previously stated, the Cali case exemplifies the current development and merging of European law with respect to economic competition and preventative environmental law.18 5 Yet the importance of understanding the historical development and the current coordination of
these two areas of law is more than a mere current appreciation of
European Union law. Since unification, the European Union created
not only the second largest economic market in the world, but it is also
a dynamically expanding community. In particular, since the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the crumbling of Cold War communism over the Central and East European Countries (CEEC), the boundaries of the EU
have continuously crept eastward. 186 In 1995, the EU formally accepted Austria, Sweden, and Finland as full Member States. Additionally, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
signed preliminary agreements to become members of the EU.18 7 However, with the institutional expansion of the EU, the new members
bring different legal traditions, various stages of economic development,
and unique values of environmental preservation.188 Preparing for additional eastward integration of Central and East Europe will present
new issues to the EU and future development of competition and environmental law.18 9
1.

Preparation for CEEC Integration

The European Community recognized the need for transitioning
economic and political relations with CEEC in the late 1980s. 190 The
eastward integration began with a multitude of agreements whereby
the EC agreed to assist national development of a competitive market
economy and align the legal policies with the west. For instance, in November, 1988, the EC and Hungary enacted a trade, economic, and
commercial cooperation agreement to begin coordinating legal policies. 191 The EC established a similar agreement between both Poland
and Czechoslovakia in 1989.192 In 1991, the EC formally opened its
market to imports from CEEC and organized institutional frameworks
185. See Casalino, supra note 26, at 228.
186. Colin Jones, Knocking on the EU's Door: Members of East European Countries,
THE BANKER, May 1998, at 43.

187. Id. See also the specific EU Europe Agreements with the CEEC; Poland Europe
Agreement, 1993 O.J. (L 3348), the Hungary Europe Agreement, 1993 O.J. (L 347), the
Czech Republic Europe Agreement, 1994 O.J. (L 360), and the Slovak Republic Europe
Agreement, 1994 O.J. (L 359).
188. Id.
189. See Casalino, supra note 26, at 229-30.
190. Id.
191. See 1988 O.J. (L 27) 1.
192. See 1989 O.J. (L 339) 1; 1989 O.J.(L 88).
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to coordinate economic and social matters. This included Article 238 of
the revised EC Treaty, which specifically authorizes the EU to create
Association Agreements or "Europe" Agreements with other nations in
order to develop future coordination of economics and environmental
policies. 93 Therefore, in 1992, all previous EC agreements with CEEC
were superseded by Interim "Europe" Association Agreements.194 Furthermore, the EU also included chapter 12.2 in the Fifth EAP of 1992,
which exclusively addresses CEEC environmental policy. 195 It established environmental strategies for these countries and names the Association and PHARE196 programs as instruments for environmental
policy and economic competition development. With specific focus on
the environmental cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe,
the foreign ministers of the respected countries met in Lucerne in April
1993, to approve the enactment and financing of the EAP for Central
and Eastern Europe. 197 By February 1, 1994, the EU had accepted Poland and Hungary as complete Associated Members of the EU, followed
by the Czech Republic in February, 1995, and Slovakia in June, 1995.
The preparations for EU integration of the associated countries of
CEEC became an obligation for the EU and was discussed on a ministerial level at several European Council meetings' 98 and elaborated specifically in a White Paper. 199
a.

European Agreements

The EU Europe Agreements with individual CEECs commits both
parties to gradually harmonize environmental and competition laws
over the next ten years. 200 Title II of the Europe Agreement establishes
specific principles and standards that must be achieved, such as privatization of state owned enterprises and creation of market economies.
In particular, a primary precondition for economic integration into the
EU is "the approximation of the country's existing and future legislation
of that of the Community.. .in particular.. .the rules on competi-

193. EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 238.
194. See generally Hungary Interim Agreement, 1992 O.J. (L 116); Poland Interim
Agreement, 1992 O.J. (L 113) 1; Czech Republic Interim Agreement, 1992 O.J. (L 151);
Slovakia Interim Agreement, 1992 O.J. (L 115).
195. A European Community Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Environment, 1993 O.J. (C 138) 1, 89.
196. PHARE is a French acronym for Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Reconstruction. The program extended quickly to all central and east European countries to
assist the economic transition to a free market system. Id.
197. See JULIAN WILSON, PHARE PROGRESS AND STRATEGY PAPER: ENVIRONMENT TO

THE YEAR 2000 (1993).
198. EU: Special Edition; Essen Summit, Euro-East, Dec. 12, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Euro-East File.
199. See Casalino, supra note 26, at 243.
200. Id. at 241.
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tion .... transport, and the environment."20 1
b.

White Paper and Agenda 2000

The White Paper set forth the pre-accession strategy for the Associated EU Members. 20 2 The primary objective of the White Paper is the
economic "alignment" of the CEECs with the EU Internal Market.
Various legislative descriptions and business conditions in the main
body of the Paper provide the specific strategy for the transition. 203 The
Annex addresses other legal sectors, including the environment, in
which the future members will participate. 20 4 In its evaluation of the
White Paper, the Community praised the document because "it provides
a guide to complexities of the Internal Market and suggests a logical
sequence in which the associated countries should bring their legislation in line with that in the Union," 20 5 explained Commissioner Hans
Van den Broek. On the other hand, some CEECs have criticized the
impracticability of the strategies. For example, Poland's Secretary of
State for European Affairs, Jareck Saryusz-Wolksi, stated the Paper
should be a guide rather than an obstacle requiring high demands for
20 6
accession into the EU.
The Agenda 2000 is the most recent EU expansion plan. 20 7 The
Agenda 2000 is a 1,300 page enlargement prospectus drafted by the
European Commission to incorporate ten new CEECs into the EU.208
The negotiations for the first wave of broadening the EU member based
on the Agenda 2000 began in early 1998, with five post-communist
countries; Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia. 20 9 A second group identified for future negotiations include Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 210 In total, the Agenda
2000 details the plan to increase the EU's population to 500 million, yet

its GDP would barely grow by

5%.211

In order for the CEECs to qualify for EU membership, the Agenda
primarily requires that the post-communist country transition to a

201. Id.
202. Id. at 243.

203. Id. at 239.
204. Id.
205. Eva Munk, FurtheringIntegration Goal of EU Assistance, PRAGUE POST, July 12
1995, at A5.
206. EU/East Europe: A
White Paper Approved for Nine CEECs, EUROPEAN
INFORMATION SERVICES, June 23, 1995, at 1
207. Jones, supra note 186, at 43.

208.
209.
210.
211.
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functioning democracy and a well-operating competitive economy. 212
The EU expansion requirements also include subscribing to the union's
acquis communautaire, the body of EU law that all members must
adopt. 213 Therefore, in some ways, each country's detailed obligations
are unique. Some may include creating or strengthening competition
laws. Others may deal with encouraging innovative, efficient economic
growth through funding business. Yet still others may concern the environmental standards of operating businesses and the protection of the
environment in general. 214 The five first-tier countries identified by the
Agenda 2000 highlight the ever closer reality of the broadening of the
EU and Brussels willingness to address the problem areas. But at the
same time, even though each CEEC has accomplished tremendous legal
and economic transformation, the prospective EU Member States must
continue to alter their legal, regulatory, and institutional framework
just as the EU does.
2.

Example: Poland and the Integration

As a whole, the CEECs' transitions have been generally successful.
Yet each experience is individually unique due to their diverse political,
legal, and cultural backgrounds. 215 Initially, economic restructuring
caused the most difficulty. In particular, each country approached the
creation of a market economy with different strategies of privatization,
business incentive programs, and employment training. 2 16 The economies struggled with growing pains, but recently the CEECs' inflation
stabilized, interest rates rose, and privatized businesses compete more
efficiently in the global market. 217 Despite the slowly stabilizing economy, the CEECs continue to confront challenges of insufficient financing, poor monitoring systems, institutional weaknesses, and poorly
trained human resources 218 as they are still learning to adjust.
One of the most unique examples of a CEEC legal transition that
demonstrates the effects of the Cali case issue is the privatization of the
Polish shipping industry. After the fall of communism in 1989, Poland
began to build a free market economy by selling several state-owned enterprises to private individuals. This change enabled Poland to create
private businesses, which freely competed in a national market economy, and eventually in the EU. For example, in the early 1990s, Poland

212. Id. at 44-45.

213. Id.
214. Id. at 45-46.

215. EU/East Europe: EU Focus on Role for Local Government in East Europe,
EUROPEAN INFORMATION SERVICES, Sept. 6, 1995, at 1.

216. Id.
217. EU Enlargement, Business Europe, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Oct. 19,
1998, at 22.
218. See Casalino, supra note 26, at 250-54.
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initiated a privatization plan for its national sea ports, particularly
Gdansk and Gdenia. 21 9 First, the state-owned shipping enterprises of
Gdansk Commercial Sea Port, Gdenia Commercial Sea Port, and Szczecin-Swinoryscie Port Authority were sold to private shareholders as
new joint stock enterprises by late 1991.220 Second, by October 1996,
the joint stock companies structurally reorganized in accordance with
EU competition laws. 221 Third, beginning in November 1996 to the present, the companies have operated according to national legislation that
includes environmental standards established by the EU.222 Simply by
examining the general phases of the privatization plan for the Polish
shipping industry, the impact of the Cali is obvious. The integration of
the EU laws creates new standards by which Poland, and other Associated EU Members must adjust. 223 Such alterations of EU law can be
seen as both positive and negative. The integration is a positive benefit
because the CEECs are being held to a higher standard of fair competition and environmental responsibility which is new to the region and
beneficial to national consumers. 224 In contrast, if the ECJ frequently
interprets the laws in such an arbitrary and unreliable manner, it becomes very difficult for the CEECs to formulate laws in their transitioning system that model such legal inconsistencies.225 Although the
integration provides benefits of enlightened EU legal transition, integration must occur in moderation due to the direct impact beyond its
226
union members.
III.

DEEPENING LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE

EU

A. European Monetary Union
Competition and environmental laws are not the only issues of legal development exemplifying the EU's enactment of the 1997 Denver
Summit. Although much of academia focuses primarily on the development of EU laws broadening the flexibility of the laws in order to accommodate the diverse Member States' legal cultures, the EU's legal
and economic integration, as expressed by the Denver Summit, expands
beyond general widening of the common market eastward. The EU continues to also deepen the legal integration of its Member States by uni219. LEOPOLD KUZMA, Restructuring and Privatizing Poland's Seaports, in SHIPPING
IN THE BALTIC REGION, 89-96 (1997).

220. Id. at 90.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 91.

223. Id.
224. Roger Mastalir, Regulation of Competition in the "New" Free Markets of Eastern
Europe, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 61, 66 (1993).
225. Id.
226. Id.
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formly pulling the nations ever closer through new economic laws. 227
The most recent and most important example is the EU executing the
ambitious means of economic integration and monetary reform in the
modern age. 228 On January 1, 1999, eleven Member States of the European Union legally merged their currencies, ceding control of their national monetary policy to the European Central Bank. 229 The impact of
the deepening regional integration could hardly be greater, as the EU
leads the world by unifying economic law. 230 The new single currency,
the Euro, legally replaces the qualified EU national currencies throughout the world for business transactions, trading purposes, and currency
231
reserves.
The primary success of the European Monetary Union (EMU) relies, therefore, on the organization of the legal framework. The effects
of the Euro are new and many are still anticipating the full understanding and the practical implication of the legal economic framework. 232 However, the following is a preliminary analysis of the deepening regional legal integration through the EMU to demonstrate the
alternative means by which the EU realizes the 1997 Denver Summit
ideals. First the analysis will explain the basic background of legal reformation for the EMU. Second, the focus will be on the recent integration and the immediate effects. Finally, the analysis examines the immediate ramifications of the deepening legal integration beyond the
EMU region itself.
1.

Development of the European Monetary Union

Similar to the enumeration of the environmental laws, the Maastricht Treaty legislated the details of EU Member States forming the
monetary union by the twenty-first century. 233 In general, the Maastricht Treaty set forth certain economic standards of low inflation and
sound national finances in order to efficiently form a full monetary union with a single regional monetary policy.234

227. Helen Hartnell, Subregional Coalescence in European Regional Integration, 16
WIS. INT'L L.J. 115, 120 (1997).
228. Road to a Single Currency (last modified January 19, 1999) <http:II
www.cliffordchangce.com/library/pubicationsemulegal/section.html>.
229. Id.
230. Jan Meyers & Damien Levie, Legal Framework: The Introduction of the Euro, 4
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 321 (1998).
231. Id. at 328.
232. Id.
233. Rebecca H. Marek, Continuity of TransatlanticCommercial Contracts After the
Introduction of the Euro, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1990 (1998).
234. See EC TREATY, supra note 19, art. 235; Resolution of the European Council 97/C
236/03, 1997 O.J. (L-615).
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a.

Pre-Maastricht Plans

The history of the EMU began long before the Maastricht Treaty
and evolved slowly over several decades. The first plan for the EMU occurred in the 1970 Werner Plan, proposing a single currency by 1980.235
This plan failed because of rapid inflation and turbulent economic conditions caused by the demise of the Bretton Woods system and the international oil crisis. 236 The EC persisted with the monetary plans by
creating the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979.237 After a decade of successfully harmonizing the economic factors of the EC members to a narrowing margin under the EMS, 238 another monetary plan

surfaced. The Delors Report of 1989 proposed concrete stages to use in
239
creating the monetary union.
b.

The Delors Report

The three stages in the Delors Report provided a detailed plan for
the legal and time schedule for the monetary union. The EC eventually
240
codified these plans in the Maastricht Treaty.
Stage one was the preparation for the EMU. This occurred from
January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1993,241 and primarily focused on
eliminating currency controls and dismantling regional restrictions on
capital movements. 242 Pursuant to Council Directive 88/361 of June 24,
1988,243 the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) provided the means of
accomplishing this goal by stabilizing the exchange rate. 244 The EMS

created a system that the Member States' national currency could fluctuate 2.25% higher or lower than the central rate. 245 The objective was

to narrow the exchange rate margins of EU Member States and more
closely harmonize their monetary legal systems. To oversee these ob235. KENNETH DYSON, ELUSIVE UNION: THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY

UNION IN EUROPE 80-81 (1994).
236. Dyson, supranote 235, at 82-83, 89.
237. Marek, supra note 233, at 1990-91.
238. Patricia Pollard, Economic and Business Decision: The Role of the Euro as an International Currency, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 395, 396 (1998) (citing the merging direction of
the economic factors as the snake in a tunnel effect; the economic factors of inflation, deficit, interest rates, and GDP for example fluctuate from high to low in a narrowing effect
as if in a funnel or a squeezing tunnel).
239. Marek, supra note 233, at 1990 (recognizing that Jacques Delors, then President
of the European Commission, wrote the Delors Report).
240. See MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 19, art. 104(c).
241. Meyers & Levie, supra note 230, at 322.
242. Marek, supra note 233, at 1990.
243. Meyers & Levie, supra note 230, at 322.
244. Marek, supra note 233, at 1991.
245. Pollard, supra note 238, at 397-99 (discussing the detailed economic regulations
for each economic factor the EU sought to harmonize as a solid foundation for the EMU
during stage one).
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jectives, the EMS also established the central bank governors, who formulated basic regional economic policy and a common centralized
banking structure.
Stage two enacted the monetary convergence from January 1, 1994,
to December 31, 1997. The second stage required more specific economic integration factors to be met by each prospective EMU State.
Examples of these factors include the interest rate, price and currency
stability, and size of the government deficit. The criteria ensured that
the EMU Member States attained "sustainable financial positions" to
create a solid foundation for stage three of the union. In addition, Article 109(e) of the Maastricht Treaty outlined the European Monetary Institution (EMI) in Frankfurt to replace the central bank governors of
the previous stage. The EMI established the formal mechanism to coordinate the EU monetary policy. The policy includes the ECU, a regional basket of currencies to facilitate the currency merger. The ECU
created a healthy means to stable economies and to unionize the currencies smoothly.
B.

European Monetary Union Integration

Stage three of the Delors Report legally enacted the EMU. On
January 1, 1999, eleven qualified countries irrevocably fixed their currencies to the Euro and volunteered their fiscal policy and national
banks to the European Central Bank via the form of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). This, however, was only one of three important events for stage three integration. Prior to the countries' fixing
their respective currencies to the Euro, on May 3, 1998, the Council of
Ministers formally selected the eligible EMU Member States based on
the national financial status of each. The decision naming the Member
States qualified for the single currency followed a Council vote, based
on European Commission and EMI reports submitted in March 1998,
and an opinion by the European Parliament. The Council decided that
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain fulfilled the necessary economic conditions. Greece clearly did not satisfy the requirements; Sweden failed
to meet the Exchange Rate Mechanism membership and still maintained an independent central bank; and Denmark and the United
246
Kingdom both exercised the "opt-out" clause in the 1999 integration.
Thus, on January 1, 1999, the currencies of the participating first wave
Member States ceased to exist, and monetary history was made. 247 Legally, the Euro replaces all "paperless" money forms of the participating

246. The initial choice of EU members to opt out does not prohibit them from joining
the EMU at a later date. See MAASTRICHT Treaty, supra note 19, arts. 1091(1)-(2), 109j
(4).
247. See generally Road to a Single Currency, supra note 228.
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countries on a 1:1 basis. 248 Finally, the third important date is January
1, 2002, when the Euro banknotes and coins will be tendered. 249 This
day is dubbed the E-day, when the Euro will be the only legal currency
for the EMU.250 By the end of June, 2002, all national currencies will
251
cease to be legal tender.

Timetable: Key Elements of the EMU Integration
March 1998

Commission and EMI produced reports on Member State

compliance with
Maastricht criteria
May 1998

Participating Member States chosen
Announcement of bilateral conversion rates
between participating currencies
Article 1091(4) Regulation adopted

June 1998
Dec.

31,

European Central Bank established
1998

to
January 3, 1999

Conversion Weekend
Re-denomination of domestic government debt of participating Member States
Stock exchanges of participating Member States move to
Euro
ICSDs move to Euro operations

January 1, 1999

Launch of single currency and start of transitional period:
Irrevocable locking of conversion rates
Euro becomes currency of participating Member States
National currency units become denominations of the
Euro
ECU obligations converted into Euro obligations at 1:1
conversion rate
European Central Bank takes over control of monetary
policy for Euro zone
New issues of government debt issued in Euro

248.
249.
250.
251.

See Council Resolution 97/C 236/03-04 and 981133fEC 1999 O.J. (L-615)
Id.
Meyers & Levie, supra note 230, at 327.
Id.
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End of transitional period
Obligations denominated in national currency units redenominated into Euro

January 1, 2002
0, 2002
3June

Euro banknotes and coins introduced
Latest date on which national banknotes and coins cease
to be legal tender

C.

Impact of the EMU on EU Expansion

The European Monetary Union plan is a very ambitious and farreaching legal reform for the EU's economy. 252 Europe has formed the
world's largest trading block with a single currency since the collapse of
the Roman Empire. In terms of sheer size, the EMU encompasses a
population of 290 million people, a population greater than the United
States. 253 In terms of economic performance, the EMU only narrowly
254
trails the first place gross domestic product of the United State.
Based on these statistics and the anticipated impact of the new currency, central banks around the world have already switched large portions of their foreign exchange reserves from the US dollar to the Euro,
completing the biggest financial asset movement in history. 25 5 Furthermore, the introduction of the Euro impacts all aspects of the EMU
Member States international interaction.
An example of this impact may be seen in the European Council's

Regulation

1103/97.256

In preparation for the monetary conversion, the

Regulation established the principle of continuity of contract. Specifically, this principle provides that the change of the European currencies
will not invalidate any contractual obligation. 25 7 It also defines the conversion procedures and rounding valuation rules. Although such regulations have direct force of law only in the EMU, the EU legislated laws
252. Id. at 323.
253. Anthony Browne, Birth of the Euro: Dollar Trembles as a Giant Awakes, THE
OBSERVER, Jan. 3, 1999, at 6.
254. Id.
255. Id (stating that the asset switch from dollar to Euro is estimated to reach $1,000
billion worth of assets).
256. See Council Regulation 1103/97 of June 17, 1997 on Certain Provisions Relating
to the Introduction of the Euro, 1997 O.J. (L162) 1. Additional legislation includes Regulation 1091(4) which states, "the introduction of the euro shall not have the effect of altering any term of a legal instrument or of discharging or excusing performance under
any legal instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate such an
instrument." Resolution of the European Council of July 7, 1997 on the Legal Framework
for the Introduction of the Euro, 1997 O.J. (C 236) 7.
257. See generally Council Regulation 1103/97, supra note 256.
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for the entire union to ensure credibility of the new currency. 258 For
example, Regulation 235, based upon Article 235 of the EC Treaty, applies to the entire EU regardless of the State's participation in stage
three. Another unusual legal feature is that the national currencies involved will not disappear immediately. 25 9 This allows society to progressively adjust to the new legal currency and familiarize itself with
the novel market prices. 260 Accounting, tax, and securities concerns
have been additional areas of law that the EU has drafted new directives to harmonize. 26' Overall, while the legal infrastructure is in position, the long-term ramifications and application of the legal framework
remains to be seen. In the short-term, however, the immediate economic and legal results appear to be positive for the EMU.262
In light of the new predominant currency in the world financial
market, many EU banks, such as ABN AMRO Bank of Netherlands are
merging and acquiring other financial institutions to expand their
service networks across the world. 263 Again, the EU legal integration
affects nations beyond only the eligible EMU Member States, and even
beyond the EU Member States. The Central and East European Countries have been the most directly affected by the deepening EU legal reform. 264 For example ABN AMRO's most recent acquisition was the
Magyar Hitel Bank in Hungary. This merger created the fourth largest
bank in Europe and the eighth largest in the world. 265
In general, Hungary, along with Poland and Slovenia were the first
countries to publicly acknowledge their national enthusiasm for the
Euro after its birth. 266 For these CEECs, the post-Euro benefits include
increased foreign investment and booming economies for emerging and
converging markets. 267 Within only a few weeks of life, the CEECs
quickly realized that the Euro is more than simply a single legal cur-

258. Meyers & Levie, supra note 230, at 328 (describing a detailed analysis of the rule
of Continuity of Contract and its purpose); see also Elke Theil, PoliticalImplications: The
Euro: Should the US Worry?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 447 (1998).
259. Regulation 109 (4), supra note 249, art. 6(1).
260. Meyers & Levie, supra note 230, at 335.
261. See Corn (97) 491, II503/97-EN-3, European Commission Directorate General XV,
(last modified Jan. 3, 1997) <http:/leuropa.eu.intlen/comm/dgl5/ dgl5home.html>.
262. ABN AMBRO Marches Ahead in New Euro-led Financial Environment, THE
KOREAN HERALD, Jan. 14, 1999, Asia Intelligence Wire, available in LEXIS, News library;
David Kern, International Outlook, NAT'L WESTMINSTER BANK ECON. & FIN. OUTLOOK,
January 1999, at 2.
263. See ABN, supra note 262.
264. Alan Beattie, CalmerMarkets Ponder Real's Future, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at
31.
265. See ABN, supra note 262.
266. Budapest Tastes Sweet Success: Emerging Market Focus, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan.
12, 1999, at 42.
267. Hungary Attracts Foreign Interests, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999, at 21; Budapest,
supranote 266, at 42.
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rency for eligible EMU States. Many CEECs have pegged their currencies to the Euro directly, due to the increase in international financial
activity. 268 In summary, the Euro presents an alternative way of
269
thinking about regional economic legal integration.
As several CEECs strive to join the EU, the EU has required its
eastern neighbors to harmonize their legal system and legislation to be
compatible with the EU. Countries such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia and Estonia 270 are now actively reforming laws such
as banking structure and monetary laws. 271 Additionally, the CEECs
are required to reach specific standards of economic performance as
preconditions to their entry into the EU.272 The economic factors that
have proven to be the most troubling for the CEEC include low inflation
rates and higher gross domestic products. Nonetheless, Associated EU
Members continuously strive to mirror even the deepening integration
of the EMU legal system and move ever closer to full EU member273
ship.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The European Union poignantly demonstrates the reality of several
successful and persistent steps towards the 1997 Denver Summit of
Eight's objective to promote global integration. Just as the leaders of
the Twenty-Third Annual Summit discussed, the European Union continues to enact the necessary steps, both domestically and internationally "to shape the forces of integration to ensure prosperity and peace
for our citizens and the entire world as we approach the twenty-first
century." 274 The European Union has taken bold steps to both broaden
and deepen its legal system to accomplish the ideal international integration. Competition and environmental laws reflect the EU's willingness to expand the application of its laws in order to more flexibly and
realistically accommodate the diverse sovereign Member States. The
268. Pollard, supra note 238, at 449.
269. Hartnell, supra note 227, at 120.
270. Agenda 2000 identified these five CEECs as the first tier of potential EU members. The EU selected these countries because of their relatively strong market economies and rapid legal transformation. The EU also identified a second and third tiers that
include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Georgia, Dazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (containing Serbia and Montenegro).
271. Hartnell, supra note 227, at 126-27.
272. See Jones, supra note 207, at 45.
273. See The EU Budget: Just Small Change?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 1999, at 21;
see also Unfinished Business: Poland Preparesfor Europe, THE ECONOMIST, January 19,
1999, at 37.
274. Final Communiqu6, supra note 1, at Introduction.
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European Monetary Union exemplifies important steps for the EU to
integrate its economy more extensively in order to strengthen the prosperity of the Member States. However, both the broadening and deepening legal integration create implications expanding well beyond the
EU itself. The case study of the EU legal modifications offers an opportunity to thoroughly understand and appreciate the dynamic importance of EU law in the world. The dual style EU integration demonstrates the logical evolution of law as the EU strives to effectuate the
ideals of global harmony as presented in the 1997 Denver Summit of
Eight.

BOOK NOTE

STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING, Kluwer
Law International, Boston, MA (Esin Oruici, Elspeth Attwooll, & Sean
Coyle, eds., 1996). ISBN 90-411-0906-4; 360pp.
Employing both academic and personal points of view, the authors
in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING examine how national legal institutions are born out of the need to embrace multiculturalism and reconcile seemingly disparate legal traditions. For the societies profiled - from more mainstream actors on the world stage like
Turkey and Australia, to the more obscure such as Malta and Slovenia
- the pluralism reflected in the end result accommodates diversity by
incorporating many legal traditions into a singular, national system.
In some cases, the authors explore provinces with a distinct, nationalistic character existing in tension with the larger, inclusive state.
For example, in his chapter on the Canadian province of Qu6bec, H.
Patrick Glenn explains that this strain in national relations is, in fact,
personified by provincial resistance to formalizing national legal institutions. Thus, over the centuries, Qu6bec forged a unique jurisprudential disposition, a "bi-systematic" combination of civil code (originally
French) and common law (originally English). Likewise, Alejandro Saiz
Arnaix and Joxerramon Bengoetxea Caballero illuminate a complex
system of customary practices, which have emerged in response to the
Spanish civil code and balance-of-power principles ("competances"), in
their discussion of the Basque Country (Spain). In that case, the dichotomy exists between Spanish Constitutional public law and private,
foral law. Like Qu6bec, the existence of this public-private split in
Basque law has direct links to a strongly democratic and nationalistic
tradition.
The book also covers issues relating to free trade zones, where cultures mix within the context of an institutionalized economic framework of independent states. This is especially relevant in the current
political scene, considering the global trend toward individual, autonomous nation-states, while creating a web of interconnectedness through
trade relations. Noreen Burrows' chapter on the "mega mix" of the
European Community provides a case-in-point: The EC Member States
share in an autonomous, international order, created by legal precedents set by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This has forced a debate on the supremacy of legal authority within the Community as to
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which rules govern relations among Member States, i.e., Community
law or laws of the individual Member States. Recently, the Court has
offered kinder, gentler guidelines, which blur the concept of hierarchy
in favor of the "mutual duty of sincere cooperation." Increasingly, the
ECJ has suggested that this duty is "particularly owed by the Community authorities to the judicial authorities of the Member States." However, there are regulations which bind the Member States by virtue of
the fact that they are part of the Community; these cannot be voted
down by the Members' national legislatures. By accepting the yoke of
regulation in areas such as agriculture, the Member States relinquish
"total... legislative and executive sovereignty" to the Community.
Furthermore, the book examines countries currently experiencing
redefinition in their legal cultures - states trying to maintain order in
the face of monumental upheaval while concurrently replacing those
old, established legal institutions with new ones. In this vein, David
Carey Miller describes South African public legal institutions as historically steeped in a rich mix of Roman-Dutch and English traditions:
Twentieth century developments concerning racial oppression - institutionalized in private law as "apartheid" - most concern South Africa's
recent emergence as a multicultural, democratic nation. This revolution has compelled South Africans to break down the very foundations
innate to their conceptions of their country. Similarly, according to Yury
A. Tikhomirov and Albert S. Piglokin, the Russian Federation is redefining its oppressive institutions, which the totalitarian regime formerly
used to subjugate the citizenry. Now those same administrative powers
and regulatory instruments have been transfigured for use in "the establishment of the political and economic freedom of the individual."
Additionally, the new legal system embraces both democratic and federalist ideals; breaking down the old legal construction of the Russian
state in favor of a whole new basis for nationhood.
Finally, the editors include a discussion of countries that are still in
the adolescence of their independence. At age fifty-one, Israel is still in
the process of fine-tuning and institutionalizing its legal system, borrowing from American and British jurisprudence, as well as from religious law. Stephen Goldstein clarifies this mixing in that the different
legal traditions do not blend into one law. Rather, pieces of the influential legal traditions affect various "compartmentalized" portions of the
law. For example, Israel has adopted a more common law, American
approach toward public law; with a codified, European stance toward
private law; and a religious basis for family law.
Although written in 1996, STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND
provides the reader with relevant, timely material on this important and continually developing topic. I highly recommend this book
for any serious student of multiculturalism, as it provides an excellent
comparative perspective on coping with diversity in the legal system.
MIXING

Naomi B. Starosta
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